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
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
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SIR HENRY LAWRENCE

INNES



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


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THE INDIAN EMPIRE

Prepared for Sir William Wilson Hunter's
IMPERIAL GAZETTEER OF INDIA



REFERENCES

Railways opened
do not opened
Ports
The numbers denote the height above sea level in feet.
This Map is intended only to exhibit the principal places, cities, rivers &c. in India.



John Lawrence

Portrait photograph made in Locke in 1877.

(Rulers of India — Vol. 28)

NOT TO BE ISSUED

SIR HENRY LAWRENCE

THE PACIFICATOR

BY

LIEUT.-GENERAL J. J. MCLEOD INNES

R.E., V.C.

WITH PORTRAIT

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

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Oxford

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PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

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NOTE

The orthography of proper names follows the system adopted by the Indian Government for the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*. That system, while adhering to the popular spelling of very well-known places, such as Punjab, Poona, Deccan, &c., employs in all other cases the vowels with the following uniform sounds:—

a, as in woman : *ā*, as in father : *ī*, as in kin : *î*, as in intrigue :
e, as in cold : u, as in bull : *û*, as in rule.

INTRODUCTION

ENGLAND was convulsed under the shock of the outbreak of the Bengal Mutiny. Reinforcements were being prepared with intense energy. Sir Colin Campbell had been sent out to India to take the military command; Lord Canning was at the helm in Calcutta, but the situation was so critical that the post might become vacant at any moment; and the succession to it, under such a contingency, must be settled at once. The man best fitted to deal with the crisis, and available on the spot, had to be selected. It was under these circumstances that the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company resolved, on July 22, 1857, that 'Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence, K.C.B., be appointed provisionally to succeed to the office of Governor-General of India on the death, resignation, or coming away of Viscount Canning, pending the arrival of a successor from England.'

This did not necessarily involve the selection of Sir Henry for the permanent post of Governor-General.

But his nomination for the provisional appointment, and its approval by Lord Palmerston's Ministry, indicate the value of his previous services in India, and his fitness for the supreme charge at a grave crisis in its history.

It need hardly be stated that the occasion never arose for any provisional successor to Lord Canning, and that Sir Henry Lawrence had already fallen in the Mutiny before his provisional appointment was made.

His most eminent services were the control of the Sikh Government during Lord Hardinge's rule of India; his part in the pacification and administration of the Punjab after its annexation; his subsequent management of the Rájputána States during a period of controversy and irritation; and his final but short-lived career in Oudh, with his wise and vigorous measures for preparing Lucknow for defence, as a probable centre of war during the ensuing struggle.

But, valuable as had been his administrative work, perhaps more important at that particular epoch was his position as a leader of a school of Indian administrators. This school, which gave special consideration to the feelings, traditions and modes of thought of the native community, demanded a fair recognition of the claims of native States, and urged the need for wise and generous treatment of the natural leaders of the people and the influential classes, fallen into an unsatisfactory state after ages

of war and turmoil. They also advocated the policy of continuing in a large measure the independence, under British protection, of native States and Dynasties, and of educating their rulers for their position and guiding them in the discharge of their high functions.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

THE father of Henry Montgomery Lawrence was Colonel Alexander Lawrence, of the British army, a veteran of Seringapatam, who had passed through a career of hard service, wounds, and privations; a typical son of Derry, strong, brave, resolute, peculiarly simple-minded and conscientious—characteristics of which he left the inheritance to his large family of sons and daughters. Six of the sons grew up to manhood, of whom Henry was the third. Three others, George, who was older, and John (the future Lord Lawrence) and Richard, who were younger, were all much associated with Henry during his career in India.

Henry was born in Ceylon on June 28, 1806, and, after the usual education at local schools, obtained an Addiscombe cadetship, and there won his commission in the Bengal Artillery, which he joined at its headquarters, Damdam, near Calcutta, in February, 1823.

During the next year a war broke out with Purma, and he served throughout its full course, including

the capture of Arakan; but eventually the virulent and continued fever of the country led to his being ordered on sick leave to England. After a prolonged interval, with his health fairly restored, he returned to India accompanied by his brother John, now starting on his career in the Civil Service. Henry was duly re-posted to military duty, serving first with a Field Battery and then with the Horse Artillery; and after three years was selected, in February, 1833, for employment in the Revenue Survey.

Five years of service in this department attracted attention to his energy and capacity; and, the troubles with Afghánistán then breaking out, he was appointed to political duty on the Punjab frontier, as assistant at Firozpur to Sir George Clerk.

Here, in January, 1839, began his acquaintance with the Sikhs, which continued for three years, during which it increased in intimacy and thoroughness, especially while serving, in 1842, with their contingents at Pesháwar and in Afghánistán, in the force which, under Sir George Pollock, retrieved the Kábul disasters of the earlier part of that year.

After the close of that war he was promoted to the post of Resident at the Court of Nepál; but at the end of 1845 he was summoned back to the scene of his previous labours, the Punjab; now, however, not as Assistant, but as Agent to the Governor-General; for the Sikhs had invaded British territory, and Major Broadfoot, whom Lawrence was to succeed, had been killed in the battle of Firozsháh. On

the termination of the war Lawrence was appointed Agent for the Punjab; but towards the end of 1846 a fresh treaty enlarged his powers of control over the Council of Regency and invested him with the practical rule of the Province. Before December 1847, however, when all was working well, his health again broke down, and he had to leave for England.

In a few months a rising, nominally against the Sikh Durbar, but really against the English control over it, broke out at Múltán, and gradually spread through the Sikh community; the siege of Múltán growing into the Punjab Campaign, or Second Sikh War, which ended with the crushing defeat of the Sikhs at Gujrát and the annexation of the Province by Lord Dalhousie.

Sir Henry Lawrence, though his health was still far from restored, had hastened out to India, and was present at the siege at Múltán and at some of the later engagements in the war; and, though averse to the annexation, had accepted the post of the head of the Council or Board which governed the Province after it was annexed in April, 1849. His special part in the work of the Administration lay in the political and military departments and the pacification and conciliation of the people.

Here he remained till the end of 1852, by which time the Province was thoroughly settled, contented, and prosperous; when Lord Dalhousie, having decided that the time had now come to place the Province under the sway of a single responsible head,

who must be a trained civil administrator, dissolved the Board, appointed John Lawrence, Sir Henry's brother, to the rule of the Province, and transferred Sir Henry himself to the Agency of Rájputána, a Province of native states, under native rulers, in which there was much discontent prevalent, and at least one burning question was causing anxiety. Sir Henry held this post for rather more than four years, during which Rájputána was restored to its normal state of good-will and tranquillity; after which, in the beginning of 1857, when overt signs of the Mutiny began to appear, he was appointed to the charge of the Province of Oudh, which was already seething with irritation and open sedition. Here too, as in the Punjab and Rájputána, he immediately quieted the Province, restored law and order, and gained the confidence of the people. And, further, he made military preparations forthwith for the war which he saw to be impending, effectively fortified the Lucknow Residency, and was unfortunately struck down in the first days of the siege that ensued.

It was during the last eleven years of his career, from 1846, when he ruled the Punjab through the Council of Regency, till his death in the Lucknow Residency in 1857, that Lawrence's position and services were of the eminence and weight that made their mark on the rule and fate of India.

But he had, from the very first, made exceptionally good use of his varied experiences, military, civil,

and political ; had watched closely and intensely the working of the several branches of the administration with which he had come in contact ; had eagerly studied the ways, and feelings, and modes of thought of the native community of all classes ; and thus had in his later years acquired, as was universally recognized, a perfectly unique influence over the people and an exceptional insight into the defects and requirements of the Administration.

His experiences in the Burmese war, and with the Kábul disasters during the subsequent campaign, as well as in the battles on the Sutlej, had impressed him gravely with the shortcomings in the military system and arrangements then in force, and the chronic dangers resulting from them.

His six years of service in the Revenue Survey, with the close contact into which his methods of work brought him with all classes of the people—chiefs, gentry, and peasantry, official and non-official, the corrupt and the simple-minded—opened his eyes to the benefits that would ensue from a change in the system and tone of civil administration—from the high and dry school, from the oppression of middlemen and of legal formalities, to one of direct contact with the people—which he introduced into the Punjab, and carried out with the strong support and valuable help of his brother John.

It was in those days also that he formed his views of the natural and real relations between the upper and lower classes, and of what was due both by

policy and by justice to the former, wanting though they had no doubt become generally in the exercise of the corresponding duties and functions. Acquiescing also in the policy of most of the older school of Indian statesmen—and markedly of Sir John Malcolm—he was an advocate for the retention, on an extensive scale and whenever just and feasible, of the rule of native states by their hereditary native rulers. His first political employment on the Punjab frontier, when he became the disciple of Sir George Clerk, not only strengthened his views on this point, but led to his prominent position in the school of foreign politics which desired the retention of independent buffer states on the North-Western frontier.

SIR HENRY LAWRENCE

CHAPTER I

THE BURMA WAR AND EARLY EXPERIENCES

As stated in the Biographical Sketch, Henry Lawrence arrived in India as a subaltern of the Bengal Artillery in February, 1823. During his first year spent at the headquarters of his regiment his leisure time was mostly passed in study, in reading historical and military works, and in playing chess. In March of the following year Lord Amherst declared war with Burma; and in that war, especially in its early stages, he learnt lessons and gained experience which, with his thoughtful and practical bent of mind, proved invaluable in the most critical parts of his subsequent career.

A subaltern of only a year's standing, he was placed, on May 24, 1824, in command of a battery of six guns in Calcutta, with orders to prepare to move to Chittagong, where General Morrison's division of the army, under Sir Archibald Campbell, was to be formed. On May 31, he writes:—

‘We were ordered to march into Fort William the next morning to embark in pilot schooners. At nine o’clock that night the order was countermanded, but we were desired to hold ourselves in readiness to march at a moment’s warning. At past nine on the night of the 4th June the order arrived to hold ourselves in readiness to march next morning at three o’clock, which we according did—arrived in the Fort about six, reported the detachment to the Town Major, and he told me that we were to embark at 4.30 p.m.’

But the chain of the task of embarkation was one of many links. All day long he was running about for orders, for bullocks, and for the men’s pay, and could get only two guns on board that night. Next day he got two more of the guns on to his own ship, and the remaining two on to another; but not the tunbrils and ammunition: these the commanders of the vessels would not allow to be brought on board at all. So in fact Lawrence had to rush back to Calcutta, and to worry the high naval and military authorities before he could get all embarked, and to succeed in a contest for the absolute necessities of the Service against the desire of the naval officers to sail light. But Lawrence’s case was not singular; under the Military Board System, the same mismanagement pervaded the arrangements for the whole of the operations; so that eventually, as he writes:—

‘We were six months preparing to move a force of 10,000 men, most of our cattle having been procured from the banks of the Narbudá in Central India, at least 1,000 miles from Chittagong.’

This was his first insight into the practical absence of any organization in the Government departments for the mobilization and movement of troops; a flagrant and glaring evil, which gave the key to his early attempts to attract attention to the subject and to the dangers involved.

Almost simultaneous with this experience was the fact of the misconduct of three Sepoy regiments at Barrackpur, who being under orders for this campaign demurred to the sea trip as being prejudicial to their caste. One of the regiments, the 47th, more mutinous than the others, was paraded and confronted with British troops and artillery. They refused to obey the order to lay down their arms, and were fired into and broke and fled. This provided food for reflection to a thoughtful mind like that of Lawrence.

Of actual fighting and ordinary military operations and difficulties he soon obtained valuable experience. The principal combat was in the capture of Arakan, on April 1, 1825, to effect which six hills in succession had to be taken, in which operations heavy loss was entailed. Of this Lawrence wrote:—

‘The hill . . . was very strong indeed, both by nature and art. It was so steep that it was with great difficulty I could reach the top; so what must it have been for our poor fellows who had a heavy direct and flanking fire to withstand, as well as the difficulty of the ascent? . . . I heard that on the 29th a Sepoy was the first man up the hill, and that just as he gained the top he was seen to roll all the way down.’

He felt and wrote much more; and gave many traits of the gallantry and high spirit of the Sepoys, chiefly Madras men, on that occasion.

Previous to the capture of Arakan, Lawrence had experienced all the difficulties of a march along the sea-coast, with no roads, and countless ravines to be crossed, bordered by jungles which afforded cover for attacks and surprises; and, in approaching Arakan in concentration for the assault, a sharp conflict had occurred in storming the Mahattie stockade, in which Lawrence and his guns had played a prominent part.

No serious operations occurred after this. The Burmese were thoroughly defeated; but peace was not ratified by treaty till the February of 1826. Meanwhile fever, amounting to pestilence, had attacked the British force; and Lawrence, who had been appointed Adjutant of the Artillery Division, and afterwards its Ordnance officer, was seized with the malady. Its severity was so great and its nature so virulent that he was subject to its effects and its recurrence throughout his whole life. A short trip to sea and to Calcutta was found ineffectual to stop it, and he was consequently ordered on long sick-leave by way of China to England.

With this ended his service in Burma and his direct connexion with that country. But the subaltern had sufficiently studied its military circumstances to lead to his addressing suggestions to Government some ten years afterwards, when there appeared to be a prospect of a fresh war with Burma.

The object of the leave which he was about to take being the recovery of his shattered health, he proceeded homeward by a prolonged sea voyage in a sailing vessel, which in those days was recognized as the most effective step to that end. Sailing from Calcutta on August 2, 1826, and going by the Straits and China route, he reached England and rejoined his family in the following May.

Of his life during this furlough, little need be said beyond what has been already mentioned in the Biographical Sketch. But as he felt himself regaining strength his restored energy soon overcame all thought of real rest ; his time was well occupied in travelling, walking tours, studying, drawing, and in pursuit of practical knowledge ; and he also seized the opportunity of employment in the Irish Ordnance Survey, in which the experience gained proved of the highest importance to him in his subsequent work in the Revenue Survey of India.

By this stay in England his health was greatly, but not fully restored. In fact, the germs of the Arakan fever had been so thoroughly implanted in his constitution that he never threw them off, and they affected his strength and his staying powers permanently.

But by the end of the summer of 1829 it was time for him to return to duty ; and he accordingly sailed a second time for India on September 2, accompanied by a sister and his brother John, who had passed through Haileybury, and was now starting

on his great career in the Civil Service of India. They reached Calcutta in February, 1830, and there the brothers parted; John remaining to study and pass in the languages, and Henry going up country to Karnál to join the battery to which he had been posted. His elder brother, George, was there with his regiment, and the two of course lived together. Karnál was in the neighbourhood of Delhi, to which John was posted in a few months, on passing his Calcutta examination. Thus, for about a couple of years, the three brothers were within hail of each other.

For three years Henry's time was spent in studying and qualifying for professional and official advancement. In the one direction he practised hard in the riding school, and qualified for the Horse Artillery; in the other, he studied the prescribed oriental languages strenuously, and passing the tests, bore against his name the magic letters P.C. (Passed College). In consequence of the former qualification, he was transferred to the Horse Artillery in September, 1831, and owing to the latter he was first made Interpreter and Quartermaster to the Artillery, and then, in 1833, was placed on Staff employment and appointed to the Revenue Survey. He had, for a while, during this course of study, spent some time on the canals in the North-West with his brother officer, Colonel Cautley, and had there learnt from him the essentials of the duties and difficulties of canal engineering and irrigation operations.

CHAPTER II

THE REVENUE SURVEY AND POLITICAL TRAINING

Revenue Survey.

IN entering the Revenue Survey department, Henry Lawrence began a career which was almost entirely spent in direct touch with the natives of India, either the civil or the military community ; losing meanwhile that intimate contact with British troops and their families in which he had been placed during the first ten years of his service. What use he had made of that experience will presently be seen, from the advantage and benefit to which he turned it in founding the Lawrence Asylum twelve years afterwards.

This Revenue Survey, in which he worked for five years, was comparatively in its infancy. It had been devised by one of the ablest of the Civil administrators of those days, with the object of obtaining sound data for the assessment of the land revenue ; the groundwork of which had hitherto been in so chaotic a state as to give great scope for fraud and trickery, and also to inflict dire injustice and hardship on some large bodies of the people, while at the same time it let

others off cheaply, and thus acted with a result prejudicial to the public purse. The Survey was not practically effecting its object when Henry Lawrence joined it; its progress being very slow, and its cost tending to be prohibitory. The dilemma was serious; but his experience in the Irish Ordnance Survey and his energy and judgment came to the rescue. His suggestions, reducing and modifying the details of the work and largely curtailing the supervising staff, were tried and proved successful. With this, his character and reputation were established, and recognized in important quarters; but the real benefit to him lay in the sound and intimate insight it gave him into native life and character. As described by Sir Herbert Edwardes—

‘ Here he first really learnt to know the natives of India, and the best class of natives, the agricultural population. It was *their* villages, *their* fields, *their* crops, *their* interests of every kind with which his eyes, hands, thoughts, and heart were now occupied for five years. Instead of living in a European station, he pitched his tents among the people, under their trees and by their streams, for eight months out of twelve. He saw them as military men seldom can see them, as all civilians ought to see them, and as the best *do* see them—in their homes and daily life—and thus learnt to sympathize with them as a race, and to understand their wants. In many respects, indeed, the Revenue Surveyor gets more at the heart of the people than the Civil officers of the district; for while the Collector or Deputy Commissioner is the chief actor on the stage of government, the Surveyor is not only among the audience in the pit, but passes behind

the scenes and sees the working of the machinery. To him, if he has got any heart at all, come the grey-beards of the village next to his camp, to tell their parish griefs, nine-tenths of which come under one head—the corruption of their own countrymen in office—and the other tenth the blindness of the white Sâhib-Zillâh (district officer). And no feature in his latter days was then more marked than the fierce war he waged against all “Jacks-in-office,” whether black or white.

‘Another experience which he laid to heart when a surveyor, and gave vigorous effect to as a governor, was the duty and policy of light assessments, the cruelty and desolation of heavy ones.

‘Another was the superiority of work done out of doors, surrounded by the people, to work done in court, surrounded by untrustworthy officials.

‘And another, which became a cardinal maxim in his mind, was this, that roads were the first want of any country and any government.

“Push on your roads,” he used to say; “open out your district. The farmer, the soldier, the policeman, the traveller, the merchant—all want roads. Cut roads in every direction.”

‘Roads and canals are not much thought of except as the first conduce occasionally to our personal comfort. The great points, the traffic of the country, the inter-communication of districts, the facilities of markets, and such matters, are generally less considered than the chance of the great man once a year going to shikâr. Who that has travelled much about the country, and witnessed the poor man digging his hackery out of the ruts on the public highway, while shortly after he finds miles of almost unfrequented road in good order, will think this picture exaggerated?

‘Every district should have not only its military road—its *Via Appia*—of the most durable material, connected in all

parts by bridges (and not, as is now too often seen, left impassable for two or three months in the year, for want of bridges), but should also have fair district and market roads leading to gháts and marts, subject to periodical repairs, and raised above the level of the country, not made in the beds of streams.

'In short, by intersecting the country with canals, roads, and railroads, we would get to ourselves an imperishable name, strengthen our own hands, enrich the country, and pay ourselves almost immediately. No more then would famine be raging in one part of the empire while grain was a drug in another. Nor would the detachments be cut up while their supports were coming on at the lazy rate of twenty or thirty miles a day¹.'

In fact, during this period he learnt to know the natives thoroughly, their modes of thought and springs of action, their idiosyncrasies and their prejudices. Sympathizing with them to an exceptional degree, he stored up a knowledge of their wants and needs, their feelings towards their rulers and other sections and classes of the community, their griefs and sufferings from the oppressions of usurers and of the official underlings, and the various drawbacks to their happiness and contentment.

More than all, he became permanently impressed with the keenness of their traditional feelings, and with the conviction that to govern India well and successfully it was essential to secure the confidence of the people and keep in touch with their modes of thought and feeling. He was keenly alive to the

¹ *Biography of Henry Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 121.

folly of despising or ignoring their mental powers, and their insight into the causes, bearings, and results of the actions and measures of the State; and of assuming that their views in these matters were to be disregarded. His tolerant mind condemned the prejudice which the arrogant Englishman was apt to form against the native, and the tendency to assume that English standards of conduct and of policy should alone be used to judge native action and attitude towards British rule.

During the five years of his employment in the Revenue Survey his mental activity was at its height, and, whilst genuinely modest, he was as plain, simple and straightforward in submitting to the authorities his views and suggestions on topics of public importance as he was himself always open and accessible to receiving them from others. Thus, on rumours of renewed hostilities with Burma, he sent up, as before mentioned, a memorandum of suggestions resulting from his experiences of the former war. He wrote, proposing the organization of irregular corps, of which the famous 'Guides' afterwards formed the prototype. He made notes on the Quartermaster-General's Department, on engineers, canals, roads, surveys, statistics, the formation of a Staff Corps, and the like; and such was the tone, good sense and pertinence of his suggestions that generally they were received with favour; except perhaps when, in his anxiety to explain and exemplify his views, he ventured on names and personal recommendations. At the same

time, such disquisitions necessarily involved exposure of assumed defects or shortcomings, and laid him open to the charge of being inclined to controversial and contentious writing. But his truthfulness and generous character, as well as his powerful and painstaking thought, gave them real and practical value, and tended effectually to nullify anything that might have otherwise been offensive in their argumentative aspect.

Political Training on the Punjab Frontier.

In August, 1838, Lawrence's career took an entirely new direction. Military operations in Afghánistán were imminent, and, the troop of Horse Artillery, on whose strength he was borne, being named for active service, he was relieved from his Survey duties and accompanied it to the Punjab frontier, the Sutlej, reaching Firozpur in November. But news of the cessation of the siege of Herát led to the strength of the expeditionary force being reduced, so as not to include Lawrence's troop. On the other hand, the political staff on that frontier, under Mr. George Clerk, required to be strengthened; and Lawrence was appointed to it, as assistant at Firozpur, Mr. Clerk himself being at Ludhiána. This occurred in January, 1839, and was the turning-point of Lawrence's career; thus starting his connexion with the Sikhs and the Punjab, and bringing him into close relations with Mr. Clerk, who was already at that time a statesman of the highest mark.

The Firozpur State lies on the south bank of the Sutlej, and, along with the other Cis-Sutlej States, had been taken under British protection, in accordance with the agreement with Ranjít Singh. On the death of its hereditary chief, in 1835, it had lapsed by feudal custom to the English, by whom its administration had then to be taken in hand.

This was no easy task, surrounded as the State was, on nearly all sides, either by the marauding Bikanír and other tribes or by the feudatories of Lahore, whose raids, and the rapine and violence that accompanied them, were costing hundreds of lives annually. By the end of 1838 matters had somewhat improved; but Henry Lawrence, on arriving, threw his whole energy into the work, and made such progress with the town and its fort and defences, and so punished and curbed the turbulent and settled the district, that at the end of twelve months Mr. Metcalfe, the Governor-General's agent, commented warmly on the flourishing state of affairs, and the great improvements that had been made. Lawrence had also begun to enter into kindly relations with the surrounding independent chiefs, and to adjudicate by their own request in their disputes and boundary questions. His success was such—notably in the case of the Farídkot State—that applications for his employment on these matters became more and more numerous, and the repute and influence that resulted from it were of great value. Such was his first essay at government; and, dealing as he was

with a new and turbulent race, his success augured well for the future.

Six months after Henry Lawrence entered on his duties at Ferozpur, Ranjít Singh, the founder of the Sikh kingdom, died, and the whole State became agitated with intrigue. This altered and weakened the state of the relations between the Sikhs and the English, and, combined with the war now going on in Afghánistán, enhanced to the utmost the demands on Lawrence's vigilance and energy, as well as tact, in his advanced position on the frontier.

A full account of the origin and past history of the Sikhs will be found in Sir Lepel Griffin's *Ranjít Singh* in this series, and a brief one at p. 45 of this volume. Here it may suffice to say that the Punjab is peopled not only, or even mainly, by the Sikhs, but by many races; Muhammadans and Hindus, as well as Sikhs; that the Sikhs are a military brotherhood, and as such are one in caste; and that those of the Punjab proper, or Trans-Sutlej, had been organized by Ranjít Singh into a compact, powerful, and well-disciplined army. Their bravery and fighting efficiency were well known, but with Ranjít Singh they had been kept well in hand and under the sternest discipline. He had recognized the assured fact of the power and supremacy of the British, and had ever been loyal to his alliance with them, if only as a matter of sound policy. But now that he was dead there was no one ready and fitted to take his place, and the situation resolved itself into, on the

one hand a brave and effective army, composed of a soldiery with complete confidence in themselves, inclined for war, and turbulent, especially now when freed from the powerful hand that had restrained them; and on the other hand, a band of rival chiefs and men of influence aspiring to the leadership, and ready to bid unscrupulously for the support of that army.

This situation was most serious, and Lawrence's part, under George Clerk's guidance, was to watch them all with the utmost vigilance, to guard against the action of the crafty and ambitious, and to guide and support the well-disposed. Sher Singh, a reputed son of Ránjít Singh, became the Mahárájá, after the death of another almost imbecile son, Kharak Singh; and it was during his rule, and with his Darbár, that Lawrence while at Firozpur was chiefly connected in other than local matters.

Troubles in Afghánistán.

A special subject of anxiety was the maintenance of the alliance against Afghánistán which the British had made with Ránjít Singh, which he had not really liked, and which had not been popular with the Sikhs, however much they hated the Afgháns.

It had been entered into in connexion with the expedition of 1839, consequent on the anxiety which the British had begun to feel at the advance of Russia, and the significant complications respecting Herát

the bank of the Sutlej in ten days, and crossing it on December 16 reached Pesháwar on the 28th.

Meanwhile Sir George took another step of special importance to Lawrence, and transferred him to Pesháwar; which, lying on the Sikh frontier of Afghánistán, was now certain to be the advanced base of operations. In writing to him Sir George said:—

‘It is because I feel much confidence in your knowledge of the Sikh authorities, in their reliance on your fair dealing, in your experience as a district officer and a people’s protector, and in your activity and decision to meet emergencies of every shape, that I have selected you for the present to proceed to Pesháwar.’

This was a marked testimony to the sound knowledge of the Sikh character, and the powerful influence with the leaders and the people, that Lawrence had by this time acquired.

He was now to enter on his experience of the Sikh soldiery, and to be intimately associated with them all through 1842.

CHAPTER III

WITH THE SIKHS IN THE AFGHÁN WAR

LAWRENCE accompanied Wild's brigade of four Sepoy regiments to Pesháwar; and there his actual duty lay in direct connexion with the Sikhs, and in giving general aid and support to Major Mackeson, the Political Agent for the Afghán frontier. During the march through the Punjab he was in communication with the Sikh authorities, and was struck with the desolation of the country and the paucity of the inhabitants along the route traversed. He reached Pesháwar on December 28, 1841, but it was not until somewhat later that he heard of Macnaghten's murder and Elphinstone's retreat, which had followed on the supineness, and worse than inaction, which had taken place after the murder of Burnes.

The support of the Sikhs was now of the utmost importance; but, as Lawrence had feared, the events in Afghánistán were telling prejudicially on them. It could hardly be otherwise: they could not fail to see that the British army had been worsted and humiliated by those Afgháns whom they themselves had defeated and expelled from the Punjab. The loan of some guns which was requested by Wild was

declined by the Sikh officials at Pesháwar; and it needed Clerk's influence at Lahore and the Mahárájá Sher Singh's own orders to obtain these, as also the support of a column of 5,000 men under Ghuláb Singh of Jammu from Huzára. The Sikh gunners were almost mutinous, mainly from the belief that the guns would not be safe in English keeping; and the Sikh garrison were in an unsafe mood, derisively asking the British officers and Sepoys (there were no English troops present) whether they ever expected to penetrate and return from the passes? At the beginning of January no entry into the Kháibar pass was yet practicable. Alí Masjid, a fort about twelve miles above its mouth, was held only by some Afgháns and Punjabís of doubtful fidelity; and Wild's camp still remained near Jamrúd at the mouth itself. On January 12 the 64th N.I. was troublesome about its pay; but it did not absolutely mutiny, and the matter was tided over. It was significant however of the temper of our own Sepoys there.

Still, on the 15th, that regiment with another, the 53rd N.I., advanced into the pass, drove off the enemy that held it, and entered Alí Masjid under Major Mackeson's guidance. On the other hand, only a small portion of the supplies that were to have accompanied the party arrived with it, the rest having been left behind at Pesháwar. Four days later, a brigade of two more Sepoy regiments and some of the Sikh contingent troops having moved forward with guns to the support of Alí Masjid, the

Sikhs of the party mutinied, and, driving off their own officers, returned to Pesháwar, while the Sepoy regiments were checked, repulsed, and driven back to their camp. Ali Masjid, being without supplies, was then evacuated.

These particulars show the peculiar experience that Lawrence had, from his political position, of the evils of a badly organized and mismanaged force; of disaffected native regiments and disheartened officers; of the captious spirit of the Sikhs towards us under such circumstances; and of the effects of such intelligence as was now being received of the disastrous retreat from Kábul.

But on the other hand was seen the contrasting counter-experience of the bold attitude and vigorous action of the Jalálábád garrison, with such men as Sale, who was in command; Dennis, Monteath, and Mayne with the English and native troops; Abbott, Backhouse, and Dawes with the artillery; Broadfoot as the engineer; McGregor the political, and Henry Havelock the staff officer; each bearing a name well-known for conduct and efficiency. There, in the midst of disaster, they were repelling and countering every attack, fighting and working vigorously, and keeping in good heart and spirits. This defence bore invaluable fruit, not merely from its own successful issue, but from the colour it gave to the situation and its effect on the native mind, especially at Pesháwar, when all else was in the depth of gloom—an uncontrovertible testimony to the paramount and inestimable effect of

vigour and boldness, however hopeless the outlook. It was only by this stand at Jalálábád that Sir George Clerk and his assistants were enabled to cope with the situation at Pesháwar and in the Punjab, and to prevent matters growing from bad to worse during February, while only one Brigade—Wild's—was there.

But at this juncture General Pollock arrived at Pesháwar to assume the command. Ghuláb Singh also, with 10,000 Punjabí troops, reached Attock on February 1, and on the arrival of McCaskill's (the Second) Brigade of British troops, was enabled to send back out of the way the old Najíb contingent which had mutinied. After which he moved on to Pesháwar, and appeared there about the 14th; but on his arrival he openly expressed his doubt of being able to induce his army to advance into the Kháibar. The whole Sikh army was sullen, and doubtful of the success of the enterprise, and it was only Sale's attitude at Jalálábád that prevented their active opposition to co-operation with the British. As Sir George Clerk himself knew well, neither Ghuláb Singh nor any Sikh Sardár was competent to command or control effectively the old Sikh soldiery, who had now for a long time past been bullying the Darbár and their own officers. Still Sir George kept up a resolute front, and forced Sher Singh into sending all the help he could to Pesháwar, and ordering his generals there to obey and co-operate heartily with the English.

But it was not until the end of March, when

additional British troops were approaching Pesháwar, and the successful defence of Jalálábád was more and more making its impression on the native mind, that the tide began to turn, and Lawrence's persistent hold on the Sikh leaders at Pesháwar bore fruit. On March 31, Pollock, who had recently arrived, having received reinforcements, moved forward to Jamrúd, at the mouth of the Kháibar; and Lawrence arranged with the Sikhs that they should force one branch of the Kháibar while Pollock forced the other, and that they should then for two months hold the whole pass up to Alí Masjid and keep open the communications with Pollock's further advance. Mackeson had won the Afrídís to co-operate; but Akbár Khán now appeared on the scene. He detached a portion of his army from the siege of Jalálábád towards Alí Masjid to block the pass; but it failed and returned.

On April 5, Pollock, advancing along the heights right and left of one (the Shadia Bagiaree) branch of the pass, turned the enemy's flank, defeated them so effectively as to clear the route, which was seven miles long, and captured Alí Masjid. The Sikh column too cleared its branch (the Jubbákí), which was fourteen miles in length, fought well, lost some hundred men, joined at Alí Masjid, and became entirely altered in their demeanour. Thus closed in success, for the time at least, the prolonged efforts of Sir George Clerk and Henry Lawrence to retain the support of the Sikhs in this war.

The part which they had now undertaken was to

hold the Kháibar and keep open the communications for two months. But at this juncture Pollock, having reached Jalálábád, was shackled by the Governor-General, and barred from forthwith prosecuting his victorious advance. So long did this halt continue that the stipulated time expired, and, although the Lahore Darbár behaved honestly and well, their troops in the hated Kháibar again began to show a bad spirit.

But Lord Ellenborough now roused himself, and offered the Sikhs the possession of the Passes and Jalálábád as their share of the successful campaign. The Darbár accepted it; the soldiery were delighted, and again changed their attitude; and 5,000 of them, under Ghuláb Singh, marched forward from Alí Masjid and joined Pollock at Jalálábád on June 10; Lawrence being warmly thanked by Government, and appointed to the charge of them there.

In consequence however of fresh indecision on Lord Ellenborough's part there was further trouble and danger to be faced. English families and officers were still prisoners in the hands of the Afgháns, yet he refused to give Nott and Pollock definite orders or permission to advance. The following is what he had written on April 28 to Pollock:—

‘The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghánistán appears to be such, according to the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his lordship cannot but contemplate the possibility of your having been led, by the absence of serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst the Afghán chiefs, and by the natural

desire you must, in common with every true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph upon the scene of our late disasters, to advance upon and occupy the city of Kábul.

‘If that event should have occurred, you will understand that it will in no respect vary the view which the Governor-General previously took of the policy now to be pursued. The Governor-General will adhere to the opinion that the only safe course is that of withdrawing the army under your command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Kháibar Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications with India.’

This for the time paralyzed all efforts towards any further movements to the front. At length however, on July 4, Lord Ellenborough wrote to Nott, allowing him to ‘*retire via Kábul* if he would take the responsibility’; to which Nott replied on the 20th that he would do so, and Pollock, having settled arrangements with him, started with his own force for Kábul on the 7th of August.

A few days before this, two of the English prisoners—Colin Troup and George Lawrence—had been sent down to Pollock with proposals from Akbar Khán. George Lawrence was ill, and Henry had promptly proposed to change places with him; but this was not allowed.

Henry Lawrence, in charge of the Sikh contingent, accompanied Pollock’s advance, and took part in the combats at Tezin and the Huft Kotál, where his Sikhs fought well, and received the General’s thanks:

he was also present when his brother and the other prisoners arrived in camp successfully released from their long captivity.

With the prescribed objects of the war thus obtained, Pollock with all his forces left Kábul on October 12 for the return march to Pesháwar, and reached Jamrúd on November 1. The Sikhs no longer cared to retain Jalálábád and the Kháibar, which they had previously accepted, but in the retention of which they now saw no advantage.

The close of the war was marked by a jubilant gathering of 45,000 troops at Firozpur, where a large concourse of Sikh chiefs and their followers attended; and thus, in the beginning of 1843, ended Henry Lawrence's training in his connexion with the Sikhs. He had learnt to know them in the stern and orderly days of Ranjít Singh; then in the period of comparative anarchy when the soldiery rose to practical supremacy in the State; afterwards, and more intimately, during their vacillating relations with the English, when their troubles and disasters gave room for temptation; and finally, he had commanded and led them during the fighting in Afghánistán, and had acquired a clear perception of their faults and character, of their good and their bad qualities, and had become personally well known to them. He had secured the confidence and regard of their chiefs and leaders, first at Firozpur and afterwards in his close connexion with them throughout the later troubles; and he pictured them and their ways in his tale

entitled 'Adventures of an Officer in the service of Ranjít Singh,' usually known as 'The Adventurer in the Punjab.'

Kaithal and Nepál.

After the termination of the Afghán war Lawrence held a succession of desultory appointments for more or less brief periods; but it was in one of these posts—the charge of the Kaithal State—that, having to make a summary revenue settlement, he carried it out so successfully that in six months the number of ploughs increased by fifty per cent. Eventually, however, he was appointed, in November, 1843, to the high diplomatic post of Resident at the Court of Nepál.

His tenure of this appointment lasted for two years, to the close of 1845, and was a period of comparative rest, during which he was exceptionally busy with his pen, and wrote, besides other articles, his defence of Sir William Macnaghten. These contributions to literature will be referred to at length further on¹, in connexion with those periods of his career when his remarks and suggestions were most pertinent to the state of affairs actually in force.

His career at the Court of Nepál was free from any incidents or questions of high importance. But he studied the military character and proclivities of the people, and came to the conclusion that they possessed no power for invasion or aggression; and that the only room for anxiety or need for watch-

¹ See p. 144.

fulness lay in their tendency to combine with the other Northern Powers and make a frontier barrier against any British advance.

It was during his residence at Nepál that the final anarchy among the Sikhs began, when the Nepálís eagerly watched the progress of events in the Punjab. Henry Lawrence, it need hardly be said, kept, on his part, a sharp outlook on the Court, and on the excited feelings of the Nepálís, while closely observant of the proceedings of the Sikhs and preparing in his own mind for their impending outbreak.

CHAPTER IV

SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE SIKHS AND THE SUTLEJ WAR

AT this juncture, when the Sikhs were about to enter into that trial of strength with the English which Ranjit Singh had been so anxious to avoid, it may be as well to give a sketch of their past history.

The Sikhs were only a fraction, though a large fraction, and the leading section, of the races that occupied the Punjab. They can and do include all castes of Hindus; but as regards caste distinctions, they form only one caste, a military brotherhood, with one special aim, the military and political exaltation of the whole body, and one special antipathy—that towards Muhammadans. The peasantry—the Jât Sikhs, who constitute their principal fighting body, both horse and foot, are the best class in the community—are generally dull-witted and simple-minded, not good in the council, but splendid in the battle-field. They have come out in these later days at their very best, are excellent cultivators, contented and prosperous in civil life, and unsurpassed as soldiers in the native ranks of the British army. They were originally organized in a few large confederacies, called Misls, with the head of some particular family

as the chief and leader of each. Six of the Misls occupied the lands in the Punjab proper, i. e. Trans-Sutlej (on the north side of the Sutlej); other six those in the Cis-Sutlej lands (on the south), generally called Malwá.

At the end of the eighteenth century, this system and organization was acting successfully; the Misls had retained their independence, and, when confederated as one brotherhood—called the Khálsa—against a common enemy, had kept them at bay and held their own. At the beginning of the present century, Ranjít Singh appeared on the scene, being himself a leading member of one of the Misls, the Sukarchakia, and through his wife's connexions most weighty and influential with two others, the Rámgarhia and Kunhaya Misls. His aim was eventually to reduce the power and separate action of the Misls, and to organize an improved and well-disciplined combined or Khálsa army, which should be independent of the Misl basis.

He gradually quarrelled with the other Trans-Sutlej Misls and leading families in turn, and attacked and mastered them. He early got possession of Lahore, and then of Amritsar in 1802; but he had not brought the whole Mánjha district—the great nucleus of the Sikh population—under his sway till 1816. During this interval he had at first made some efforts to include also the Cis-Sutlej Misls and their territory. But their chiefs, having been previously defeated by the English and afterwards kindly treated by them,

had accepted their friendship, and now obtained their formal protection; and Ranjít Singh, acquiescing in the situation, restricted his authority, by definite treaty, to the Trans-Sutlej territory, and ever after remained absolutely true to his alliance with the English.

He now turned his arms against the districts south of the Mánjha and down to Múltán, which was held by the Múltaní Pathán chief, Muzaffar Khán, as Governor for the Amír of Kábul. In 1818 Ranjít Singh captured Múltán, the Governor and most of his sons being killed fighting to the last; and he then appointed as Governor in his place a clever Khatri named Sáwan Mall; after which he gradually reduced the Muhammadan tribes in the neighbourhood.

Next year, turning to the north, he took Kashmir from its Durání rulers, after many years of intrigues and partisan conflicts. Then followed fighting in Hazára, Pesháwar, and along the frontier; Pesháwar being eventually secured in 1833. Two years afterwards he defeated Dost Muhammad there, and forced the Afgháns to retire to Jalálábád.

But he had no desire to interfere further with Afghánistán. He disliked the invasion of it by the English, but was prepared, as a matter of policy, to share the burthen of that invasion and war, though it was against the inclination of his chiefs.

The Punjab was held in complete subjugation under his masterful hand; and the army was a splendid fighting machine, with all the martial qualities of its Sikh soldiery fully developed, and their aspirations

repressed only by his stern control. The influence of their more direct leaders, however popular, was slight compared with that of the great Mahārājā. The discipline was intensely severe, almost brutal; but it was effective for the time, though not of a quality or on a basis that was likely to last, once the pressure of his iron hand was removed.

His kingdom now comprised states extending from Kashmír on the north to Múltán on the south, and from the boundaries of Afghánistán on the west to the Sutlej on the east, and contained large populations of various nationalities, of whom, however, the Sikhs formed the leading section; and of them the army almost entirely consisted.

But, by this time, i.e. towards the close of Ranjít Singh's reign, the chiefs and leaders of the nation under him were not necessarily, as of old, the heads of the Mísils and of the principal families, but included mostly those men of personal weight and capacity whom the Mahārājā had advanced and brought into his court and into high positions, and had enriched with jágírs, whether Sikhs, Rájputs, or Muhammadans. Thus, there were the three Jammu brothers, as they were called, Ghuláb Singh, Dhyan Singh, and Suchet Singh, and Dhyan Singh's son, Híra Singh, who were Rájputs. There were the Bráhmín soldiers, Khushyal Singh and Tej Singh. There were sundry Bábas and Bhaís, priests. There was the Khatri, Sáwan Mall of Múltán. There were such Hindus as Dina Náth, Shunkur Dass, and Ajodhya Persad.

There were even notable Muhammadans, such as Nawáb Sarfaráz Khán, Khoda Yár Khán, Fakír Aziz-ud-dín, Sheikh Emam-ud-dín, Khálifa Syad Muhammad Khán, and Syad Muhammad Hussein. With such a widely ranging and diversified list of courtiers, governors, and commanders, besides Sikh Sardárs, and with the conflicting interests involved, in the absence of any strongly recognized succession to the throne the control of the State was not unlikely to fall to pieces once the mighty hand of the great ruler was removed.

Up to the close of the Afghán war Sir George Clerk and Henry Lawrence alone knew more or less thoroughly the character and bent of these several men, and Lawrence alone possessed the necessary experience of their fighting qualities, as well as of their tendency to insubordination. After the great Maharájá's death they were entirely out of hand, and under real obedience to no one, and few knew this better than Ghuláb Singh, their nominal commander. The Court and its supporters had no influence with them, either collectively or individually, and the only person who; in addition to those already mentioned, rose into prominence after Ranjít Singh's death was the Raní Jindan, one of his wives, a woman of the most dissolute character, who had shortly before given birth to a son, Dhulíp Singh. This child was, later on, publicly recognized as legitimate, and in the line of succession to the throne.

On Ranjít Singh's death, in 1839, anarchy, to a

greater or less degree, ensued and continued. One of his sons, Kharak Singh, was the first to be placed on the throne; but he was imbecile and a puppet, and after his death another son, Sher Singh, eventually succeeded—a man who, though of low character and habits, had some sense, and was faithful to the English alliance even through the trials of the Afghán war.

Between Kharak Singh and Sher Singh, Náo Nihál Singh, son of Kharak Singh, had succeeded; but he lived for only one day as Mahárájá; and even Sher Singh, before he was installed as the permanent successor, acted only as a temporary ruler, with Dhyán Singh as the Minister, and Kharak Singh's widow as the nominal and temporary regent. This arrangement, which rested chiefly on the support of the Sindhanwála family, was based on the ground of the widow possibly giving an heir to her late husband. Thus, while Sher Singh was virtually occupying the throne and ruling the State, three conflicting elements were surrounding him—the claims of Kharak Singh's widow, with the backing of the Sindhanwála clan; the aims of the Jammu brothers, with one of them, Dhyán Singh, as the actual Minister; and the pressure of the Khálsa army, with, in addition, the Raní Jindan and her child Dhulíp Singh in the background. These conflicting elements eventually overwhelmed him.

He was, as already shown, staunch to the British alliance, but the Minister, Dhyán Singh, was secretly

intriguing against him for his own ends, and was aided by his clever son, Hira Singh; their policy, backed by the Raní Jindan, being to incite the army to action, and induce them to attack the British.

But, friendly to the British alliance, the Sindh-anwála brothers tricked Dhyān Singh, entrapped him into assassinating Sher Singh, and afterwards killed Dhyān Singh himself; on which Hira Singh, his son, appealed to the army, attacked and killed the Sindh-anwála men, and got Dhulíp Singh proclaimed Mahārājā and himself his Minister. But his ministry was short-lived; Raní Jindan, having used him to get herself and her boy Dhulíp Singh into power, threw him over and denounced him to the army, which led to his murder. Thus, after Ranjít Singh's death, his throne had been successively held by Kharak Singh, Náo Nihál Singh (for a day), Sher Singh, and now the boy Dhulíp Singh. But the army was absolutely supreme; such intriguing as went on was with a view to guiding its power to its own destruction by attacking the English. The Khálsa was openly the only authority that Ghuláb Singh acknowledged, while at the same time he shrewdly refused the post of Minister. The army thus getting out of hand, and influenced or incited by the Raní Jindan and the court intriguers, for their own ends as above shown, gradually drifted into the war, dead against the views of the Sardárs and the really natural leaders of the people.

It was most fortunate for the Government of India

that the war, now on the point of breaking out, had been so long delayed, owing to the Sikhs being sufficiently engrossed with their own affairs. During the interval since Ranjít Singh's death the disasters and humiliations which the British had suffered in Afghánistán had terribly lowered their prestige and excited the minds of the native races—of none more so than those of the Punjab. Wars, due primarily to the results of these feelings, had ensued in Sind and Gwalior, in the very year after the return of Pollock's army from Afghánistán; and if the Sikhs also had challenged the British power at the same time, the difficulty in dealing with them, great as it proved to be afterwards, would undoubtedly have been very much greater then. The Government therefore had been sensibly relieved by the outbreak of those other wars thus occurring at an opportunely early date, before the more serious crisis arose with the Punjab.

Of course, they had ever since the close of the Afghán war been fully alive to the excited and dangerous state of the Sikh army and the Punjab, and had been arranging to meet the storm whenever it should burst. Major Broadfoot, who had latterly succeeded to the charge of the frontier, had kept Sir Henry Hardinge, who was now the Governor-General, as well informed as possible of the progress of events, and gradually it became but too certain that a war with the Sikhs was inevitable.

Sir Henry however was determined that the Sikhs

should have no grounds for charging the English with any provocation, and, in accordance with this sentiment, though he continued to bring up troops from all quarters, so as to have a large army ready to advance from Meerut and similar positions, he kept the actual frontier much too weak, and the supports too much in the rear, to meet, with fair approach to equality of strength, the attack that the Sikh army might make at any moment in full force on our frontier garrisons. He thus subordinated the military necessities of the case to political expediency, and placed Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, at a grave disadvantage. Only the Ambála and the frontier troops were held ready for war. The Meerut force was not allowed to move and strengthen the front till the Sikhs should have taken the initiative; even when Ghuláb Singh, the Rájá of Jammu, had sent intelligence to the British of the absolute certainty of the impending advance across the frontier, and had proposed to cast in his lot with the English definitely. Then at length, as the Rájá had said, the Sikh army took the aggressive. The Sikh Sardárs disapproved and objected; but they were patriotic, and joined the Khálsa, though the command was assigned to two men of no national weight or position, the one being Tej Singh, the nephew of Jemadar Khushal Singh, and the other Lál Singh, the favourite of the Raní Jindan.

Hitherto, it must be borne in mind, no one except Henry Lawrence had been in a position to gauge by

sound experience the real fighting qualities of the Sikhs; and even he had seen them only at their worst—in hill warfare, that is—in which they do not specially excel. It may be fairly conjectured that neither the Government, nor the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, nor their nearest advisers, estimated at its proper weight the gravity of the impending contests in the battlefield, much less of any attempt at a conquest of the Punjab. Hence their preparations were insufficient for the initial operations, and the army in India was inadequate for the exhaustive conduct of the war to its proper completion.

We do not propose to give any detailed account of the campaign, but these particulars of the steps leading up to the conflict are necessary for a correct idea of the conduct of the Khálsa and of the members of various ranks of the Sikh community in coming into conflict with the English Government. It need hardly be pointed out that the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs, whether as states or peoples, took no part in the movement against the British.

By December 11, 1845, the Punjab Sikh armies were invading the British territory in force, crossing the Sutlej by various fords near Firozpur. One army under Tej Singh remained there facing and threatening it, while another under Lál Singh threw up entrenchments at Firozsháh and then moved further eastwards to meet the British army. These two encountered; and the first important action was fought on December 18 at Múdkí—a severe one, and attended with heavy loss

on both sides. It ended in a victory for the British, who, routing the Sikhs and following them westwards, advanced to the support of Firozpur. Then, at Firozsháh, which Lál Singh had already entrenched, a very sanguinary battle was fought on December 21 and 22, which left matters in a critical state on the night of the 21st, but ended next day in the complete defeat of the enemy.

In this struggle Major Broadfoot was killed, and Henry Lawrence was at once summoned from Nepal to replace him.

The divisions of Sir Hugh Gough's army from the hill stations and from Meerut, which had been held back till the Sikh invasion actually occurred, had been meanwhile advancing rapidly, and now joined in the campaign. Sir Hugh again fought the Sikhs at Aliwál on January 28, and then finally, a fortnight later, after an exceptionally severe and stubborn action, stormed their entrenchments on the Sutlej at Sobráon on February 10, 1846, and drove the Sikh army, shattered, across the river back into the Punjab; which ended the campaign.

Henry Lawrence had meanwhile joined, and was present at Sobráon, where the victory was thorough and so overwhelming as to be decisive; so that the question of the treatment of the Sikh kingdom had to be immediately settled. There were three courses from which to choose: (1) annexation; (2) a subsidiary alliance; (3) the continuance of the kingdom separate and independent, but reduced in military

strength. Both the East India Company and Sir Henry Hardinge were opposed to annexation—a view in which Lawrence entirely concurred—for political reasons such as the buffer-state idea, but also and more strongly because it was felt to be impracticable at this juncture, as the British force was not really equal to the task that would have been demanded of it if the Sikh army, though defeated in the open on its frontier, had resolved on contesting the conquest of the country, and utilizing its strongholds and capabilities for prolonged defence. The idea of annexation was therefore set aside. Next, a subsidiary alliance meant the continuance of the State as a separate kingdom, but with its army levied by the British Government, though paid for from the finances of the State. This arrangement, under certain circumstances, had answered fairly well, but had not been found to conduce to the good administration of the State concerned. So this too was negatived, and the third plan was decided on.

The Sikh army had now been thoroughly defeated in the field, and its patriotic chiefs, though averse to the war, had been chagrined and humiliated by the issue. But the Darbár, on the other hand, whose main desire had been the crushing of the ascendancy of the Khálsa, were inwardly elated by the success of their intrigues and measures. So on the British army crossing the Sutlej, and encamping in the Punjab on February 13, the representatives of the Darbár immediately came forward, and on the 15th made their

submission before Sir Henry Hardinge. They were followed three days afterwards by the boy Maharájá Dhulíp Singh; and, in the sequel, when Hardinge and the army had reached and occupied the capital. Lahore, which they did on the 20th, the Darbár had so far gained their ends.

CHAPTER V

LAWRENCE AS AGENT IN THE PUNJAB—KASHMÍR AND GHULÁB SINGH

Lawrence as Agent in the Punjab.

To carry into effect his intentions in regard to the strength and independence to be left to the Punjab Government, and at the same time to punish the State for its aggressive action, the conditions that the Governor-General demanded were these—the transfer to the British Government of a portion of the Punjab territory, called the Jálándhar Doáb (i. e. the tract lying between the rivers Sutlej and Beas); an indemnity of $1\frac{1}{2}$ crores of rupees (i. e. millions sterling); the reduction of the Sikh army to 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry; and the surrender of all the artillery that had been used in the campaign.

These conditions were accepted, and the arrangements proposed and adopted for the proper conduct of the administration were, that it should be vested in a Council of Regency of leading men, with Lál Singh at their head as Minister, under the watch and control of a British Agent; that, in the case of difficulty about the indemnity, there should be a further cession of territory; and (at the urgent

request of the Sikh Council) that British troops should occupy Lahore till the end of the current year, 1846.

This arrangement, which was ratified by the Treaty of Lahore on March 11, was one of which the success was open to grave doubt; in fact failure seemed more than probable; but considering the importance of the results aimed at, and the evils inseparable from any other scheme, Lord Hardinge held it to be worth trying. What he personally thought of the chances and difficulties of success is shown in the following letter of March 30, 1846, to Lawrence, whom he appointed Agent to carry out the plan :—

‘When I consider the character of the Raní, her minister Lál Singh, and the absence of any man of master-mind among the Sikhs to take the helm at this crisis, I confess I think the probability is adverse to the continuance of a Sikh Government.’

And he had already written :—

‘The Sikh chiefs, excluded from power, will probably intrigue against the Government, and may attempt to excite the soldiery against those who were parties to the Treaty of Peace. It will be necessary to be at all times in a state of military vigilance.’

Lord Hardinge was never weary of requiring that the Sikhs should be led to understand his policy thoroughly.

‘You will’ (he wrote to Lawrence) ‘on all occasions assure the Sikh rulers that, whilst we do not desire the annexation of the Punjab, the Government is determined not to lend

itself to any subsidiary system, and, as soon as its troops are withdrawn, will decline to interfere in the internal affairs of the Sikh State except by friendly councils (? counsels) as in the time of the Mahārājā Ranjīt Singh.'

Henry Lawrence, as above incidentally noted, was appointed the British Agent. Of the 1½ millions required as indemnity, only half a million was forthcoming. Government accepted the territory of Kashmír and Hazára as the equivalent for the million still required; and then, glad to separate Kashmír from the Punjab, handed it over (for a large price) as a separate kingdom to Ghuláb Singh, the ruler of Jammu, a Rájput who, it will be remembered, had been the commander of the Sikh troops during the Afghán war. This transaction is referred to in more detail later on (page 63).

The Council of Regency unfortunately contained too few of the Sikh Sardárs, and too many of the old Court. It was owing to *their* fears of the Khálsa army that the Council pressed for the retention of the British force; and it was in *their* preponderance, and the consequent tendency to intrigue and to the Raní's influence becoming paramount, as well as to the feeling in the Khálsa army, that the danger lay of the failure of the arrangements. Lawrence's anxieties lay chiefly in those directions. He had good hope that Ghuláb Singh, with all his faults, would be loyal and helpful; and that the Sikh soldiery, and the peasantry from which it sprung, if well treated, might not resent their defeat, as they were brave,

and had been beaten by brave men in fair fight, and not by superior artillery or warlike skill or force of numbers: though as a drawback to this, there were loud murmurs imputing treachery on the part of their leaders. With a misgoverned army 'nous sommes trahis' is not an uncommon idea.

Sir Henry, now Lord Hardinge, was mainly solicitous about intrigues on the part of the Sikh chiefs; not so Henry Lawrence, who dreaded more the machinations of the Raní and her party in the Council.

The treaty of March 11, 1846, embodying those arrangements, and called the Treaty of Lahore, was signed by the Mahárájá, by Sardárs Lál Singh, Tej Singh, and Rám Singh, and by the Diwán Dina Náth. Lord Hardinge's words to the Council were these:—

'Success or failure is in your own hands; my co-operation shall not be wanting; but, if you neglect this opportunity, no aid on the part of the British Government can save the State.'

When thus undertaking his new charge, it may be explained that Henry Lawrence's views, though in accordance with Lord Hardinge's, were based on a far wider range of ideas and objects. Now that Sir George Clerk had left, there was no one there who had such an intimate knowledge of the Sikhs, such an appreciation of their real worth, and such a true insight into their shortcomings and the causes to which they were due. Knowing the chiefs personally, having won their confidence in the Firozpur

days, and been chosen by them as the arbitrator in their disputes, he was alive to their defects, and to the antecedents which had caused them. Having commanded the men and fought with them in Afghánistán, and seen their demeanour both in Ranjít Singh's days and in the trials of the disorderly times at Pesháwar, and again in the battles of the recent campaign, he had formed a very high opinion of their essential military qualities and many valuable characteristics. He felt that it was all-important to the good of the British rule to avert their permanent hostility, and, if possible, to secure their active friendship, good-will, and alliance.

As recognized and foreseen by Hardinge, Lawrence's task was a most difficult and anxious one, and troubles began almost immediately; these were however suppressed by his judicious management. The Sikh army had first to be dealt with, and was reduced by degrees; most of the men reverting to the plough, and a few enlisting in the British ranks, from which however the mass of them were deterred by the regulations then in force in the British service, about the head-dress of the troops, and the wearing of the hair and beard. The fort of Kángra rebelled and had to be captured; and also a serious 'cow row' occurred¹. But the chief disturbance was the intrigue instigated by the Rání through Lál Singh, the Minister,

¹ Cattle are held by Hindus and Sikhs to be sacred animals, and their slaughter occasionally gives rise to disturbances, which are generally known as Cow-rows.

against Ghuláb Singh's assumption of the throne of Kashmír. The Rájá had, as already described, offered a large price for that sovereignty on its being assigned to the British Government by the Punjab Council in lieu of part of the indemnity; Lord Hardinge, though there was some difference of opinion as to the propriety of the step, had adopted it, and Henry Lawrence had supported the arrangement. He knew Ghuláb Singh's defects and bad qualities—had he not realized them in the Afghán war?—but he held him to be no worse, on the points in which he failed, than any other who could possibly be suggested for the position; while he was far superior to them in ability, and strongly inclined to be true to an alliance with the English, and to conform to their wishes and views, as he had already proved before the outbreak of the war.

Kashmír and Ghuláb Singh.

It may be advisable to explain the facts and reasons of this assignment of Kashmír to Ghuláb Singh fully but concisely, as much misunderstanding seems to exist about it. It must first be reiterated that the Punjab could not have been annexed at the close of the Sutlej campaign for reasons already explained. As the Punjab could not be annexed, neither could Kashmír, which lay beyond it, and which was in such an isolated position, that it would have been impracticable for the British to attempt to rule and

administer it with the Punjab intervening as foreign territory.

But Kashmír was a tract of country which it was advisable to separate from the Punjab. Here is what the greatest authority on the subject, Sir George Clerk, says:—

‘As to the policy of making Kashmír a separate State, Ranjít Singh fostered in the north of his kingdom a Rájput Power, because it could have no affinity with his turbulent Khálsa on one side or with malignant and vindictive Islám on the other. Had proof of the wisdom of this measure been wanting, it has been signally shown in his time and ours on four important occasions.’

As to allowing it to come under the sway of Ghuláb Singh instead of some one else, here again is what Sir G. Clerk says:—

‘I have been under the necessity, on more than one occasion, of testing rather severely Ghuláb Singh’s loyalty to us; my belief is that he is a man eminently qualified, by character and surrounding territorial possessions, for the position of ruler there (Kashmír), that all his interests lie on the side of friendship with us, that he will always desire, and some time or other may need, our countenance of his authority against enemies. Their aggressions, whether Chinese or Gúrkas on one side of him, or Afgháns on the other, will be retarded rather than precipitated by his proximity to them in that form. If Rájá Ghuláb Singh of Kashmír ever goes against us it will be owing only to his having been handled stupidly by our Government, or by our officers on the frontier and in the Punjab.’

In transferring Kashmír to Ghuláb Singh, it was still remaining under despotic native rule, but not

becoming liable to any worse government than if it had remained in the Punjab. Misrule did afterwards occur in it; but not worse than under any independent Punjab or other native ruler. Still attempts have been made—obviously unjust—to hold Lawrence (and all who were concerned in the transfer) responsible for that subsequent misrule.

Henry Lawrence's view of the case was given in his article on Lord Hardinge's Administration in the *Calcutta Review*, an extract from which is entered on page 91, and the following letters of Lord Hardinge—extracted from the volume of this series dealing with his rule in India—give his own account of the matter:—

'It was necessary last March to weaken the Sikhs by depriving them of Kashmír. The distance from Kashmír to the Sutlej is 300 miles, of very difficult mountainous country, quite impracticable for six months. To keep a British force 300 miles from any possibility of support would have been an undertaking that merited a strait-waistcoat and not a peerage.

'Ghuláb Singh was never Minister at Lahore for the administration of its affairs. Early in 1845 Jawáhir Singh persuaded the army to march against Jammu. Ghuláb Singh, despairing of being able to defend himself, threw himself into the hands of the Pancháyáts and was brought a prisoner to Lahore. He was there treated with great severity; and subsequently, when the army offered him the Wazírship, he repeatedly declined the offer. When the invasion took place he remained at Jammu, and took no part against us, but tendered his allegiance on condition of being confirmed in the possession of his own territories. This was neither

conceded nor refused, as the paramount power did not think it becoming, while the armies were in presence of each other, to show any doubt as to the result by granting terms. I merely referred him to the terms of the proclamation of December, when the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej. Nevertheless, it was clearly to be understood by the terms of that proclamation that, if Ghuláb Singh took no part against us, he was entitled to consideration whenever the affairs of the Punjab came to be settled. It was evident that he had no cause of gratitude or attachment to the Lahore Darbár, by whose orders and intrigues his own family had been nearly exterminated, his possessions taken, and his son slain. During the whole of the campaign he had purposely kept aloof; not a single hill soldier had fired a shot against us, so that the Government had every right to treat with him. They had their own interests also to attend to; which in policy required that the Sikh State should be weakened and that the hills should be separated from the plains.

‘Were we to be deterred from doing what was right, and what had been previously determined upon, because the Lahore Darbár, knowing he had not participated in their crimes, chose to employ him for a particular object as being the man most acceptable to us? Was he the Minister, and were not four other commissioners associated with him for settling the terms of peace? After Múdkí and Firozsháh the Raní had implored him to come to Lahore and bring his troops to her aid. He sent evasive answers. After the battle of Aliwál more pressing invitations were sent, as he alone, in their opinion, could settle affairs with the English, because he had not taken part against them. He came to Lahore, protesting publicly in Darbár against all that had been done. He accepted the responsibility of attempting a settlement, but required the Raní to sign a paper that she

would accede to the terms which he and the other four Commissioners should agree upon. He had been told by Major Lawrence on February 3, in a written document, that we appreciated his wisdom in not having taken up arms against us, and that his interests would be taken into consideration. The words of the proclamation, dated February 14, were these: "The extent of the territory which it may be advisable to take will be determined by the conduct of the Darbár and by considerations for the security of the British frontier."

'These words were meant to include any arrangements which would render the hills independent of the plains, which arrangement had been well considered before the battle of Sohráon. It was always intended that Ghuláb Singh, whose troops had not fired a shot, should have his case and position fully considered. What act of treason, then, had he committed against the Lahore State? He had done good service to us, which we had recognized before he was a Sikh commissioner. After the war commenced, were we to abandon our policy and to treat the only man who had not lifted up his arm against us with indifference, because he came to head-quarters specially deputed by the Lahore Darbár to confer with us as one who had not joined in their unprovoked invasion? His forbearance was rewarded, because this forbearance was in accordance with an intended policy, and because the charge of treachery could not be substantiated.'

Briefly put, the Kashmír case was this:—In 1846 the Punjab could not be annexed; consequently Kashmír, lying beyond it, could not be annexed. But its separation from the Punjab was desirable. Ghuláb Singh was a fitter man than any other native to be its ruler; it was therefore transferred to him.

It was in connexion with this sovereignty that the Maharánī and her favourite, the minister Lál Singh, began their intrigues. Until now the Governor of Kashmír, for the Sikh Darbár, had been Sheikh Emam-ud-dín, a model Muhammadan gentleman in manners, appearance, intelligence, and education, but with all the evil habits and shortcomings that were apt to be developed in a life spent among the intrigues of Lahore. On acquiring the kingdom of Kashmír, Ghuláb Singh had offered the Sheikh to retain him in his old position of Governor, but Emam-ud-dín hesitated, and under suggestions from Lahore, considered three alternative courses of action : (1) to accept Ghuláb Singh's own offer, and remain as Governor under him ; (2) to bribe the English to substitute him for Ghuláb Singh ; or (3) to oppose Ghuláb Singh's assumption of the sovereignty, which was Lál Singh's proposal to him. He adopted this last alternative, and took up arms to oppose Ghuláb Singh's entry.

Lawrence forthwith pressed the Darbár into collecting a force of 10,000 Sikh and Kohistání (mountaineer) troops, with ten guns, under Darbár generals ; and, joining them himself, marched with them into Kashmír, where Sheikh Emam-ud-dín, instead of fighting, surrendered to him personally. These Sikh troops had recently fought against the British under the same officers who now led them ; and, unwilling as they were in their hearts to support Ghuláb Singh, whom the Khálsa hated thoroughly, they acted ad-

mirably in these operations, and drew warm commendations from Lord Hardinge. This was a great triumph for Lawrence, as a proof of his judgement of the merits of the Khálsa troops when properly managed and of his personal influence with them and their leaders.

Ghuláb Singh was then installed, in November 1846, as Mahárájá of Kashmír; after which, as Sheikh Emam-ud-dín had submitted to Lawrence proofs of his having been instigated to his rebellion by Rájá Lál Singh, Lawrence required the Darbár to bring the latter to trial for treachery to the State.

Lál Singh was accordingly tried in open court, with a large crowd of the leading Sardárs present to watch the proceedings. The Rájá admitted the validity of some of the papers produced by the Sheikh, and, on December 4, an unanimous verdict of guilty was pronounced against him. The Sardárs fully acquiesced in this, and in the necessity of deposing him from his position in the Council and forfeiting his jágirs. The ministry heretofore held by Lál Singh alone was then vested in a council of four, viz. Sardárs Tej Singh and Sher Singh (Attariwála), Diwán Dina Náth, and Fakír Nú-ud-dín, while Rájá Lál Singh was removed to Firozpur, and the Maharání was left without his support in her political intrigues. But a still more important change was impending, which reduced and eventually deprived her of her power for mischief.

CHAPTER VI

THE TREATY OF BHAIROWÁL—TREATY OF LAHORE INEFFECTIVE

THE year was drawing to its close, and the time was at hand when, under the existing Treaty—the Treaty of Lahore—the British troops should be withdrawn. But the trickery that had been going on had prevented the better members of the Council from making that progress in the formation of a strong and stable Government which would enable them to exercise a proper control over the army and the Sikh population. Hence the majority of the Sardárs were filled with alarm at the prospect of the withdrawal of the British troops, especially as the Mahárání now proposed, with the support of Dina Náth, that she should be placed at the head of the administration. This brought matters to a crisis. The Sardárs, with Tej Singh and Sher Singh at their head, opposed her staunchly; and on December 14, leaving her and Dina Náth to act as they might choose, proposed, through Sher Singh, to Lawrence that the British Government should take over the guardianship of the State till the Mahárájá should attain his majority. A Darbár was held accordingly on December 15, at which many more classes of the community than usual were

represented, including not only the Ministers and principal leaders, but petty chiefs and landholders, officers, and even an Akalí. It was announced, on the part of the Governor-General, that he was averse from any change in the arrangement heretofore in force; but if a change was desired, his control must be complete; he must be at liberty to occupy the country with whatever force he thought necessary, the funds needed to meet the expenses of administration must be placed at his disposal, and the rule must be under the supervision of a British Resident, though conducted by the Darbár and its officers. The Mahárání was to have no vote in the matter, which must be decided by the Sardárs and the pillars of the State. The result was that—the whole of the fifty-one entitled to vote being present—they decided unanimously and in writing in favour of this new arrangement. Accordingly on December 10, 1846, the details of the new Treaty—the Treaty of Bhairówál—were settled. It was to hold good till Dhulíp Singh should attain his majority. The capital should continue to be occupied by British troops. The country should be ruled by a council of eight leading chiefs, acting under the control and guidance of a British Resident, whose power was to extend without limit over every department. Military forces were to be placed wherever he desired. The first Resident was to be Henry Lawrence, who thus became the real ruler of the Punjab.

This arrangement might be looked upon as to

a certain extent involving the 'subsidiary' element which Lord Hardinge had objected to a year before ; but, as a fact, it did not include the combination which he had meant by the phrase, and which he had prominently in his mind as undesirable, viz. freedom of action on the part of the native rulers, and their support by a British contingent, i.e. an army levied by the British but paid by the State.

Lord Hardinge's despatches of September 1846 and the following months show clearly his views of the past management of the Punjab ; of the conduct of the Council and others ; the necessity for a change ; the grounds for the new arrangements, and the steps by which they were introduced. Some extracts will here be useful.

Referring to such success as had been achieved, he says :—

'There can be no doubt of the great improvement of our relations with the people of the Punjab, in this short space of time, which is corroborated by the satisfaction which has followed the assessment of lands made in the Jalandhar and the ceded territories.

'I notice this state of popular feeling, as far as it can be correctly ascertained, not only because its existence is a satisfactory proof that the occupation has been followed by desirable results, but because this disposition on the part of the people to confide in our justice and lenity will be an essential means of carrying on a Government through a British Minister, if such an expedient should be adopted. At any rate you will be enabled to form a correct judgement of the present state of our relations with the Punjab.'

He then deals with the question of the retention of British troops in the Punjab:—

‘In my despatch of the 3rd instant, I stated my impression that no permanent advantage to the Maharájá’s interests, or to our own, would be derived by the continued presence, under existing circumstances, of our troops at Lahore. That opinion remains unaltered.

‘I do not think that the British Government would be justified in supporting a native Government in the Punjab, merely because it may conduce to the safety of a Regent, and a Minister obnoxious to the chiefs and people, and to whom the British Government owes no obligations. These are the very individuals who, for personal interests of their own, excited the Sikh soldiery to invade the British frontier; and considerations of humanity to individuals would be no plea for employing British bayonets in perpetuating the misrule of a native State, by enabling such a Government to oppress the people.

‘Our interference, if it should ever be called in, must be founded on the broad principle of preserving the people from anarchy and ruin, and our own frontier from the inconvenience and insecurity of such a state of things as that which, it is assumed, will follow when the British troops retire.

‘To continue to hold Lahore, without reforming the evils so clearly existing under the Vizier’s Government, would not only, if that Government is to remain as it is now constituted, be an infraction of the agreement entered into on March 11, but would, in all probability, be an unsuccessful attempt. If the various classes who now justly complain of the misrule of the Regent and the Vizier find that a British force, in opposition to the terms of the Treaty, continues to occupy Lahore in support of a bad Government, the con-

fidence which we have inspired up to the present time will be changed into mistrust of our intentions; the Sikh troops remaining unpaid would refuse to serve at the distant stations; and, with a British garrison at Lahore, the whole of the country beyond the Rāvi would not fail to be a scene of disorder and bloodshed. I therefore adhere to the opinions expressed in my last despatch, that the British garrison ought not to remain beyond the stipulated period, if a native Government continues to administer the affairs of the Punjab.

‘I have, since my arrival in India, constantly felt and expressed my aversion to what is termed the subsidiary system, and, although it was probably most useful and politic in the earlier period of British conquest in India, I have no doubt of its impolicy at the present time, but more especially on this, the most vulnerable, frontier of our empire.

‘The period of the occupation of Lahore was expressly limited to the end of this year, for the purposes specified in the agreement of March 11, namely, that the Sikh army having been disbanded by the sixth article of the Treaty, a British force should be left to protect the person of the Mahārājā and the inhabitants of the city, during the re-organization of the Sikh army. By the fifteenth article of the Treaty it was stipulated that the British Government would not exercise any interference in the internal affairs of the Lahore State.

‘At that time, the entreaties of the Regent for our assistance appeared to me not only reasonable, but as imposing upon me a moral duty, exacting as I was at that very time from the Lahore Government the disbandment of their mutinous army. It is true this assistance, and the whole measure of occupation, was no part of the original policy in framing the Treaty, for you are aware that the application

for our troops was made after the Treaty had been signed. But it was evident I had no alternative, if I felt confident, as I then did, that the British garrison would be able to effect its declared objects without compromising the safety of the troops. I therefore did not hesitate to afford the aid solicited, although I did so with reluctance.

‘On every occasion the Lahore Government has been assured that the British Government deprecates interference in their affairs; they have been informed that our troops were ready to retire at any moment, if the reorganization of the Sikh army and the improved state of the country would admit of their being withdrawn.

‘It may be further observed, that the occupation of Lahore could not be considered in the light of a subsidiary arrangement, because the instructions given to the General Officer and to the Political Agent were, that the garrison was placed there to preserve the peace of the town, but was not to be employed in any expedition, even between the Rávi and the Sutlej.

‘The force was expressly given as a loan of troops for a peculiar emergency, and to aid the Lahore Government in carrying out an essential article of the Treaty, which required the disbandment of their army. No payment was demanded, except for certain extra allowances granted to the native troops whilst serving beyond the Sutlej.’

His objections to the continued presence of British troops under the same administrative arrangements as heretofore are thus shown:—

‘If, therefore, the proposals of the Regent and the Darbár are merely confined to a further loan of British troops for six months, on the plea that a Hindu Government cannot be carried on unless supported by British bayonets, I am of opinion that the application must be refused.

‘There has been ample time for the reorganization of the Sikh army, and by proper management the Darbár could have fulfilled the limited objects for which the British force was left at Lahore. The means of effecting these objects had been invariably neglected, in opposition to the friendly admonitions of the British Government. I have not failed to exhort the Vizier to pay the troops with regularity, as the only mode by which the Government and the Army can be on good terms, and without which no efficient service or correct discipline can be expected. Two regiments have been recently driven into mutiny for want of pay—such a course being their only means of obtaining their just dues—whilst estates of large value have been given to the brother of the Maharání, as well as to the relations of the Vizier. It is surprising that, after the experience of the last five years of a mutinous army controlling its own government at Lahore, the Darbár cannot understand or will not practise so simple a system to ensure obedience.

‘It is not necessary that I should recapitulate the acts of impolicy and injustice which have marked the conduct of the Darbár during the last five months. Having a right to interfere by the terms of the Treaty in matters relating to the payment of the disbanded soldiery, I have frequently urged the Darbár to do their duty; and this advice, given with moderation, has led the Sikh Government to make the confession of its own weakness, and to implore the Governor-General to prolong the period of occupation.

‘It is impossible to place any confidence in the professions of the Maharání or the Vizier, that the advice of a British Agent would be followed if the garrison were to be permitted to remain; the British Government would, in such case, be a party to the oppression of all classes of the people. Again, if the troops are withdrawn, we are warned that the country will be plunged into a state of anarchy, and the

destruction of all government will ensue. Neither of these results would be consistent with the humanity or the sincerity of our policy, and they would be equally opposed to our best interests.'

Proposals leading to the Treaty of Bhairówál.

His suggestions for modified arrangements—which resulted in the new Treaty of Bhairówál—were thus explained:—

'The other course—which it may be open to the British Government to take, and which has constantly occupied my attention since September 3—would be, to carry on the Government at Lahore in the name of the Mahārāja during his minority (a period of about eight years), or for a more limited time, placing a British Minister at the head of the Government, assisted by a Native Council, composed of the ablest and most influential chiefs.

'This course, however, could not be adopted, even if the offer to surrender the Regency were to be made by the Mahārání, unless Her Highness' solicitations were cordially and publicly assented to by the great majority of the chiefs.

'If, therefore, the chiefs should not join the Regent and the Darbár in calling upon the British Government to act as the guardian of the young prince during his minority, and to conduct the administration, no attempt would be made to carry such a measure into execution. I should, in that case, scrupulously adhere to the terms of the agreement. Those terms could not be suspended, even temporarily, without some such public act as that of assembling all the chiefs who have an interest in the State through the lands they hold from the Mahārāja; and in any such proceeding the proposal must originate with the Lahore, and not with the British authorities.'

He then supports these proposals, and shows the

difference between them and the 'subsidiary system,' to which he was opposed:—

'The marked difference between the system of having a British Minister residing at Lahore and conducting the Government through native agency, and that which now prevails of a native Government administering the affairs of the State without any interference, foreign or domestic, excepting from the Regent, would amount to this, that in the one case our troops are made the instrument for supporting misrule, and giving countenance and strength to oppression; in the other, by British interposition justice and moderation are secured by an administration conducted by native executive agency, in accordance with the customs and feelings, and even prejudices, of the people. An efficient administration, working satisfactorily, being fairly established, the British interposition might be withdrawn; or, if necessary, it might continue till the coming of age of the Maharájá, when, as may be hoped, his country would be made over to him in a much improved and prosperous condition.

'The principal means of ensuring a successful government would consist in the strict administration of justice between the Government and the people, in the regular payment of the troops, and the guarantee to the chiefs of the unmolested enjoyment of their estates, which should only be liable to forfeiture on a strong case of misconduct clearly proved.'

The alternatives offered to the Sikh Government are thus concisely stated:—

'If, therefore, the proposal of the Regent and Darbár should lead to an offer to carry on the Lahore Government by a British Minister, during the minority of the Maharájá, and the proposal should be confirmed by the influential chiefs, publicly convoked for the deliberation of such a measure,

I should be disposed to give to the experiment a favourable consideration.

‘If no such proposal leading to modifications of the Treaty should be made, it is my intention to withdraw the British force from Lahore the latter end of December, in accordance with the agreement. I shall, in this case, have afforded the Lahore Darbár every facility in my power to avert the misfortune which the Vizier and his colleagues anticipate on the retirement of the troops; and you may be assured that, in the transactions now pending, the conduct of the British Government shall be strictly regulated by principles of justice and good faith.’

Lord Hardinge’s narrative of the new or Bhairowál Treaty runs thus:—

‘I stated that it was the duty of His Highness’ Government and the chiefs to decide upon the course which they might deem to be most expedient; but that in these arrangements I could exercise no interference, further than in giving to His Highness’ Government the aid of my advice and good offices in promoting the interests of the State.

‘These sentiments were conveyed to His Highness in Mr. Currie’s letter of December 9, and the answer is contained in a recapitulation of each paragraph by the Darbár, concluding with the request that I would leave two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and a field-battery at Lahore, with Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence as the Resident, for some months longer.

‘Mr. Currie, in his reply to this letter of the Maharájá’s, informed His Highness that the application for the continuance of a British force at Lahore involved a departure from the conditions of the articles of agreement concluded on March 11, and stated that it would therefore be advisable

that the members of the Darbár and the principal Sardárs should assemble, in order that Mr. Currie might declare, in their presence, the only terms on which the Governor-General would consent to a modification of the arrangements, and to the continuance of a British force at Lahore, after the expiration of the stipulated period.

‘The paper containing these conditions was carefully translated into Persian and Hindustaní, and delivered by Mr. Currie to the chiefs, when they met on December 15. For the purpose of avoiding all misunderstanding, the different articles were explained; the Sardárs retired for consultation, and, after some discussion relating to the amount of the contribution for the expense of the British garrison, the terms were agreed to.

‘In order to afford full time for further deliberation, it was resolved that the Sardárs and chiefs should re-assemble on the following day, when certain individuals should be selected by themselves to draw up articles of agreement, in conjunction with Mr. Currie and Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence. The chiefs accordingly re-assembled at Mr. Currie’s Darbár tent, at three o’clock of the 16th instant. Each article was discussed separately; the contribution was fixed at twenty-two lakhs; and every Sardár present signed and sealed the paper. All the chiefs, in number fifty-two, on the conclusion of the meeting expressed their satisfaction that the Mahárájá would be under the protection of the British Government during his minority, which will continue until September 4, 1854.

‘At these meetings the chiefs unanimously concurred that a State necessity existed for excluding the Maharání from exercising any authority in the administration of affairs, and the Darbár and the chiefs have come to the decision that Her Highness shall receive an annuity of one lakh and a half.

‘You will observe, that a British officer appointed by the Governor-General in Council, with an efficient establishment of subordinates, will remain at Lahore, to direct and control every department of the State.

‘The feelings of the people and the just rights of all classes will be respected.

‘A Council of Regency, composed of leading chiefs, will act under the control and guidance of the British Resident.

‘The Council will consist of eight Sardárs, and the numbers will not be changed without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the orders of the Governor-General.

‘The power of the Resident extends over every department, and to any extent.

‘A military force may be placed in such forts and posts, and of such strength, within the Lahore territories, as the Governor-General may determine.

‘These terms give the British Resident unlimited authority in all matters of internal administration and external relations during the Maharájá’s minority.

‘The concession of these powers will enable the British Government to secure the peace and good order of the country—the authority will be exercised for the most beneficial purposes; these terms are more extensive than have been heretofore required, when native States have received the protection of a British contingent force. My motive in requiring such large powers has arisen from the experience of its necessity during the last nine months, and my reluctance on general principles to revert to the subsidiary system of using British troops to support a native Government, while we have no means of correcting the abuses of the civil administration of a country ostensibly under British protection. A British force acting as the instrument of a corrupt native agency is a system leading to mischievous

consequences, and which ought, when it is possible, to be avoided.

‘The occupation of Lahore will afford the means of counteracting much of the disorder and anarchy which have disturbed the Punjab for the last five years, chiefly owing to a numerous Sikh army, kept up in the vicinity of the capital, in numbers greatly disproportioned to the revenues of the country, and by whose republican system of discipline the soldiery had usurped all the functions of the State.

‘The control which a British garrison can exercise in enforcing order amongst the disbanded soldiery will, in conjunction with a British system of administration, protect all classes of the community. The immediate effect of depriving a numerous body of military adventurers of employment (there being still many to be disbanded to reduce the numbers to the limits of the Treaty of Lahore) may be troublesome, and a source of some uneasiness. No policy can at once get rid of an evil which has been the growth of years. But the operation of a system of order introduced into the Punjab will subdue the habits of this class, as has been the case in our own provinces since the Pindárá war, and, by gradually mitigating the turbulent spirit of the Sikh population, encourage the people to cultivate the arts of industry and peace.

‘A strict adherence to the letter of the Treaty, by the withdrawal of the British garrison at this moment from the Punjab, after the avowals made by the Darbár that the Government could not stand, would probably have led to measures of aggrandizement and the extension of our territory, after scenes of confusion and anarchy. This danger was felt by the most able of the Sardárs, and it reconciled them to the sacrifices which the terms inevitably required for the interest of the Lahore State. By the course which has been adopted, the modification of the terms of the

agreement of last March has been made with the free consent of the Sardárs, publicly assembled, who were made fully aware of the extent of the power which, by the new articles, was to be transferred to the British Government.

‘The confidence which the Sikh chiefs have reposed in British good faith must tend, by the unanimity of their decision, which partakes, as far as it is possible in an eastern country, of a national sanction, to promote the success of this measure.’

CHAPTER VII

LAWRENCE AS RESIDENT IN THE PUNJAB

COLONEL HENRY LAWRENCE was now practically the real ruler of the Punjab. The Council of Regency, who nominally governed and in whose name all orders were issued, consisted of eight leading men—Tej Singh, who had commanded the Sikh army; Ranjúr Singh, one of its generals; Sher Singh (Attariwála), the Mahárájá's brother-in-law; Sardárs Atar Singh and Shamsheer Singh (Sindhanwála); Diwán Dina Náth; Fakír Núr-ud-dín; and Bhai Nidhán Singh. Lawrence's influence was such that he secured their assent to his several measures. He selected and employed an exceptionally suitable and efficient body of officers, who fell in with his ideas, and acted in their several districts and posts in hearty accordance with his prescriptions, of which the guiding precept was—'settle the country, make the people happy, and take care that there are no rows.' The genial accessibility, the freedom of discussion, the manly sympathy and the readiness to redress wrongs and evils, united with the sturdy capacity for rule and the freedom from all tendency to intrigue or narrowness of demeanour or

control that were found to prevail, won in a marvellous degree the feelings of all classes of the people, Sardárs, chiefs, landholders, and peasantry alike, and secured their devotion to a number of the officers, as notably to Abbott in Hazára, Lumsden in Yusufzai, and John Nicholson and Edwardes on the Indus.

But with all the resulting success and personal popularity Lawrence could not escape from many serious dangers and difficulties. The Raní, as before, was in the forefront of the mischief. First she devised what was known as the Preyma plot, of which the chief aim was the assassination of Tej Singh, whom she hated; further she tried sedulously to corrupt the British Sepoy troops; and later on, a suspicious correspondence was detected with Mulráj, the Governor—and afterwards the rebel—of Múltán. So she was separated from her son, Dhulíp Singh, and removed to Firozpur, and eventually to Benares; and nothing further came, at the time, of any intrigue that may have been going on with Mulráj, as the conduct of all in high places was carefully watched. At the same time, Henry Lawrence had been obliged to check and thwart Mulráj in efforts which he had made to override the Council respecting his governorship of Múltán and its accounts.

But the matter that demanded the most sedulous and vigilant attention was the temper of the soldiery and of the warlike members of the community.

Lawrence's letter of June 2, 1847, will best show this, and that it had till then been dealt with effectively.

‘With the experience,’ he wrote, ‘of fourteen months, I can certify to this people having settled down in a manner that could never have been hoped or believed of them; but they have not lost their spirit. . . . A large majority of the disbanded soldiers have returned to the plough or to trade, but there are still very many floating on the surface of society; and such is the fickleness of the national character, and so easily are they led by their priests and pundits, and so great is their known pride of race and of a long unchecked career of victory, that if every Sardār and Sikh in the Punjab were to avow himself satisfied with the humbled position of his country, it would be the extreme of infatuation to believe him, or to doubt for a moment that, among the crowd who are loudest in our praise, there are many who cannot forgive our victory or even our forbearance, and who chafe at their own loss of power, in exact proportion as they submit to ours.

‘At no period of Anglo-Indian history has any great conquest or crisis been immediately followed by complete peace and security in the countries annexed to our dominion, or by the universal good-will of a people whom we have beaten in the field.’

Such was, perhaps, the greatest difficulty Henry Lawrence had to face. But he had faced and dealt with it and all other difficulties successfully, though only by the exercise of the utmost care, vigilance, and sagacity, as well as vigour and common sense.

By the middle of 1847, however, his health began to give way seriously. A short spell of leave from August to October was tried and found to be insufficient, and after a few weeks he had to turn his face again towards England. At this period, however, all

seemed to be well and to promise well. A real peace was reigning in the Punjab, to which it had long been a stranger. The population had settled down, and were obviously feeling the advantages of orderly rule; the Sardárs appeared loyal, and the Khálsa were no longer showing signs of any tendency to aggression.

Still, in the same letter of June 2 from which we have already quoted, he points out the springs of disaffection and danger that were still in force and must be watched and met:—

‘Our position at Lahore will always be a delicate one; benefits are soon forgotten, and little gratitude is to be expected. Moreover, there are the daily refusals, the necessary resummptions, the repressing or patching up of squabbles, all leaving behind them more or less of ill-will, paltry enough in detail, but, in the mass, sufficient to affect for years to come the movements of any honest administration of the Punjab. It was but the other day reclaimed from a state of the most ignorant barbarism, and has been but little subjected to the wholesome restraints of a regular government.’

During his short leave his brother John acted for him. Henry had written of him as his chief help, without whom he should have difficulty in carrying on, and he hoped that he would be allowed to rule for him in his absence in England. But this was not to be. Sir Frederick Currie, the Foreign Secretary, was appointed to the post.

This rule under Henry Lawrence’s direct guidance lasted for little more than six months, and, though carried out, by the selected officers referred to, in some

of the districts, those officers were, for various reasons, but few, and their districts the most difficult. But these were the cases that stamped the tone and mode of control desired, and gave the keynote to that later administration, adopted for the Punjab after the annexation, which proved so effective and was universally hailed as a model. Short as the time had been, the whole country had been more or less surveyed; the fiscal and excise systems had been readjusted; oppressive duties and Government monopolies had been abolished; and roads had been started. Further, a simple code of laws, founded on Sikh customs, had been framed by a selected body of some fifty heads of villages under the supervision of Sardár Lehna Singh. This same Sardár Lehna Singh had also been giving valuable aid in the general administration; for it was under his influence that the Manjha, the greatest and most important of the Sikh districts, containing both Lahore and Amritsir, had been specially quiet and tranquil. But there were two men who were held to need careful watching; Sultán Muhammad Khán, of Dost Muhammad's family, who governed Pesháwar, and Sardár Chattar Singh (Attaríwála), who was the ruler of Huzára—the father-in-law of the Mahárájá Dhulíp Singh, and the father of Sher Singh, the leading member of the Council of Regency.

No one thought at that juncture that the author of any approaching mischief in the Sikh community would be found in the Khatrí Governor of the remote, out of the way, Muhammadan district of Múltán.

With his departure from the Punjab at the end of 1847 closed the first great administrative part of Henry Lawrence's career—it was probably the brightest. He enjoyed the complete confidence of his direct superior, Lord Hardinge, he was the almost absolute head—the virtual king—of the Punjab, and was daily winning the golden opinions and the personal regard of his subjects, and looking forward, notwithstanding an apparently hopeless prospect at the start, to securing the good-will and alliance of the kingdom for the British Government, and the permanence of the policy of a friendly buffer-state on the frontier.

*Position and Prospects when Lawrence
took leave.*

Lawrence, then, being about to leave the control of the administration of the Punjab through its Council of Regency, it may be convenient to give here his views on various points of the policy which he had been administering. They are extracted mainly from his published article on Lord Hardinge's administration.

On the *old* general policy in respect of the Punjab before the war he writes thus:—

‘It has ever been the wish of the British Government to assist in the maintenance of a strong Sikh Government in the Punjab. It is understood that those who had the best means of forming a judgement on this question, in whatever other points they may have differed, were all agreed in this,

that no advantage that might be gained by annexation could equal that of having an independent and warlike but friendly people between us and the loose, wild, Muhammadan hordes of Central Asia. Not that the latter are in themselves formidable, even in their own country, but that their unsettled government, or too often absence of all government, must ever render them unsatisfactory neighbours. Much however as the maintenance of a Sikh Government in the Punjab was desired, it was early perceived that the chances were against it. One after another the ablest men in that unhappy country were cut off; falling by each other's hands or plots, often the assassin with his victim.'

His account of this situation in the Punjab, and the uncontrollable state and pretorian bearing of the Sikh troops that led up to the outbreak, is as follows:—

'Intoxicated with success at home, where no man's honour was safe from their violence, where they had emptied the coffers of the State and plundered those of Jammu, the unsated soldiery now sought to help themselves from the bazárs and treasuries of Delhi. This madness of the Sikh army was the true cause of invasion, and not either the acts of the British Government or its agents.

'Next to Ranjít Singh, Mahárájá Sher Singh was the truest friend in the Punjab to the British alliance. He was not a wise man, but in this at least he showed wisdom. Few indeed are the native chiefs, or natives of any rank, whose wisdom is consistent and complete. Many are clever in the extreme, acute, persevering, energetic, able to compete with the best of Europeans in ordinary matters, to surpass them in some; but the most accomplished character among them has its flaw. Mahárájá Sher Singh is an instance. Brave, frank, and shrewd, he might have been a

strong if not a great ruler, had he not been the slave of sensuality. Though he was a king, he wanted the resolution to act as one.'

Afterwards he states:—

'In the year 1843, and again in 1844, the Sikh army actually left Lahore with the declared purpose of invading the British provinces.'

He thus points out the impossibility, owing to our numerical military weakness, of annexing the Punjab after Sobráon, and the advantage of assigning Kashmír to Ghuláb Singh:—

'Lord Hardinge had not the means for annexation, had he desired it. It was necessary to punish and weaken the invader without, if possible, destroying his political vitality. To lessen his power for mischief by dividing his territory was the only alternative; nor, in doing so, would it have been practicable to have annexed the Hill Provinces, adding the upper half of it to the British dominions. A position so isolated and difficult of access could only have been held by means of a chain of strong military posts. The ruinous expense of such a measure is the most conclusive argument against it. Would those again who clamour against handing over the Hill Territory to Ghuláb Singh have approved of annexing the Lower Provinces to the British dominions, thus fastening the more cruel and distasteful rule of the Sikhs upon the mountain tribes; or would those who urge the danger of the neighbourhood of the Sikhs, even now that their army is dispersed, have listened with complacency to a proposition which would have given them so advantageous a position of annoyance as the possession of the mountain ranges which bound the plains of the Punjab?'

His account of the success, for the time, of Lord Hardinge's policy, and of his own administration, is as follows:—

‘The Sikhs *have* come to terms, and *have* settled down, because they have been well treated *by us*, and protected from their own army and chiefs *by us*; because scarcely a single *jágír* in the country has been resumed, and because the rights and even prejudices of all classes have been respected. It is however by no means so certain that had the country been occupied—all *jágírs* summarily resumed as has been done elsewhere in India, and held until it might be the pleasure or convenience of Government to examine into the tenures—and had our system, even in its most moderate form, but with its necessary vexations to a loose wild people, been introduced, it is by no means so certain that the Sikh population would have sat down quietly under the yoke. They have lost little that they held under Ranjít Singh; they are therefore patient and submissive, if not contented and happy, but had they been reduced to the level of our revenue-paying population, there cannot be a doubt that ere now there would have been a strike for freedom. The Sikhs perhaps care as little for their Government as do other natives of India; but like others they care for themselves, their *jágírs*, their patrimonial wells, gardens, and fields, their immunities and their honour. And in all these respects the Sikh and Ját population had much to lose. The Sikh position must not be mistaken. They are a privileged race, a large proportion have *jágírs* and rent-free lands; all hold their fields on more favourable terms than the Mussulmen around them.

‘These are substantial reasons for the Governor-General's moderation, and many others even as cogent might be found ;

but he acted on higher and nobler grounds than mere expediency. He desired to punish a gross violation of treaties; he did not desire to destroy an old and long faithful ally. No one more than the Governor-General saw the chances of a breakdown in the arrangement of March, 1846; but it is as idle as it is malicious therefore to blame him for its consequences. The question rested entirely on the honesty and patriotism of the Sikh Cabinet. Were they or were they not disposed to sacrifice their own selfish desires to the hope of rescuing their country from internal anarchy and foreign domination? Because one good, one able man was not to be found in a whole people, was that a just reason for condemning the Governor-General's acts? He at least did his duty, nobly, wisely, and honestly. Carefully abstaining from such interference as would weaken the executive, he authorized remonstrance of the most decided kind to the Darbár in behalf of the disbanded soldiery; as decidedly he supported the constituted authorities against the assumptions of Diwán Mulraj of Múltán; he forbore on the strong provocation given at Kángra, and forgave the offence of Kashmír, punishing in the latter case one individual, where a very slight stretch of privilege would have authorized a disseverance of the whole treaty.'

CHAPTER VIII

THE PUNJAB WAR

COLONEL LAWRENCE handed over his charge in the Punjab to his brother John towards the close of 1847, as a temporary measure pending the arrival of Sir Frederick Currie on March 6, and left Calcutta for England on January 18, 1848, in the same steamer with Lord Hardinge.

Meanwhile, Lord Hardinge had seriously altered the strength and distribution of the army. Hoping for a continuation of peace, he had reduced the strength of the Sepoy army by 50,000. But he had so re-arranged the troops as to double the garrisons on the North-West frontier. There were 50,000 men with 60 guns on the Sutlej, 10,000 men at Ferozpur, and 9,000 at Lahore. But though the troops at hand for immediate operations in the Punjab were thus greatly increased, the grave reduction in the native army diminished very seriously the force naturally available for prompt hot-weather campaigning.

A very brief period elapsed after Sir Henry's departure when Mulráj, the Governor of Múltán, began to complain to John Lawrence, who held office till March, 1848, of his inability to comply with the

demands of the Darbár in regard to revenue; and, after an interval, he tendered his resignation and begged to be relieved of his governorship. On Currie's arrival his resignation was accepted, and Sardár Khán Singh was appointed Nazim (Governor) to relieve him.

It is to be remembered that one of the political intrigues in which the Mahárání was thought to have been involved was with Mulráj; and it may be conjectured, as at least probable, that there was mischief at the bottom of Mulráj's present complaints, proposals, and proceedings; but John Lawrence did not think so at the time; and it was even mooted that he should be appointed a member of the Punjab Council of Regency.

Certainly nothing seems to have been done, of any moment, to ascertain promptly and vigorously the real state of matters and of feeling at Múltán before assenting to Mulráj's request, though there was no part of the Punjab in which there was such a diversity of races of importance, the Múltání Patháns especially being hereditary foes of Mulráj's rule.

The result was that Sardár Khán Singh, accompanied by two young English officers, Mr. Vans Agnew of the Civil Service, and Lieut. Anderson, proceeded with an escort to Múltán. But the movement was mismanaged, both in spirit and in detail. The vigorous personal guidance and assertion that had made the Kashmír expedition so successful, was entirely absent. There was none of the care and precaution exercised that was

obviously advisable in arranging to replace a troublesome Governor in a wild district. It was treated as an ordinary change of officials during high peace. Even as regards the escort, instead of the unison between the British officers and their men, that was usually so much attended to, being cared for on this occasion, the officers never saw the escort till they reached Múltán; and then the attitude of the people and the events that occurred were a complete surprise. When they were with Mulráj, on April 19, the day after they arrived, the British officers were attacked by his Darbár troops, being first wounded and afterwards killed. Mulráj, who had fled immediately, at first wrote saying that his people were dominating him and would not allow him to resign; but presently he threw off the mask and declared hostility to the English control. Mulráj, it must be understood, was not a Sikh, neither was the Sepoy who began the fray by attacking Agnew, whereas, when Agnew was struck, the man who defended him and knocked over his assailant was a Sikh trooper of his escort; and Khán Singh, the new diwán, who was a Sikh Sardár, rescued Agnew, and was himself made a prisoner and maltreated. The measure that caused the rising was the substitution of Khán Singh, a Sikh Sardár, for the Khatrí Mulráj, and this certainly did not incite the Sikhs there to oppose the step. The only circumstance ever suggested as having led to their being hostile to it was the rumour that the Darbár intended to disband the local Sikh regiment at the instigation

of Tej Singh. In fact, however, the outbreak seems to have been due to a purely local intrigue and not to the instigation of the Khálsa or the Sikh community or leaders. Nor could any part of the Punjab be named which was so out of touch with the Khálsa and their aspirations as Múltán. The local rabble seemed to be more involved than any particular party, and they were not Sikhs at all.

Sir F. Currie at once made the Darbár send off some of their troops towards Múltán, but Lord Gough objected to the movement of any British troops for such a business and at such a season.

The response of Lord Dalhousie to the challenge given by Mulráj was, in his minute of May 11, in these words:—

‘We are fully sensible how important it is that this rebellion against the State of Lahore should forthwith be repressed, and that the insult offered and foul treachery shown to the British power should be followed by early and signal punishment. But however imminent may be the risk that, if the British troops do not now move, insurrection, apparently successful for a time at Múltán, may extend its influence over the Punjab, and may cause disturbance and revolt throughout its bounds, we yet think that the dangers which would thence arise to the British interests in India are far less than those which would be created by our being compelled to discontinue operations once begun before they had been brought to a successful termination, and by the fearful loss among the troops which is anticipated as the consequence of entering on military operations on the scale required in such a district as Múltán, at such a season of the year as this.

'We have determined therefore not to make any such movement at present, but we shall proceed to make the necessary preparations for enabling us, as soon as the season will permit, to enter on operations which we consider imperatively necessary for punishing the causeless rebellion of Mulráj, and for exacting ample reparation from the State of Lahore for the insult offered and the deep injury inflicted on your Government in the base murder of your faithful servants through the treachery, desertion, and crime of the servants of the Maharájá of Lahore.'

This was the minute of Lord Dalhousie; and it was thoroughly in accordance with the views of Lord Gough, if not based on them, and was also, it is understood, concurred in by Sir Frederick Currie.

Such steps were thus deliberately avoided as might have crushed the outbreak at its start, as Henry Lawrence had done with the Kashmír attempt. Obviously the outbreak was assumed to be a premeditated Sikh movement, putting aside all idea of the continuance of a friendly Punjab. And the Government practically elected to run the risk—many held it to be the certainty—of the flame of insurrection spreading over the Province; of rousing afresh that spirit in the Khálsa, to the soothing and repression of which all Hardinge's and Lawrence's efforts and policy and precautions had been so strenuously and keenly directed, and filling it with a wild desire to try conclusions again with the British military power.

The view that this decision of Government would inevitably lead to this result proved correct. Many held it to be so obvious that there could be no other

result, that they refused to believe that the coming struggle was not deliberately desired and determined by the Commander-in-Chief and the Government—notwithstanding all Lord Hardinge's policy and Lawrence's efforts in the opposite direction. The general story is well known; and its details need not be given here, though a slight sketch may be useful. Mulráj forthwith prepared Múltán for defence, and all the Darbár troops on the spot joined him. Lieutenant Edwardes—opposite Múltán, on the Indus, to the west—held his own against Mulráj's outlying detachments, and roused the Baháwalpur State, peopled by a Muhammadan race called Dáúd-putras that lay to the south, to rise and co-operate against Mulráj. He raised levies of friendly Trans-Indus frontier and other tribes, and, duly obtaining sanction and gathering all these native troops together, met and defeated Mulráj's army in the field twice, and drove them into the fort of Múltán. This was done in June, in the height of the fiercest heat.

The Lahore Darbár had, as already said, despatched troops towards Múltán, ostensibly to operate against Mulráj, now a rebel against them. These troops were in three separate columns under Rájá Sher Singh, Diwán Jawáhir Mall, and Sheikh Emam-ud-dín respectively. The two latter commanders, being loyal and distrusting the Sikhs of their columns, sent them back to Lahore, and came onward with their Muhammadans only; Sher Singh, however, brought on his whole force. Edwardes had soon begun to besiege

the fort of Múltán, and had urged on the Government that if a body of Sepoy troops were sent to his support the fort might be taken quickly, as it was still in an unfinished state and had not yet attained its subsequent strength. On hearing of Edwardes' victories, Sir Frederick Currie decided to comply with his proposals, and on his own authority ordered off a Sepoy force, partly from Lahore and partly from Firozpur, to proceed to Múltán and support Edwardes; but meanwhile the Darbár troops had joined Edwardes, and he, though gravely distrusting the Sikhs in their ranks, had perforce to carry on the siege in conjunction with them.

Lord Gough, on hearing of Sir Frederick Currie's independent action, and not thinking it desirable to oppose him, accepted the measure; and further, being of opinion that the strength which Currie had arranged for the force was inadequate, he increased it by two British regiments and other additions. Hence, early in September, the combined force, consisting of Edwardes' original party, the Beháwalpur men, the Lahore Durbar troops, and Whish's newly arrived British division, were operating against Múltán. On the 14th, however, Sher Singh and the Sikh Darbár troops threw off the mask and deserted to Mulráj; leaving the attack so weak comparatively that the siege had to be suspended. But a second division of British troops was ordered up from Bombay, and on its arrival in November the siege was recommenced, and ended with the capture of the fortress,

but not till January 22, 1849, nine months after Mulráj had raised the standard of revolt.

Meanwhile the desertion of Sher Singh and his Sikh troops at Múltán had practically inaugurated the second Sikh rising and war against the British Government, simultaneous as it was with the revolt of Chattar Singh, Sher Singh's father, in the extreme north-west of the Punjab. The Khálsa were now up; but Lahore and the Mánjha were in the hands of the English, and could not become the battlefield; so Sher Sing collected his Sikh army on the Chenáb, to the west, and there awaited the conflict.

The siege of Múltán continued, while Lord Gough, having collected his army, fought the actions of Rám Nagar, Sadulápur, and Chilianwála. Though the enemy were defeated in all these combats, so many mishaps and such heavy losses occurred on the English side that they were looked upon as disasters, and by some as virtual defeats. Practically, Gough had throughout been overmatched in artillery. While large bodies of troops and his heavy guns were employed in siege work, his army was still inadequate, especially in artillery, for the field operations needed for the conquest of the country, and he therefore now waited till the Múltán army could join him.

This it did on February 20, 1849, and on the 21st Gough fought the battle and won the overwhelming victory of Gujrát, leading to the pursuit and surrender of the whole Sikh army, and laying the Punjab prostrate before the British power.

Thus ended the Punjab campaign. The flame of war had been lit, not in the capital, or the Mánjha, or by the Sikhs, but in an out-of-the-way Muhammadan corner of the kingdom, by its Khatri governor and his followers. The British Government had deliberately allowed the excitement in the Darbár army and the disbanded Sikh troops to grow and develop unchecked; only a very few Sikh chiefs had, like Chattar Singh and his son Sher Singh, taken part in inciting to the war. Many of them remained loyal to the British interests; whilst others, as a matter of patriotic duty, had, like the Scottish highlanders a hundred years before, sided with their countrymen when open war began; and, though against their own inclinations and interest, led them gallantly in the struggle, and were now shattered by the blow. These had not sought the war, and had hoped that Hardinge's policy and Lawrence's guidance would have led to its being permanently averted.

Shortly after reaching England, Henry Lawrence received the honour of K.C.B. in recognition of his recent services; but he had been at home only about three months when the news arrived of the Múltán outbreak. It is needless to say what profound grief this catastrophe and the action that was taken on it caused him. Putting aside the other aspects of the matter, he realized that his efforts to keep the Sikhs straight would now prove to have been in vain. A similar crisis had been averted in Kashmír by his own vigorous and politic conduct in dealing with

Sheik Emam-ud-dín's rebellion, but he felt assured that the Sikh troops, left to themselves to operate against Mulráj, who had proclaimed his outbreak to be against the English, would not be able to resist the temptation to assert their own pretorian independence as before, and again try conclusions with the English power; and that the fate of the Sikh kingdom was sealed. There can be no doubt that he felt it to be certain that for every British soldier whose life would have been risked by an immediate hot-weather movement against Mulráj, tens or fifties would be lost in the war that was sure to ensue; and, in his heart, he thought with others, though he could not say so openly, that a sweeping war in the following winter and the conquest of the Punjab formed the real aim of the new rule in India; that no fair chance was now being given to the Sikhs, or to the policy which he had been placed in his post in the Punjab to further, and had carried out with such marked success while there.

On hearing of the outbreak he decided on rejoining, if possible; and, having asked for leave to return, he was informed at the end of July that his return was left to his own option. Afterwards, receiving the concurrence of the Duke of Wellington in the opinion that he should rejoin, he returned to India, and reached Bombay in December, 1848.

But it may be observed that the above reply from the E. I. Board, though perhaps a courteous recognition of his zeal, showed a marked indifference to

any need for his presence in the Punjab at such a contingency, and indicated a chilling disregard or ignorance of any exceptional value attaching to his relations with the Sikhs.

When thus about to resume his old post and functions, Sir Henry could not help feeling the difficulty in which Lord Dalhousie was placed, and of his realizing that it was almost impossible for him, from want of the intimate knowledge of the fluctuating details of recent years, to accept what Sir Henry held to be the only view that was true and just and sound of the conduct of the Khálsa, and of the treatment that should be meted out to them. Still, he felt it to be his duty to let that view be clearly known; although, as will be seen, it was made as difficult and disagreeable as possible for him to do so.

Lord Dalhousie's opinions and intentions were thus expressed to him :—

‘It will remain for us to consider whether we can continue in relations of amity with a power whose Government, even under our protection and guidance, will not, or cannot, control its own army, or whether we should not at once take our own measures for obliterating a State which, as these events would appear to show, can never become a peaceful neighbour, and which, so long as it is allowed to exist, is likely to be a perpetual source of military annoyance (at all events), and consequently a cause of unsatisfactory expense and of additional anxiety.’

And again :—

‘There was no more sincere friend of Lord Hardinge's policy to establish a strong Hindu Government between the

Sutlej and the Kháibar than I. I have done all that man could do to support such a Government and to sustain that policy—I no longer believe it feasible to do so.'

This is bold and clear language. Lord Dalhousie's language always was so. But was it sound, and did it indicate a real knowledge and recognition of past circumstances? The whole basis of the arrangements then in force under the treaty of Bhairówál was the avowed inability of the Darbár to control the Sikh army, and the support they were in consequence to receive from the British force to keep it in subjection till its temper should have been subdued and proper discipline and content introduced. When Mulráj's misconduct led to the crisis in the Sikh army, was Lord Dalhousie's deliberate abstention from using the British troops to suppress the evil tendency in real accordance with his assertion that he had 'done all that man could do to support the (Sikh) Government'?

It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that he had not learnt to distinguish, and to regard separately, the three discordant elements in the Sikh polity—the Court, the Sikh aristocracy or chiefs, and the Sikh army—and that instead he looked on them as one body, so united in action and interests as to require to be all dealt with on the same footing. Nor in his haughty anger at their daring to war against the British Government did he show any inclination to make allowances for the grave temptations to which the Sikh army had been subjected by the military

blunders and incompetence of the British, displayed during the Afghán war. Lord Hardinge had been fully sensible of it, and had estimated their power, the danger of the temptation, and the unfortunate position in which they had been placed by the death of Ranjít Singh, the absence of any suitable successors to him, the relaxation of all discipline and control, and the pitiful figure that mismanagement had caused the British power to assume in their eyes. That it was no longer possible to support the Sikh Government was one matter; that the Sikh chiefs and the Sikh army and people deserved condign punishment was quite another. Lord Dalhousie's demeanour and language did not seem to show that he recognized the difference at this epoch; though his eventual action indicated a more friendly tone to the people.

On landing at Bombay, in December, 1848, Sir Henry proceeded at once to the Punjab, and halting at Múltán for two or three days, left for Lahore on January 8. Lord Dalhousie had heard—it is not known from whom—that Sir Henry—so much given to theatrical exhibitions!—had contemplated some ‘pretty stage effect’ of his own at Múltán, including a personal surrender of Mulráj to himself; and, in consequence, he wrote to him thus:—

‘There are strong rumours current that if you should arrive anywhere near Múltán before the operations against that fortress are renewed and completed, the Diwán Mulráj means to surrender himself to you. I have no doubt whatever that you would not receive him, or act in any public

capacity whatever, at present. Nevertheless, as you are necessarily ignorant of much that has passed, I think it right to address you expressly on the subject. I have to inform you that I will grant no terms whatever to Mulráj, nor listen to any proposal but unconditional surrender.'

This letter justly ignored the idea that Sir Henry meant to act or could act in the way that had been suggested; but the correspondence intimated very clearly that he must form no conclusions as to the present state of matters, or of the future policy, till he had become more fully and correctly conversant with the details of recent occurrences. It implied that judgement had been already passed on the rising of the Sikhs, and that the outbreak involved a new departure in policy, making any former policy a thing of the past. At the same time, it did not necessarily indicate that, except in some particular cases, such as that of Mulráj, the threatened severity would go beyond political repression.

At first, therefore, Sir Henry had no reason to think that he would not have opportunities for keeping in view the principles and grounds of the old policy of a friendly race on our borders, though that policy itself might no longer be open to adoption in the shape that had been before hoped for, as a continuance of that race in an independent kingdom.

After leaving Múltán he came to Lahore, and we next hear of him at Chilianwála. He was present

at the action of January 13; and statements have been made—but not apparently on any authentic grounds—that it was owing to his influence that Lord Gough was led to hold his ground after the battle was over.

After Chilianwála, Sir Henry returned to Lahore, while Lord Dalhousie still remained at Firozpur, receiving occasional visits from Sir Henry, and apparently maintaining daily correspondence with him. Múltán surrendered on January 22, and the besieging army was forthwith ordered to move northwards to reinforce Lord Gough, which it did a month afterwards, when the battle of Gujrát was fought, finishing the war by a crushing defeat of the Sikh army.

CHAPTER IX

ANNEXATION AND PACIFICATION OF THE PUNJAB-- STEPS LEADING UP TO THE ANNEXATION

MEANWHILE communications had been going on with the enemy respecting the release of Colonel George Lawrence and others, whom they were holding as prisoners; and Sir Henry was engaged in preparing, by Lord Dalhousie's wish, besides other arrangements, drafts of proclamations to be issued to the Sikhs on their being defeated. There is no sign that Lord Dalhousie gave instructions of any kind to Sir Henry regarding the tenor, particulars, or form of the proposed proclamations, and Sir Henry consequently drew up such a document as he would have prepared in accordance with the practice, policy, and tone in force under Lord Hardinge, and submitted it to Lord Dalhousie. The Governor-General's letter, in reply, dated February 3, 1849, dealt both with the proclamation and with the proposals for the release of George Lawrence and the other captives with the Sikhs. It is necessary to note this, because the warm and friendly terms in which he dealt with the latter subject indicate Lord Dalhousie's kindly feelings, and must be borne in view in reading the plain-spoken

and otherwise harsh language in which he commented on the proposed proclamation :—

‘In my conversation with you a few days ago I took occasion to say to you that my mode of conducting public business, in the administration with which I am entrusted, and especially with the confidential servants of the Government, are, to speak with perfect openness, without any reserve, and plainly to tell my mind without disguise or mincing of words. In pursuance of that system, I now remark on the proclamation you have proposed. It is objectionable in matter, because, from the terms in which it is worded, it is calculated to convey to those who are engaged in this shameful war an expectation of much more favourable terms, much more extended immunity from punishment, than I consider myself justified in granting them. It is objectionable in manner; because (unintentionally, no doubt) its whole tone substitutes you personally, as the Resident at Lahore, for the Government which you represent. It is calculated to raise the inference that a new state of things is arising; that the fact of your arrival with a desire to bring peace to the Punjab is likely to affect the warlike measures of the Government; and that you are come as a peacemaker for the Sikhs, as standing between them and the Government. . . . This cannot be. . . . There must be entire identity between the Government and its agent, whoever he is. . . . I repeat, that I can allow nothing to be said or done which should raise the notion that the policy of the Government of India, or its intentions, depend on your presence as Resident in the Punjab, or the presence of Sir F. Currie instead. By the orders of the Court of Directors, that policy is not to be finally declared until after the country is subjected to our military possession, and after a full review of the whole subject. The orders of the Court

shall be obeyed by me. I do not seek for a moment to conceal from you that I have seen no reason whatever to depart from the opinion that the peace and vital interests of the British Empire now require that the power of the Sikh Government should not only be defeated, but subverted, and their dynasty abolished. . . . I am very willing that a proclamation should be issued by you, but bearing evidence that it proceeds from Government. It may notify that no terms can be given but unconditional submission; yet that, on submission being immediately made, no man's life shall be forfeited for the part he has taken in hostilities against the British Government.'

The only remark that need be made on this extract is that it placed Sir Henry's position on a perfectly different footing from that on which it had hitherto been, and practically changed it from one of confidence and latitude, which had worked with perfect smoothness, to one of restriction and obedience to definite orders.

But to Sir Henry, the gravamen of the letter lay less in its tone towards himself than in the treatment to which it seemed to indicate that the Punjab and the Sikhs would certainly be subjected. His anxiety was deeply aroused. He feared the worst; that is, that all chance was at an end of securing a friendly feeling of good-will and alliance in the frontier race, and that one of bitter alienation, hatred, and hostility would prevail instead. His fear for the State was the impracticable situation that would result; and his anxiety, based on the disposition that seemed to him to prevail, was lest the treatment

should prove to be so harsh that the permanent alienation of an essentially brave and noble-hearted though misguided race was almost certain to ensue, in contrast to the good-will and loyalty that prevailed, consequent on just and honourable treatment, among their brethren in the Phulkian and other Misls in the Cis-Sutlej States. That anxiety had, for its rock ahead, the presence, in a strong strategical position, of a brave and powerful enemy in case of serious complications with foes beyond the frontier.

But Lord Dalhousie, whatever ideas may be suggested by his strong language, was in reality very mindful of Sir Henry's views, considered them well, and, as will be seen, meant to adopt and utilize them to a very great extent. The battle of Gujrat was fought and won on February 21, and the Punjab lay prostrate before the British Government. The question of its fate had now to be settled. Before deciding, Lord Dalhousie, at Sir Henry's own suggestion, consulted with John Lawrence; and, as he approved of annexation as being undeniably and urgently expedient, it was forthwith determined on, and the proclamation was issued on March 29, announcing that the sovereignty of the Punjab had passed over to the Queen of England.

On its being decided, in the middle of March, that the Province was to be annexed, Sir Henry tendered his resignation of the Residentsip, thereby removing any difficulty that there might be in regard to the appointment of some other officer to the charge of

the territory under the altered circumstances ; his own inclinations being at that time strongly against undertaking the new duties—partly from his avowed view of the impolicy of the annexation, but mainly from the belief that the arrangements that would ensue would be so harsh to the conquered people that his concurrence in them would be out of the question.

But Sir Henry Elliot, the Secretary in the Foreign Department, was deputed by Lord Dalhousie to see Sir Henry Lawrence on the subject, and explain to him that the Governor-General particularly desired that he should continue in his leading position in the Punjab, if only for the special reason that it would ensure his having the best opportunity for effecting his great object, the fair and even indulgent consideration of the vanquished—the smoothing down of the inevitable pangs of subjugation to those proud and brave enemies, with whose chief and leaders no man was so familiar as he, or so appreciative of what was noble in their character. Such an appeal—such a reason—entirely altered Sir Henry's sentiments, placed the prospect in a wholly new light, led him to withdraw his resignation, and made him more reconciled to Lord Dalhousie and his ways.

He had been appointed Chief Commissioner in February, but the eventual arrangement for the administration was not that of one responsible ruler in charge of it, but that it should be vested in a triumvirate consisting of Sir Henry Lawrence as

President, his brother John Lawrence and Mr. Mansel as members. They were to form a board, in whose name all orders should be issued, each of them however to have distinct functions and charges; Sir Henry, the Political and Military; John, the Revenue; and Mr. Mansel, the Judicial Department. The great duty of effecting the pacification of the Province, removing the irritation, and introducing contentment and peace, rested largely on Sir Henry.

As a first step towards this end, such support as could be obtained from the members of the recent Sikh Government was desirable; and on March 28, the day before the annexation was publicly proclaimed, Sir Henry Elliot, armed with full instructions from Lord Dalhousie, and accompanied by Sir Henry Lawrence, and his Assistant, Mr. Bowring, met the Sikh Council, and announced the coming annexation, and the terms which the members of the Council would receive. Tej Singh, Dina Náth, Fakír Núr-ud-dín, and Bhai Nidhán Singh, were those present, and agreed in writing to the terms. They were promised the retention of their jágírs, if they gave loyal assistance.

*Lawrence as President of the Board of
Administration.*

Proper military precautions having been taken, the annexation was effected peacefully, and there was no opposition or trouble. Lord Dalhousie had promised—and he fulfilled his promise—to provide the Punjab

with the best men in India to help the Board; and thenceforth ensued a rule which was unsurpassed for efficiency, and unequalled for the rapidity and thoroughness with which a wild and disorganized State was brought into order and prosperity, and an embittered and turbulent race turned into a contented and loyal population. The main credit, without any invidious meaning, for the judicial organization rested with Mr. Mansel and Mr. Montgomery; the civil and district arrangements, and especially the revenue and financial, were due to John Lawrence; but the tone of the administration, the accessibility of the officials, and the frank intercourse between them and the people, had been inaugurated by Sir Henry when Resident at Lahore before the Múltán outbreak and the recent war. His injunctions in those days had been thus expressed in writing to one of his men:—

‘In a new country, especially a wild one, promptness, accessibility, brevity, and kindness are the best engines of government. Have as few forms as possible, and as are consistent with a brief record of proceedings. Be considerate and kind, not expecting too much from ignorant people. Make no change, unless certain of decided improvement in the substitute; light assessment, considering the claims and privileges, even when somewhat extravagant, of the privileged classes, especially when they affect Government and not the ryots’ (i.e. the peasantry).

It was this general tone, quite as much as the efficacy of the detailed arrangements, that led to the contentment and peace of the Punjab, though it was

unquestionably the financial management of John Lawrence that made it so prosperous. Sir Henry, under Dalhousie's orders, created the military defence of the frontier; inaugurated the local force, of which the example was the corps of Guides, that did such noble service in later days; inspired the development of the natural resources of the country, and furthered its material improvement by the construction of roads and canals and other engineering work, supervised by Colonel Napier, afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala. Even in the matters of the more distinctly civil administration organized by his brother, Henry's influence not less than John's tended to simplification of procedure. That administration formed a model of the Non-Regulation system. It has been described succinctly in the volume of this series dealing with the career of Lord Lawrence. Sir Henry's own special aims and efforts were directed towards effecting the conciliation and creating the goodwill which he regarded as of paramount necessity to the welfare of the Empire.

The remarks which have been made respecting John Lawrence when Henry was Resident show the regard in which he held his brother, and how strong the bond and unity of purpose was between the two. But, in the more detailed administrative work of the Board, differences of views naturally developed. There was only one, however, that led to actual friction, and that was the treatment of the old *jágírdárs*.

Before dealing with it, however, two other dif-

ferences may be mentioned, which did not involve any peculiar friction. One, the economy of public expenditure; the other, the continuance or formation of an influential upper class or aristocracy.

As to public economy, it must not be supposed that Sir Henry had any tendency to disregard it; on the contrary, his whole spirit was imbued with the desire for thrift; only, his view of the subject was broader than John's. He did not, for one point, consider that it should be restricted to the rigid idea of the necessity of making two ends meet. He held that 'in public as in private life, judicious liberality is in the end economy.' 'Money is saved by keeping men contented, preserving the peace, and getting expeditiously through work.' 'Money is gained and the revenue increased by expenditure on roads and canals.' Though the brothers differed on the theory of the subject, they were sufficiently in unison on the practical points involved to agree on the several undertakings at issue, and the result was that there was generally a surplus of income over expenditure.

The other point of difference, the general policy of fostering an influential upper class or aristocracy, was never a matter of question, because Lord Dalhousie was definitely against it, and there was no more to be said; the policy must be that laid down by the Governor-General. But Sir Henry's views may be mentioned. Broadly speaking, he desired for the Trans-Sutlej States or Punjab a class of natural and influential leaders of the people, such as had long

existed in the Cis-Sutlej Sikh States. There the heads of the Phulkian and other Misls and organizations had by degrees, and especially latterly under British protection, increased in status, position and power; and such men as the Rájás of Patialá and of Jind materially influenced, guided, and ruled the people. If Sir Henry could have had his way, he would have created and fostered a similar aristocracy from among the chiefs and influential men in the several Trans-Sutlej districts. But this was not to be. Lord Dalhousie would have none of it. The people were to be brought to lean only on the benefits and guidance of the Administration; and, consequently, there was to be no retention, beyond what was unavoidable, of any recognized body of men of position who could claim, or who were likely to possess, any real influence or hold over the people, except by personal weight and force of character.

But mark the results when the Mutiny broke out. On comparing the action of the Sikh community in the Cis-Sutlej States and those in the Punjab, it will be seen that the Cis-Sutlej men, under the specific guidance and orders of their chiefs, at once declared for the British, kept open the road to Delhi, furnished valuable contingents, and gave important aid throughout the siege. In the Jálándhar Doáb, also, the Kapúρθala Rájá held the district for the Government; but no other Trans-Sutlej Sikhs thus voluntarily came forward to aid the State; and when at length John Lawrence called on the Sikh chiefs of

the Punjab, on July 23, to furnish men for the war, the result was that no levies of real Sikhs under their own leaders ever seem to have joined at all, though a body of gunners and sappers was organized, and a large number of Muzhabís—low-caste Sikhs—were raised from among the canal workmen by the irrigation engineers, and converted into sappers and pioneers for employment at Delhi; while, in contrast to them, leaders and chiefs of the Muhammadan Múltán and frontier tribes under the influence of Edwardes and the frontier officers raised regiment after regiment of their Múltání, Pathán, and other followers (not Sikhs at all), who marched down to the seat of war, and aided in the conflict at Delhi. One often reads loosely worded allusions to John Lawrence having sent down large bodies of newly-raised Sikhs to Delhi. In point of fact, he sent none but the few mentioned above. Those who aided us at Delhi were the *Cis-Sutlej* Sikhs and the Múltán and frontier Muhammadans, besides the Kashmír contingent of 2,000 men, who arrived shortly before Delhi was stormed.

After the capture of Delhi, when the storm had been weathered and the tide had turned—but not till then—the Trans-Sutlej Sikhs came forward and enlisted in thousands, raising the strength of the Punjab troops, it is said, up to some 70,000 men.

Though this matter, then, of an influential upper class in the Punjab, whatever its merits or its demerits, was not to be encouraged, a question closely

connected with it—the treatment of the old jágirdárs—was in some respects left open and formed the one point of friction between the brothers.

These jágirdárs were men of position who had received from Ranjit Singh, or acquired by the sword or by services, grants of land called jágírs. Dalhousie gave the Board instructions in respect of these and other rent-free tenures—specifying however six classes of cases—in which the decision on them should depend for each case on its own merit. That there would be differences of opinion he well knew, but he held that this would do good and not harm. But they gradually became so numerous as to involve a very weighty mass of contention, and a serious one, because the question affected the divergent responsibilities of the two brothers—John's, in his capacity as local Chancellor of the Exchequer and his consequent aims at the minimizing of the expenditure; Henry's, in his position as the head of the Administration, in charge of the political department, with the duty of pacifying the Province and securing the good-will and friendliness of the community, of the men of weight as well as of the peasantry and the mass of the people. Apparently all the cases in which they did not agree had to be referred to Lord Dalhousie, and his decisions were more frequently in accordance with John's opinions than with Sir Henry's, who began to feel, therefore, that he did not hold in reality as in name the position of Head of the Administration, of *Primus inter pares*,

and also that the fundamental undertaking of which he was specially in charge—the pacification of the Province—was being jeopardized. The former was a personal matter, but was not consonant either with his present position nor with that of Resident and Chief Commissioner, which he had been holding when appointed to the Board. The latter was serious as affecting the welfare and outlook of the Province and the country; besides also causing him the most intense depression, as it lowered him in the eyes of his old friends, the Sikh Sardárs, and tended to the conclusion that he had failed to secure for them, and that they had no further hope of obtaining, the justice they had expected of him—even those of them who had been members of the Council of Regency, and had been present at the meeting on the day before the annexation was proclaimed.

He therefore tendered his resignation; and so did his brother John. Lord Dalhousie's reply to Sir Henry ran thus:—

'You are aware that by the unreserved communications of yourself and your brother for several years past I have been made fully cognizant of your differences of opinion and of the partial estrangement they had created. On every occasion I have spoken frankly to each of you; I have repeated to each what I had said to the other, and up to the last occasion on which we met I stated my conviction that, however irksome or painful such conflict of opinion might be to yourselves, the public service had, I conceived, been promoted rather than injured by it.

'I am bound to say that during the present year I have

felt some doubt whether your estrangement was not beginning to be injurious. From the letters of both of you I have received the impression that differences of opinion were becoming more frequent and more acrid, and that equally the existence of them, and the desire on both sides to avoid cause for engaging in them, was leading to questions being tacitly laid aside because you saw no probability of agreeing upon them, when it is very probable that they might have been advantageously mooted and discussed.

‘It has for some time been the recorded opinion of the supreme Government that, whenever an opportunity occurred for effecting a change, the administration of the Punjab would best be conducted by a Chief Commissioner, having a Judicial and a Revenue Commissioner under him. But it was also the opinion of the Government that, whenever the change should be made, the Chief Commissioner ought to be an officer of the Civil Service.

‘You stand far too high, and have received too many assurances and too many proofs of the great estimation in which your ability, qualities, and services have been held by the successive Governments under which you have been employed, to render it necessary that I should bear testimony here to the value which has been set upon your labours and upon your services as the head of the administration of the Punjab by the Government over which I have had the honour to preside. We do not regard it as in any degree disparaging to you that we, nevertheless, do not consider it expedient to commit the sole executive charge of the administration of a kingdom to any other than to a thoroughly trained and experienced civil officer. Although the Regulations do not prevail in the Punjab, and although the system of civil government has wisely and successfully been made more simple in its forms, still we are of opinion that the superintendence of so large a system, everywhere founded on the

Regulations and pervaded by their spirit, can be thoroughly controlled and moulded as changes from time to time may become necessary, only by a civilian fully versed in the system of the elder provinces and experienced in its operation. All the world unites in acknowledging the talents and merits of Sir Thomas Munro. I cannot, therefore, illustrate better the strength of my own convictions on this head than by saying that if Sir Thomas Munro were now president of your Board, I should still hold the opinion I have expressed above regarding the office of Chief Commissioner.

‘As the Government entertained these views, it became evident that the change it contemplated in the form of administration could not be effected, nor could the dissensions existing be reconciled, unless it were agreeable to you to transfer your services to some other department. And as it appeared to us very improbable that you would agree to any such transfer, and as we had no desire to *push* you into taking any step unwelcome to yourself, the Government decided not to make any movement upon this occasion.

‘Your present letter, in which you state that, with reference to the discord which prevails in the Board, you are willing to accept the Residency of Haidarábád, though by no means desirous of quitting the Punjab, has reopened the question, and I yesterday submitted it to my colleagues in council.

‘The result of our consideration was the statement I have now to make, that if you are willing to accept Rájputána, retaining your present salary as personal, the Government will be happy to appoint you to it, with a view to effecting the change of the form of administration in the Punjab, to which I have already referred.

‘I presume your offer had no especial reference to Haidarábád. Rájputána in your hands will have the same

salary as Haidarábád, and a political jurisdiction such, I believe, as accords with your inclinations. The agent marches all the cold weather, and in the hot weather is privileged to retire to Mount Abú. These are considerations which render the appointment agreeable as well as important, though I do not for a moment pretend to compare its importance with the Punjab.

‘I have now very fully explained the views and proceedings of the Government regarding your position and the proposal under review.

‘I hope you will be satisfied by it that the Government has evinced every desire to treat you with the highest consideration. Although it is not to be expected that you can concur in the view the Government has taken regarding the Chief Commissionership, you will at least be convinced that neither I nor my colleagues had any desire of forcing our views into practical operation at the expense of your feelings, or to do anything which might discredit your public position.

‘Before closing this letter, I must take the liberty of adding what is due in justice to you, that in all our correspondence and conversations regarding your differences with John Lawrence, I have always found you acting towards him with frankness and generosity.’

Such was Lord Dalhousie’s reply to Sir Henry. The point on which the two brothers were apt to differ has been explained, but it may be well to remark here that Sir Henry’s views on it have been greatly exaggerated by some writers, and his intentions much misrepresented.

Lord Dalhousie, it may be seen, made in this very letter no adverse comment whatever on the

points which Sir Henry advocated in opposition to his brother, in regard to the retention by the chiefs, in the disputed cases, of their old *jágírs*.

There is no doubt that Sir Henry felt this decision of Lord Dalhousie's very keenly, however gracious the terms in which it was conveyed. On the one hand, as a personal matter, he could not admit the implied incompetence to rule the Province when the situation was easy, after he had managed it so successfully in the trying times that followed on the Sutlej campaign, and after he, as head of the later administration, subsequent to the annexation, had brought it into such exceptional estimation and repute. And, on the other hand, as representative of the military and political branch of the service, he repudiated the idea that that profound experience of the details of civil administration of one part of the Empire was essential for the charge of another part, in the same sense that a trained medical man is needed for medical work, or a trained lawyer for the exposition of the law.

Nor was the Punjab yet in such a state of confirmed and ingrained tranquillity, of settled repose and contentment, that the style of administration hitherto carried on could be with safety set aside and replaced by more high and dry methods.

Now that Sir Henry was about to quit the Punjab, the gravity of the position lay, as already suggested, in the probability that there could be little hope of the arrangements for the *jágírdárs*, for which he had been so long striving, being fulfilled in their integrity ;

and his fears proved to be reasonable. Lord Canning, it may be here observed, on his visit to Lahore after the Mutiny, adopted more liberal measures towards these chiefs. But, meanwhile, the effect on Sir Henry was the feeling that the *jágírdárs* might think that they had been unfairly deprived of rights which they had been justified in expecting to retain, and for the loss of which they would impute the blame to him for want of power if not for want of will—a sad end to a staunch friendship in the case of a man of such deep sympathies.

Sir Henry, on receipt of Lord Dalhousie's letter, accepted the appointment to *Rájputána* ; and the news of his approaching departure was, it need hardly be said, received with a wail of sorrow by the whole Province. On his journey southwards from Lahore, he was accompanied almost throughout by a sorrowing escort of old friends and chiefs and their followers.

CHAPTER X

LAWRENCE IN RÁJPUTÁNA—THE ADOPTION QUESTION

EARLY in 1853, Henry Lawrence left the Punjab for his new charge. Besides the natural wrench in leaving the sphere of work with which he had been so long associated, with which he felt himself to be identified, where he was so much honoured and beloved, and where he was leaving behind all his most valued friends, there was this further official drawback, that he was going to a land where the polity was a clan system wholly different from that of the Sikhs and of the Punjabi Mussulmans, and where there had been a sad degeneracy from the old traditional type of Rájput gallantry and honour. They, the military caste of the Hindus, had been stubborn and bitter foes of the Muhammadans in their invasions of India, and had suffered greatly at the hands of the Mughal dynasty; but with the British they had ever been friendly, and had remained, under their protection on definite treaties with them, a group of eighteen sovereign States, in the territory on the west of the Jumna, known now as Rájputána and formerly as Rájasthan. The race was a race of warriors, and it was divided into clans, under an

intensely developed tribal organization, varying in size and in dignity of descent. They had a keen sense of honour, with an elaborate traditional code; and their fidelity was proverbial. Under British protection, and with the sudden change to absolute peace from a chronic state of warfare, the natural deteriorations had ensued, and it was only by degrees that Lawrence learnt and appreciated their good characteristics. His first feeling was that of extreme disappointment at the degeneracy of the chiefs and Rájás. No longer given to warlike pursuits, and not yet guided in nobler directions, they had become addicted to a life of sensuality and debauchery; and the spirit that prevailed was not a pleasant one.

Sir Henry Lawrence succeeded Sir John Low, who was about to join Lord Dalhousie's Council as Military Member, and who left for Sir Henry a letter giving Lord Dalhousie's views on the proper conduct of the charge. So long as the Rájput rulers paid their tribute, and did not commit serious aggressions on each other, the internal administration of the States was not to be interfered with; improvements were of course desirable if they could be brought about by quiet and unobtrusive advice; but Lord Dalhousie was quite content with the general state of things.

But the general situation—the feeling throughout the States, in touch with the feelings of their chiefs—was anything but satisfactory. This Sir Henry did not realize at first. New as he was to the feudal sentiment, which pervaded the Province—to the bond

between the chiefs and the men of the clans—he was not alive to the profound anxiety and irritation which prevailed in consequence of the line of action which Lord Dalhousie had been taking in regard to the practice in native States of the adoption of heirs in cases of default of natural successors. In pursuance of his declared policy ‘not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves,’ he had taken to opposing the exercise of the practice of adopting heirs, so that, on the failure of the natural or direct successors (within very restricted limits), the State concerned would lapse to the paramount power. The custom had been, in cases of the want of direct heirs, to adopt one, under definite traditional laws, subject to the approval and recognition of the paramount power; and it had been equally the custom to sanction such adoptions. The question had been occasionally raised of the legal rights of the practice; and, besides others, such authorities as Lord Metcalfe, Lord Auckland, and Sir George Clerk had asserted the positive right of the ruling chiefs to have their adoptions acknowledged, and had declared that they could not be barred by the paramount power, whose real part lay in *arbitration* in cases of contested adoptions.

But hitherto during Lord Dalhousie’s rule, *all* the adoptions proposed—some fifteen or sixteen—had been refused sanction, and the principalities concerned had been absorbed under the direct administration of the

British Government; a startling change of practice which had of course attracted serious and growing attention, especially in the case of Jhānsí, causing grave and increasing anxiety and irritation among the rulers of the native States, and, in such a province as Rájputána, among the clansmen as well.

The subject was comparatively new to Sir Henry, but a case in point was then under consideration in Rájputána itself, in respect of the Karauli State; and he therefore, so to speak, read up the subject carefully and thoroughly. The Karauli State itself was an insignificant one; but the principle at issue was not really affected by the size or importance of the State; it was the principle itself to which importance was attached, and that to a degree which was hardly realized. The chief had died, after adopting as his successor a boy who was a distant relative, named Bhart Pal. Sir John Low had approved of this adoption, and Sir Frederick Currie had supported it in Council; but it had been opposed by the Governor-General. On the question being referred to England, however, he had been overruled—a very exceptional occurrence—and the adoption of Bhart Pal had been approved. Meanwhile Sir Henry, having made himself acquainted with the subject, had come to the conclusion that adoption was the proper course, but not in the line that had been taken.

The facts and reasons on which he based his conclusions were these. The Rájá who had died—Núr Singh Pal—was a minor and unmarried, and had

no authority, not even to give away a village. The adoption he made would have been valid if the youth had been of age: but, under the circumstances, and especially in conformity with the practice in Rájputána, the right of selection lay with the Thákurs of the clan. Sixty-six of them, being all who were of any importance, had elected one Maddan Pal, in whose favour there also lay the further point that he was next of kin: and therefore Sir Henry considered him to be the rightful heir.

He laid these views before Lord Dalhousie, who then accepted and carried them out, instead of the original decision. The results were of the highest importance. The fears and the bitter irritation that had prevailed were allayed; the chiefs and the people saw that the policy of the stoppage of adoption, which heretofore had enjoyed a free course, had now received a sharp check; and they further felt that the decision in favour of Maddan Pal in place of Bhart Pal arose from the rise into practical power of a *régime* that was not only sympathetic and well-intentioned, but also vigorous and unflinching in its justice. The gravity of the ill-feeling subsided, and Sir Henry found himself acquiring, among these proud though for the time degenerate Rájputs, the same influence, regard, and affection which he had gained among the Sikhs and Punjabís.

He ruled in Rájputána for four years, from early in 1853 to early in 1857. His chief efforts during that period were directed against heinous malpractices—

satí, female infanticide, and the maltreatment of prisoners. Satí he practically suppressed, and the prison arrangements were greatly improved. In all such matters his principle was to interest the chiefs, to work through them, and lead them to realize that these were the proper matters for the exercise of their position and functions as rulers, and that to them would accrue the credit for success. With what delight would he have seen the noble and successful efforts made by Lord Mayo for the education and enlightenment of the Rájputána chiefs and nobles!

In the suppression of infanticide, he had not, when he left the Province, made as much way as he had hoped, or as he had done in the Punjab. Inordinate pride of race was at the bottom of the difficulty; partly in respect of the restrictions of lineage and family honour on the castes with which marriage was desirable, and partly from the extravagance and consequent impoverishment that in many cases attended the marriage ceremonies. It was only by the insistence on the principle that infanticide, like satí, involved murder, that progress was by degrees made in the suppression of the evil.

During the remainder of his stay in Rájputána the Crimean War was going on, and his thoughts were a good deal directed towards the action that Russia might be taking in regard to India and the intervening countries; and he approved of the treaty which, initiated by Herbert Edwardes, Lord Dalhousie made with Dost Muhammad.

Whilst in Rájputána, he was offered by Lord Dalhousie the chief posts in Haidarábád and in Oudh, but he declined them, electing to stay where he was. In 1856 there is nothing in his memoirs or papers to show that any seditious action going on through the country was attracting his special attention. He was probably mainly interested in the good feeling which had sprung up in Rájputána itself.

In January, 1854, he had sustained an overwhelming blow in the loss of his wife—of whom personally it would be out of place to speak here. His thoughts had been every now and then turning to a visit to England, and he had been recently corresponding about it with Lord Canning. In April, 1856, when Sir James Outram was about to vacate Oudh temporarily, Sir Henry had offered to leave Rájputána and act for him; but another officer had been appointed to that post, and while he was now making definite arrangements to take furlough to England at the end of the year the war with Persia broke out. This led to an entire change in his plans. It may first be mentioned, as a point of interest, that John Lawrence, having been consulted by Lord Canning, strongly urged the appointment of Sir Henry to the command of the proposed expedition. But that command was settled in England and given to Outram, who would otherwise have been on his way back to Oudh. The rule in Oudh consequently again became vacant; and by this time, the discontent, disaffection and sedition there had become

serious, besides being more or less apparent elsewhere. So Lord Canning, mindful of Sir Henry's former application and of his pacification of the Punjab, offered him the post—the charge of Oudh—which he at once heartily accepted, foregoing his furlough, and setting aside the claims of health and rest.

He was now about to undertake the crowning task of his career—a two-fold task—the pacification of an exasperated Province, and a pre-eminent part in the defence of the British Empire of India against revolt and the mutiny of its native army. Before entering on these two tasks, it will be well to describe more fully the personality and character, the views and principles, which enabled him to do this so successfully.

CHAPTER XI

LAWRENCE'S PERSONALITY AND VIEWS

His Personality.

WE deal first with Sir Henry's personality and character, about which in some points, at any rate, more or less incorrect ideas appear to prevail. In physique he was tall and strong, thin, spare and latterly gaunt, active and untiring; in aspect keen-eyed and observant, thoughtful, earnest and decided; in manner frank and simple; in temper warm and impulsive. This latter was his weak point, to which he sometimes gave way in cases of crafty insolence or attempted trickery. When young he was apt to be headstrong and impatient; in disposition chivalrous, gentle, sympathetic and generous; in bearing fearless and resolute, high-spirited and sensitive to affront or deception. Colonel Newcome is the typical character that represents him most closely.

With a tender conscience from his earliest days, right-minded, and carefully guided in his home education, his principles of life were always of the highest; and, having in the first years of his manhood fallen into the company of a religious circle

of comrades, he acquired the same bent, which was confirmed by his marriage. Throughout his career he was always a devout, religious and God-fearing man; evincing it in his acts and bearing; free and open respecting it in the family circle and with his intimates, but never otherwise obtruding it.

His demeanour towards the native community of all classes was gentle and paternal—enabling him to exercise unusual influence and to win a more than ordinary degree of regard and affection. The basis of his feeling was his recognition of the grave allowances that should be made for the lowered condition and habits into which, according to his view, they had fallen owing to the long continued cycles of evil and unhappy history through which they had passed. With that recognition, he was ever gentle and considerate to their faults, sympathetic in his manner and generous in his dealings with them, and a frank and open admirer of their many good qualities. Noble actions and efforts at improvement always drew from him marked approval, and he was unfailing in his efforts to repress their malpractices and wrong tendencies, and to educate them into better ways. His heart went out to them, and they felt it thoroughly, and knew that he had no thought for them except for their welfare: hence the unique influence he exercised, and the soundness of the bent and aim which characterized his statesmanship and policy.

It need hardly be said that this kindly and generous

feeling was not shown to natives only. It was of the essence of the man, and it affected his relations all round. Especially was he careful to avoid being credited with what was due to others instead of to himself. Writing to his sister of a family fund, he says, 'I dunned John into aiding it at first, but I mistook my man, for, instead of requiring to be urged, he has put me to shame.' His charities far exceeded what was in ordinary estimation thought justifiable, considering his family circumstances, while the thought and care he devoted to such considerations, in addition to actual money, are evinced by the establishment of the Lawrence Asylum and other similar institutions.

A few words here respecting the Lawrence Asylum will not be out of place. Struck by the neglected state and the great mortality of the children of the English community in India, especially in the Plains, he had first proposed that the Calcutta Orphan Asylum should be removed to the Hills, and had offered a very large contribution in aid of the scheme; but the offer was declined and the proposal rejected. He then, in 1845, proposed to Government the establishment of a school in the Hills for soldiers' children, offering a donation of £500 and a yearly subscription of £100, and pointing out how existing funds and grants might be justly utilized for such an institution. Private support to the scheme was secured, and the regimental commanders were then addressed. After much discussion, inquiry, and consideration, sufficient funds and support for a start were obtained, and the

scheme and its regulations organized. It was for the benefit both of boys and of girls, and open to all denominations. The first school was started at Sanáwar, near the Hill Station of Kasaulí, and the Kashmír Rájá, Ghuláb Singh, insisted on being allowed to contribute £10,000 towards starting it, and £2,500 afterwards. Sir Henry further endowed it largely both in his life and by legacy; and so beneficial did the arrangements prove that Government took upon itself the charge of the institution. Public charity came further to its assistance; and similar institutions have been later on organized at Murree in the Punjab Hills, at Mount Abú in Rájputána, and at Utakamand and in the Nilgiris in the Madras Presidency. The benefits resulting from Sir Henry's wise and benevolent proposals can be easily imagined; but it may be mentioned that in about twenty-five years the Sanáwar Asylum was sheltering and educating nearly 400 children, and that at Murree about 160—the proportion of boys to girls being generally about three to two; the ratio not being a fixed one. At the Utakamand school there are about 300 boys. Upwards of 4,000 children passed through Sanáwar in fifty years.

Such being the character of the man, it can be well understood how he was able to rule and manage a warlike race and a recently-conquered province with almost absolute authority—supported by a Governor-General who sympathized with all his views; loved and respected by his own subordinates; and in the

end all but worshipped, after their Oriental fashion, by the natives.

On leaving the Punjab, one friend wrote of him :—

‘He will be regretted by all, both European officers and natives. With the latter, who can supply his place? The sardars and jagirdars will lose their only friend and benefactor, and grieve most bitterly for his loss. Lord Dalhousie has struck out the keystone from the arch of the Punjab administration. For the future, *fortiter in re* will be the character of the rule, without much of the *suaviter in modo* which has hitherto accompanied it, and has been the chief element of its success.’

Another wrote :—

‘The Sikhs have always known him as a friend. He has been ever a staunch and hardy comrade to their troops, a source of honour to their chiefs, and of justice to their labouring classes; and thus it is that, at this moment (when he is leaving the Punjab), the placeless ministers, powerless sardars, jagirless jagirdars, disbanded soldiers, and other fragments of Ranjit’s broken court and army find in Sir Henry Lawrence a natural representative such as they can find nowhere else, and must inevitably be disfranchised by his loss. A people’s respect, however, is a ruler’s reward, and the kindly memory of him and his good deeds, in thousands of Punjab homes, will follow after him as a blessing.’

Of his influence and position in the Punjab, in supervising the annexation, it was said :—

‘The powers of mind—the watchful benevolence—the Catholic charity—the wisdom, far-seeing, provident, and sound, which calculated every contingency and provided for every emergency—combined the whole machinery of the administration into one of the greatest of triumphs of

modern polity. His was the spirit which inspired every act of the local government, which touched the hearts of his subordinates; all caught from him the sacred fire; his presence seemed all pervading, for the interests of the meanest were dear to him as those of the most powerful; and goodness and greatness were so natural wherever he came that other fruits seemed strange and impossible.'

On reaching Rájputána, he is said to have soon made himself as intimate and popular with the native chiefs there as he had been in the Punjab. He discovered whatever principles of good were lying latent, and reaped his reward in their admiration, esteem, and affection for himself. The Ráo Rájá of Karauli, when he heard of his death, was so deeply grieved as to abstain from all food for several days.

A high official, whose personal acquaintance with Sir Henry was comparatively slight, wrote that it was impossible to know him without loving him—that

'The sway which he exercised over classes of men widely differing in every feeling was almost marvellous. There were the conquerors and the conquered—the European officials, and the Sikh sardárs—some of the best specimens of English gentlemen, and some of the roughest of Asiatic chiefs—all alike lamenting over the departure of the man who seemed to be the personal friend of each and all.'

He is thus described in another volume of this series :—

'Henry Lawrence, the friend of every one who was down, the loved, the generous, who got a little more for every one, who fought every losing battle for the old chiefs and jágírdárs, with entire disregard to his own interests, left the Punjab amid an outburst of universal lamentation.'

His Views and Policy.

Sir Henry's views and policy on most points, and his grounds for them, have been generally described in the preceding pages in dealing with the events and circumstances with which they were concerned. But their importance and bearing—if not also their soundness—have, in many cases, become more apparent and prominent in later days, and it may therefore be well to refer to them briefly in this chapter.

The prominence that has attached to the adoption question and the *jágírdár* question has been apt to lead to the conclusion that he was a partisan of the upper classes of the native community in preference to the peasantry and lower classes. That this was not the case he showed in his settlement of Kaithal. He was a staunch supporter of the principle of light assessments and of material improvements. But the incidence of the system of settlement in force in his late years, tending as it did to bear heavily on the native aristocracy, made him practically a leader in the defence of that class. No one recognized more fully than he did the degenerate state of life and habits into which most of them had fallen; but his view of their proper treatment was—not that they should be made to disappear, but that they should be educated and raised—not that they should be deprived of their customary rights and privileges, but should be taught to act up to them and exercise their proper functions and influence in the community. 'We must keep free,'

he said, 'from the guilt of robbery—of taking property from those who had an unquestionable right to it in order to bestow it on those who had no real claim to it.' 'We have no right,' he wrote to Sir John Kaye, 'to rob a man because he spends his money badly or because he illtreats his peasantry. We may protect and help the latter without putting their rents into our own pockets.' 'Our remedy for gross mismanagement,' he also said, referring to ruling princes, 'is to take over the management, temporarily or even permanently.'

How his views have latterly been adopted, and with what success, can be best seen by naming the cases of Mysore and of the Rájputána Colleges.

Of *jágírdárs*, only one word more need be said beyond what has already appeared in these pages. He would have the borders of the Punjab, he wrote to Lord Hardinge, lined by a cordon of *jágírdárs* to meet and manage the Hill-men—a pertinent suggestion in view of the subsequent border difficulties. As to annexations, he held unquestionably that, within India, in cases of dire mismanagement the Supreme Government should annex a State in respect of its management but not in respect of the absorption of its revenues into the revenues of India. In the case of Oudh this seems to have been Lord Dalhousie's view also, though it was overruled in England.

In direct opposition to Lord Dalhousie's general policy of absorption of territory, he held strongly, in common with all the old school of Indian statesmen, and with such men as Sir George Clerk in more

modern times, that the proper duty and aim of the British Government lay in fostering the native States, and leading them into developing, with improved habits and principles and with their own traditions and modes of thought to keep them in proper touch with the people, into well-governed sovereignties under British protection, support, and guidance.

In regard to the Punjab, it has been so fully dealt with that it need hardly be touched on again. It will suffice to say that his original hope was, that it should remain an independent kingdom on the frontier, as a buffer against other intrusions in that direction; and that its people, whose worth he gauged so correctly and valued so highly, might be led to become orderly and peaceable citizens, retaining their courage and spirit, but growing into thoroughly friendly neighbours and staunch allies. It was in this hope that he undertook the duty of guiding the Darbár after the Sutlej war; and it was under the natural impression—from Lord Dalhousie's bearing and language respecting them at first—that the Sikhs would receive from him the harshest terms and treatment, and would become in consequence permanent and fierce enemies, that he dreaded the annexation and the rule that would follow.

From time to time he submitted suggestions on minor desultory military points—such as the duties and organization of the Quarter-Master-General's department, the formation of a Corps of Guides (afterwards carried out in the Punjab under his own rule), and the

creation of a Staff Corps for Staff duties. On these points it may also be added, that the type of troops which he raised for the Punjab frontier has become, with certain modifications, the model for the whole native army of Upper India ; and that, after the Mutiny, a Staff Corps was organized, but it was not one that realized the objects and aims that Sir Henry had in view.

His pen was seldom idle, especially after the Afghán war. He had previously brought out *The Adventurer in the Punjab*, a novel which at the time gained much attention and popularity, graphically describing as it did the habits and ways of the Punjab under Ranjít Singh's régime. But his chief literary works were articles written for the *Calcutta Review*. Six of these gave descriptions of the Sikhs, of Kashmír, of Oudh, of the Sutlej and the Jumna districts, and of the Maráthás ; one was an account of Lord Hardinge's administration ; and three others dealt with military subjects—the Indian Army and its reform, and the defence of the Indian Empire. As might be expected from the character of the military operations in which his practical experience had been gained, he was inclined to exalt such qualities as forethought, energy, promptitude, boldness, influence with men, leadership and the like, as the most essential requirements in an officer, and to undervalue the consideration due to an intimate knowledge of the soldier and to perfection in technical and professional details.

Probably the most important paper which he wrote (in 1843), was intended chiefly as a defence of Sir

W. Macnaghten, but it also gave a most vivid description of military mismanagement and blunders in the past, of the dangers to which a repetition of them might lead, and of the measures and attitude which he considered necessary to ensure the public safety.

Necessity of chronic readiness for War.

As we now approach the period of the Mutiny, his views, as shown in the above-mentioned military articles, and especially in his defence of Macnaghten, will help to make clear the motives which prompted his action in this great convulsion. In the Macnaghten case he wrote thus of the dangers in India :—

‘Asia has ever been fruitful in revolutions, and can show many a dynasty overthrown by such small bands as, on November 2, 1841, rose against our force at Kábul; and British India can show how timely energy, as at Vellore, Benares, and Bareilly, has put down much more formidable insurrections. . . . Dissension among our enemies has raised us from the position of commercial factors to be lords over emperors. Without courage and discipline, we could not thus have prevailed; but even these would have availed little had the country been united against us, and would now only defer the day of our discomfiture were there anything like a unanimous revolt. The same causes operated for our first success in both India and Afghánistán; and the errors by which we lost the latter may any day deprive us of the former.

‘Perhaps our greatest danger arises from the facility with which these conquests have been made; a facility which in both cases has betrayed us into the neglect of all recognized rules for military occupation. Our sway is that of the

sword, yet everywhere our military means are insufficient. There is always some essential lacking at the very moment when troops are wanted for immediate service. If stores are ready, they may rot before carriage is forthcoming. If there are muskets, there is no ammunition. If there are infantry, there are no muskets for them. In one place we have guns without a man to serve them; in another we have artillerymen standing comparatively idle because the guns have been left behind.

‘To come to examples. Is Delhi or Agra, Bareilly or Karnál, Benares or Sangor, or, in short, any one of our important military positions, better prepared than Kábul was, should 300 men rise to-morrow and seize the town? Take Delhi more especially as a parallel case. At Kábul we had the treasury and one of the commissariat forts in the town; at Delhi we have the magazine and treasury within the walls.

‘Now suppose that any morning 300 men were to take possession of these.

‘What would follow if the troops in cantonment (never more than three regiments) were to keep close to their quarters, merely strengthening the palace guards? The palace at Delhi stands much as did the Bala Hissár with respect to the city, except that the former has not sufficient elevation to command the town, as the latter did. What, then, would be the result at Delhi, if the palace garrison were to content themselves, as Colonel Shelton did, with a faint and distant cannonade from within their walls; not even effectually supporting the king’s body-guards, who had already sallied into the town, nor even enabling or assisting them to bring off their field-guns when driven back from the city; but should suffer these guns to be abandoned at the very palace gates, and there to lie? Let not a single effort be made to succour or bring off the guards at the

magazine or treasury; give up everything for lost; suffer unresistingly the communication between the town and cantonment (almost precisely the same distance in both cases) to be closed; let all this happen in Hindustán on June 2, instead of among the Afghán mountains on November 2, and does any sane man doubt that twenty-four hours would swell the hundreds of rebels into thousands; and that, if such conduct on our part lasted for a week, every ploughshare in the Delhi States would be turned into a sword? And when a sufficient force had been mustered, by bringing European regiments from the hills and native troops from every quarter (which could not be effected within a month at the very least, or in three at the rate we moved to the succour of Kandahár and Jalálábád), should we not then have a more difficult game to play than Clive had at Plassey, or Wellington at Assaye? We should then be literally striking for our existence, at the most inclement season of the year, with the prestige of our name vanished, and the fact before the eyes of imperial Delhi that the British forces, placed not only to protect but to overawe the city, were afraid to enter it.

‘But the parallel does not end here. Suppose the officer commanding at Meerut, when called on for help, were to reply, “My force is chiefly cavalry and horse artillery; not the sort to be effective within a walled town, where every house is a castle. Besides, Meerut itself, at all times unquiet, is even now in rebellion, and I cannot spare my troops.” Suppose that from Agra and Ambála an answer came that they required all the force they had to defend their own posts; and that the reply from Subáthu and Kasauli was, “We have not carriage; nor, if we had, could we sacrifice our men by moving them to the plains at this season.” All this is less than actually did happen in Afghánistán, when General Sale was recalled, and General

Nott was urgently called on for succour; and if all this should occur at Delhi, should we not have to strike anew for our Indian Empire?

‘But who would attribute the calamity to the Civil Commissioner at Delhi? And could not that functionary fairly say to the officer commanding, “I knew very well that there were not only 300 desperate characters in the city, but as many thousands—men having nothing to lose, and everything to gain, by an insurrection. You have let them plunder the magazine and the treasury. They will, doubtless, expect as little resistance elsewhere. A single battalion could have exterminated them the first day, but you let the occasion slip, and the country is now in a blaze, and the game completely out of my hands. I will now give you all the help I can, all the advice you ask, but the Riot Act has been read, and my authority has ceased.” Would the civil officer be blamed for thus acting? Could he be held responsible for the way in which the outbreak had been met?

‘I have endeavoured to put the case fairly. Delhi is nearly as turbulent and unquiet a city as Kábul. It has residing within its walls a king less true to us than was Sháh Shujá. The hot weather of India is more trying to us than the winter of Afghánistán. The ground between the town and cantonment of Delhi being a long rocky ridge on one side of the road, and the river Jumna on the other, is much more difficult for the action of the troops against an insurgent population than anything at Kábul. At Delhi the houses are fully as strong, the streets not less defensible. In short, here as there, we occupy dangerous ground. *Here*, if we act with prudence and intrepidity, we shall, under God’s blessing, be safe, as we should have been, with similar conduct, *there*.

‘But if, under the misfortune that has befallen our arms,

we content ourselves with blaming the Envoy, or even the military authorities, instead of looking fairly and closely into the foundations of our power, and minutely examining the system that could admit of such conduct as was exhibited in Afghánistán, not in one case, but in many—then, I say, we are in the fair way of reaping another harvest more terrible than that of Kábul.

‘The foregoing parallel has been drawn out minutely, perhaps tediously, for I consider it important to show that what was faulty and dangerous in one quarter is not less so in another.

‘I wish moreover to point out that the mode of operation so pertinaciously styled the “Afghán question,” and currently linked with the name of the late Envoy, as if, with all its errors, it had originated with him, is *essentially* our Indian system; that it existed with all its defects when Sir William Macnaghten was in his cradle, and flourishes in our own provinces now that he is in his grave. Among its errors are, moving with small parties on distant points without support; inefficient commissariat arrangements; absolute ignorance on all topographical points; and reckoning on the attachment of our allies (as if Hindu or Muhammadan *could* love his Christian lord, who only comes before him as master or tax-gatherer; as if it were not absurd to suppose that the chiefs of Burma, Nepál, Lahore, and the like could tolerate the power that restrains their rapacious desires and habits, that degrades them in their own and each other’s eyes).

‘Men may differ as to the soundness of our policy, but no one can question its results, as shown in the fact of Haidar Ali twice dictating terms at the gates of Fort St. George (Madras); in the disasters that attended the early period of the Nepál war; in the long state of siege in which Sir Archibald Campbell was held at Rangoon; in the

frightful mortality at Arakan; in the surrender of General Mathews; in the annihilation of Colonel Baillie's detachment; in the destruction of Colonel Monson's force; and in the attacks on the Residencies of Poona and Nágpur. These are all matters of history, though seldom practically remembered. Still less is it borne in mind how little was wanting to starve General Harris at Seringapatam, General Campbell in Ava, or Sir John Keane in Afghánistán. All these events have been duly recorded, though they have not withheld us, on each new occasion, from retracing our old errors. At length a calamity that we had often courted has fallen upon us; but direful as it is, and wrecked though it has the happiness of numbers, we may yet gather fruit from the thorns, if we learn therefrom how easily an army is paralyzed and panic-stricken, and how fatal such prostration must ever be. If we read the lesson set before us, the wreck of a small army may be the beacon to save large ones.

‘Our chief danger in India is from within, not from without. The enemy who cannot reach us with his bayonets, can touch us more fatally if he lead us to distrust ourselves and rouse our subjects to distrust us; and we shall do his work for him if we show that our former chivalrous bearing is fled, that we pause to count the half-armed rabble opposed to us, and hesitate to act with battalions where a few years before companies would have been deemed sufficient.

‘The true basis of British power in India is often lost sight of, namely, a well-paid, well-disciplined army, relying, from experience, on the good faith, wisdom, and energy of its leaders.

‘We forget that our army is composed of men, like ourselves, quick-sighted and inquisitive on all matters bearing upon their personal interests; who, if they can appreciate our points of superiority, are just as capable of detecting our

deficiencies, especially any want of military spirit or soldierly bearing.

‘At Kábul we lost an army, and we lost some character with the surrounding States. But I hold that by far our worst loss was in the confidence of our native soldiery. Better had it been for our fame if our harassed troops had rushed on the enemy and perished to a man, than that surviving Sepoys should be able to tell the tales they can of what they saw at Kábul.

‘European soldiers and officers are placed as examples to native troops, and a glorious one they have generally set in the field ; but who can estimate the evil when the example is bad—when it is not the Hindustání (most exposed to cold, and least able to bear it) who clamours for retreat and capitulation, but the cry is raised by the men he has been accustomed to look up to and to lean upon as a sure resource in every emergent peril.

‘The degenerate legionaries drove their general with their halberds to capitulation and death ; but it was the deliberate counsels of the British military commanders that urged their civil chief to his and their own destruction.’

In regard to the army, there is nothing in Lawrence’s writings to indicate that he thought there existed, up to 1857, any mutinous spirit, either chronic, at hand, or looming in the distance, although it was liable to be created at any time. He had seen two or three cases of mutinous conduct, but each of these he ascribed to a specific cause—that of the regiments ordered to the Burma war, to their objections to the violation of caste which would be involved—that of the 64th, to an exceptionally bad feeling that seemed local in the regiment—and that of the regiments in the Punjab,

after its annexation, to vexed questions of pay. In none of these cases does he seem to have thought the rest of the army at all involved, or that they implied either a widespread or an embittered feeling, or a combination. At the same time, he was a consistent believer in the arrangements for the Sepoy army being full of mischievous features, which must tend to make it a discontented body; and when the great Mutiny did break out, his opinion pointed more to its being the work of the ambitious spirits in it who had no fair outlet for their ambition, than to its being the result of the caste fears that had been aroused.

CHAPTER XII

THE STORY OF OUDH—LAWRENCE IN CHARGE

THE last chapter interrupted the narrative of Sir Henry's career when he was about to leave Rájputána and take up his new charge of Oudh; and it will now be expedient first to describe the position of matters then existent in the Province, as well as their antecedents, and then to speak of the spread and rise of the general disaffection, and the mutiny in the army.

Oudh has been not unjustly called the Garden of India. It is most fertile, yielding magnificent crops where cultivated, and where neglected covered with luxuriant forests, jungle and vegetation. A considerable proportion of the town populations was of the ruling Muhammadan race; but the country population largely consisted of Rájputs, well known for their fine physique, and then contributing the majority of the Sepoy army. The country had been left under the rule of the Delhi Emperor's Viceroy, as king, when the surrounding States were being absorbed into British territory; the cause of this being that the Viceroy had, after Clive's days, thrown in his lot with the English, and he and his successors had remained loyal to that alliance. But they had allowed the administration of the Province to be so grossly mis-

managed by their officials that the Province had collapsed into a chronic state of anarchy. These officials had become the farmers of the revenue, paying large sums to the Darbár as fees for their position and as the normal revenue of their districts, but extorting all they could by force or fraud from the Rájput landholders and occupants of the soil. These officials—amils they were called—varied in character and ability, but the oppression was on the whole execrable, and in some cases terrible, devastating hundreds of miles of territory and destroying or driving away the people. This was absolutely unquestionable, as was proved by the inquiry and personal knowledge and evidence of men of the highest character and of unimpeachable integrity. But the correctness of their evidence has been challenged, on the ground of the impossibility of the existence of such desolation as was described being compatible with the *estimated* strength of the population at various subsequent dates. But, in fact, those estimates were so fluctuating as to prove their own worthlessness. One particular feature of the desolate state of the country was that the weaker chiefs and clans had been reduced or driven off into British territory, and their lands had either, as in the Nánpára and Tulsipur districts, been devastated and wantonly laid waste, or, as in other cases, had been seized by the amils as their own property. Another feature was, that with the more powerful clans there was constant intermittent warfare, and their chiefs had *very large* forts or fortified villages, in which the

families and people lived, and where they kept the amils at bay. The main strength of their strongholds lay in the high thick and impervious bamboo hedges which surrounded them outside their ramparts, and which were themselves surrounded by deep and dense jungles. The peasantry would fly to them for protection when attacked during the cultivating seasons ; but the cultivated areas had been greatly reduced, and no security existed for life or property. The cultivation rarely extended beyond the range of the protection afforded by the forts and the jungles that surrounded them, and the outlying jungles were frequently infested by gangs of robbers and outlaws, though all the time the soil was of the best, and requiring nothing but cultivation.

After the Mutiny, it may be observed, the bulk of the people who had been driven out of Oudh by the cruelties of the amils poured back into the Province ; and the population was also increased by the presence of those who would now have been serving in the army, but for the fact that they were in disfavour.

The Sepoys and all other Oudh people who were employed in the British service enjoyed special privileges, and were to a considerable degree able to protect their own families. Hence the evil rule in Oudh did not affect the feelings of the Oudh Sepoys. But the mischief and scandal were getting intolerable ; the more so that it was possible to attribute some of the blame indirectly to the British Government itself, inasmuch as it was owing to its protection that the

King and Court of Oudh enjoyed immunity from the consequences of the misdeeds of their satellites. The narrow clan system or feeling had led, unfortunately, to the absence of any practical union of the chiefs, or of the clans; and though there were numerous chiefs or *Tálukdárs* of high character and repute and ability, there were also some of a baser sort, who made interest with the amils and joined with them in preying on their brethren. Had there been any reasonable unanimity among the *Rájput* clans, they could easily have ignored the amils, and made their own terms with the *Darbár*. As it was, their want of union made the Oudh *Darbár* feel safe from their retaliation, the more especially as the King was under the protection of the British alliance.

But the scandal of the anarchy and misgovernment that prevailed had caused Lord Dalhousie to call on Sir James Outram to make an exhaustive report on the subject; and as that report more than confirmed the impressions that had previously been current, the Government forwarded it to England with their own recommendations as to the fate of Oudh. Lord Dalhousie was not for entire annexation; like Sir Henry Lawrence, he was in favour of taking charge of the administration, but not of absorbing its revenues.

The Home Government however decided on complete annexation; and Lord Dalhousie's last act, before he left India, was to annex Oudh and absorb it into British territory, under Sir James Outram's guidance and management.

The King declined to accept the deposition as a final act. He surrendered his rule to Sir James Outram, and enjoined on all his subjects to pay him due obedience; and then set out for Calcutta, ostensibly *en route* to England to plead his cause before Her Majesty. But he was not permitted to proceed beyond Calcutta, where he settled down in the suburb of Garden Reach; which his numerous followers turned into an Alsatia that proved very mischievous and troublesome on the outbreak of the Mutiny.

The arrangements and terms for the annexation were most beneficent, and in consequence partly of this and partly of the King's injunctions, it was effected with perfect tranquillity, and without obstructions even from the Muhammadan community, who resented the change and the reduction of one of the few Mussulman dynasties that had been left from the all but universal Muhammadan empire. The families, retainers, troops, officials, and followers of the old Court had, in the proclamation, been guaranteed suitable provision, employment, and consideration; and the country population, including the Tálukdárs and other magnates, had been assured that all in actual possession should be continued in their holdings, during enquiry, for three years.

In the first few months of 1856, when Sir James Outram remained in charge of the Province, much was done in fulfilment of the promises contained in the proclamation; but, after he left, those promises seemed to be neglected and their fulfilment deferred.

(as afterwards severely commented on by Lord Stanley in a dispatch dated October 13, 1858), with the consequence that by the end of the year the whole Province was in a state of the most profound and violent irritation. The Tálukdárs were deprived in part of the estates of which they had been, rightly or wrongly, in possession ; and their clansmen feeling, in a manner which the Government had not expected, the consequent reduction of the wealth, status, and power of their chiefs, joined in their resentment.

Then, again, in the early part of 1857, before Sir Henry Lawrence's arrival, vigorous brigandage had been resuscitated, especially under a leader named Fazl Ali ; and a moulvie had begun to preach at Faizábád a Jihad, or religious war, against the infidel English. This moulvie was afterwards a most prominent leader in the revolt, and was found to have been long instigating and fomenting it over many of the Provinces of India.

On his arrival, Sir Henry's first step, as the essential basis of all content and administration, was to enforce law and order. He attacked and dispersed the bands of brigands, and killed Fazl Ali. He also caught and imprisoned the Faizábád moulvie.

His next movement was to carry out the promises and the engagements made on the proclamation of the annexation, but not hitherto fulfilled. The gratuities, pensions and allowances promised to those connected with the royal family and court were settled ; and all harsh and discourteous treatment of them was

peremptorily stopped, much misery being thereby relieved and good-will engendered, while increased employment was given to the officials and soldiery of the Darbár; and instructions were issued recognizing the fair claims of the old Oudh officials to employment in preference to immigrants from other Provinces.

Finally, as to the Tálukdárs, he met them both in Darbár and private interviews, and arranged forthwith for strict adherence to the terms of the proclamation regarding their tenure of their estates; so that, as Mr. Gubbins says, 'all returned satisfied and hopeful, all congratulated themselves on having found a ruler so well disposed to listen to their grievances and remedy them': the practical result of which was that the revenues flowed freely and fully into the district treasuries. Such was the immediate effect produced by the removal of the virulent ill-feeling which Sir Henry had found prevailing in Oudh on his arrival a month before.

CHAPTER XIII

LAWRENCE'S PRECAUTIONS AGAINST MILITARY DISAFFECTION

MEANWHILE, before Sir Henry left Rájputána for Lucknow, or had been appointed to it, the general seditious movement that culminated in the Mutiny had begun, and was spreading. But, in his correspondence, he does not appear to allude to it specifically, or otherwise than as a coming to the surface of those undercurrents of discontent that he had always felt and proclaimed to exist. Though the adoption agitation in Rájputána had subsided, the state of feeling there was still somewhat unsatisfactory, but this was largely in consequence of the comparatively degraded tone and lowered character of the Rájput leaders and community. Still, in leaving them, Sir Henry hoped that whatever sedition there might be, and whatever crisis might arise, the influence he had acquired, supported and continued as it would be by his brother George, would keep them loyal and avert misconduct.

But before he actually left, signs of ill-feeling in the army had become apparent, and in addition a sense of expectancy and anxious unrest was beginning to pervade the general community. About this

time the General Service Enlistment Act had been sprung on the army, under which all future recruits would be liable for service beyond the sea, with its attendant infringement of caste rules. And again, at the end of January, the rumour had arisen, and had not been authentically challenged and disproved, that cartridges were being manufactured the use of which would involve contamination alike to Hindus and to Mussulmans. For a month this excitement took no marked shape beyond incendiarism in and about Barrackpur, near the site of the Ordnance Factories. The first mutiny that occurred was on February 27 at Berhampur, on the arrival of a Sepoy detachment from Barrackpur. During these two months, however, two circumstances had attracted notice. One was a rumour, started in the neighbourhood of Cawnpur, that flour was being collected, intended for the use of the native troops, with which bone dust (i.e. ground bones) was being mixed; the other, commencing early in the year in Central India, was the mysterious circulation of small cakes, with no order or ostensible meaning, except that for each cake or chapatti received by any individual he was to send off three or more to front and right and left. There were several conjectural reasons for this proceeding: the actual result was a vague sense in the whole native community of unrest and impending disturbance.

This state of feeling prevailed in Upper India, and the Persian war was in progress, when Sir Henry

left Rájputána for Lucknow. He stopped for a few days at Agra on his way, and gave his friends there to understand very clearly in how serious a light he viewed the progress of the disaffection both in the people generally and in the army. 'You Brahmans,' he said to his civilian friends, 'will be shut up in the Fort before we meet again.' But, whatever the ill-feeling in the army might be, he attributed its spread not to the normal working of the exciting cause—the cartridge scare—but to the use made of it by the discontented and ambitious spirits in the army; three out of every hundred being, in his opinion, dangerously disposed.

His opinion was thus, on May 1, expressed to Lord Canning:—

'The oldest and best Hindus are easily moved, but if bad feeling extended to open mutiny, the Muhammadans would soon become the most energetic and violent of mutineers. I will watch for differences of feeling between the two creeds. Whatever may be the danger of the native press, I look on it that the papers published in our own language are much the most dangerous. Disaffected native editors need only translate, as they do, with or without order of admiration or exclamation, editorials on the duty of annexing native States, or the imbecility, if not wickedness, of allowing a single jágir, or of preaching the Gospel (even by commanding officers), to raise alarm and hatred in the minds of all connected with native principalities and jágirs, and among the above will be found the large majority of the dangerous classes. . . .

Such then was the state of feeling in the army

when Sir Henry reached Lucknow, added to which was the general disaffection and unrest throughout the country, while Oudh itself was seething with anger and sedition. Here was a task for the veteran pacificator that surpassed in difficulty, and even in importance, the duty that had been laid on him after the annexation of the Punjab; for, while pacifying Oudh, he had also to prepare for hostilities with a general enemy all around him, and to do so when he alone among the magnates of India realized, and meant to act on the conviction, that grave troubles and warfare were impending and must be prepared for.

Having cleared the ground, as has been shown, by smoothing away the disaffection of the people and reducing the local difficulties, he at the same time on his arrival took immediate steps for the improvement of the military situation, and as a precaution against the danger he felt to be impending. He had been in Lucknow in 1845, during the course of his employment in Nepál before being summoned to the Sutlej war, and he had doubtless taken in the bearings of the salient features of the city. At any rate, not more than a day or two after his arrival he directed the Engineers to clear out and repair the old Sikh fort and position of Mutchi Bhowm, for use ostensibly as a store depôt, but in fact as a place of refuge in case of need or of an *émeute*.

Within a few days after, the prospect of affairs had been further darkened by the mutiny at Barrack-

pur. But still, though the disaffection was on the increase, no specific action could be taken — only general precautions, and readiness to move and strike when necessary. The existing military arrangements were not satisfactory. The Oudh Irregular (or Local) Force, consisting of three batteries, three regiments of cavalry, and ten of infantry, was commanded by Brigadier Gray, and was in a measure under Sir Henry's orders. But the Oudh Regular Brigade, under Brigadier Handscombe, formed part of the Cawnpur Division, which was commanded by Sir Hugh Massey Wheeler. Lawrence made up his plans for a better distribution of these troops, and applied to the Governor-General for high military rank and for the command of all the force in the Province, in case of emergency. This was sanctioned later on. Meanwhile, he held prolonged consultations on matters pertinent to the situation with all classes of officials and of the general community — the Commissioners, the leading commanding officers of other stations, natives of rank, and native officers of the army. As time went on, and the month of May approached, he felt certain that matters were steadily growing worse. Incendiarism and nightly seditious gatherings in the Camp of Exercise at Ambála in the north were in full swing. Lord Canning, although he was certainly anxious and alarmed, did not seem to realize the gravity of the crisis. Sir Henry's advice did not rouse him into action ; and, though he had some good and able men about him at Calcutta, the

least wise seemed to exercise the chief influence, so that no precautions of any practical use were taken. The Commander-in-Chief too, able and sensible as he was and supported by a good and capable staff, appeared to accept the view that the threatening storm would subside or disperse, and that it was best to take no effective steps to meet it, as they might be misinterpreted and only precipitate the crisis instead of averting it.

Sir Henry entertained no such hopes; but so long as there was no local outbreak, or any great rising elsewhere, he could only keep keenly on the alert. It was at this time—April—that the Náná Sáhib, whose residence was near Cawnpur, made his appearance in Lucknow, and paraded about with a demeanour that excited Sir Henry's suspicions, and led to his cautioning Sir Hugh Wheeler against the wily Mahráthá. He was satisfied that the minds of the Sepoys were in an intensely excited and nervous if not irritated condition on the matter of infringement of caste. Even so early as the beginning of April a significant event had occurred. The surgeon of the 48th Native Infantry had put a bottle of medicine to his lips, and the men in hospital afterwards refused to take any of the medicines ordered. So dire was the offence taken at the surgeon's act, that his house was fired, and most of his property destroyed.

Although such a feeling as this prevailed, still, while no overt precautions were being taken elsewhere in his neighbourhood, Sir Henry could take

no prominent or isolated action of his own. But it was after all in Lucknow itself that the last local disturbance occurred, anticipatory of the great outbreak a week later at Meerut, and gave Sir Henry an opportunity for prompt measures.

On May 1 the recruits of the 7th Oudh local Infantry, quartered in the Musa Bāgh suburb, refused to bite the cartridges, and, some of them, even to handle them. Their mutinous demeanour did not come to Sir Henry's knowledge till they had seized their arms and the magazine; he then marched a strong force from the Cantonments to their parade-ground, surrounded and disarmed them, tried them by court-martial and meted out punishment (but not of death) to the faulty, and rewards and promotion to the loyal. The inquiry in this case led to the discovery of treasonable correspondence, and put Sir Henry more than ever on the alert, as well as on the track of the local concerted action that was contemplated, but not of any other or general movement.

Although then there was the pressing sense of an impending thunderstorm darkening the political sky, Sir Henry continued without any means of judging of the speed, direction or gravity with which it would burst. But it is quite certain that he realized that the essence of the disturbance would lie with the Sepoy troops, and would affect the tranquillity of the country generally, so that the British community, official and private, must prepare for defence. All

that he could do at this juncture and in this direction was to obtain all the local knowledge he could, and shape his plans for movement or entrenchment as events might make advisable. His investigations had obviously already led him to the conclusion that, in case of serious disturbances, the Residency was the position to be held for defence, with the Mutchi Bhowm as an immediate and temporary place of refuge for families against a city *émeute* or the like, but not as an entrenchment or fortified position against a serious attack.

CHAPTER XIV

LAWRENCE'S LETTERS TO LORD CANNING BEFORE THE MEERUT OUTBREAK

IN the first days of May Sir Henry wrote to the Governor-General the following letters, bearing not only on the origin of the ill-feeling in the army, but on his own demeanour and policy towards the Sepoys, which led to his practical success in managing them and retaining the services of as many as he held it wise to employ:—

‘I have recently received many letters on the state of the army. Most of them attribute the present bad feeling *not* to the cartridge, or any other specific question, but to a pretty general dissatisfaction at many recent acts of Government, which have been skilfully played upon by incendiaries. This is my own opinion. The Sepoy is not the man of consequence he was. He dislikes annexations, among other reasons, because each new province added to the Empire widens his sphere of service, and at the same time decreases *our* foreign enemies, and thereby the Sepoy's importance. Ten years ago a Sepoy in the Punjab asked an officer what he would do without them; another said, “Now you have got the Punjab you will reduce the army.” A third remarked when he heard that Sind was to be joined

to Bengal, "Perhaps there will be an order to join London to Bengal." The other day an Oudh Sepoy of the Bombay Cavalry at Nímach, being asked if he liked annexation, replied, "No: I used to be a great man when I went home, the best in my village rose as I approached: now, the lowest puff their pipes in my face." The General Service Enlistment Oath is most distasteful, keeps many out of the service, and frightens the old Sepoys, who imagine that the oaths of the young recruits affect the *whole* regiment. One of the best captains in the 13th Native Infantry (at this place) said to me last week he had clearly ascertained this fact. Mr. E. A. Reade, of the Sudder Board, who was for years Collector of Gorakpur, had "the general service order" given to him as a reason last year, when on his tour, by many Rájputs, for not entering the service. "The salt water," he told me was the universal answer. The new post office rules are bitter grievances; indeed the native community generally suffer by them, but the Sepoy, having here special privileges, feels the deprivation in addition to the general uncertainty as to letters, nay, rather the positive certainty of *not* getting them. There are many other points which might with great advantage be redressed, which, if your lordship will permit me, I will submit with extracts of some of the letters I have received from old regimental officers. In the words of one of them, "If the Sepoy is not speedily redressed, he will redress himself." I would rather say, unless some openings to rewards are offered to the military, as have been to the native civil servants, and unless certain matters are righted, we shall perpetually be subjected to our present condition of affairs. The Sepoy feels that we cannot do without him, and yet the highest reward a Sepoy can obtain, at fifty, sixty, and seventy years of age, is about one hundred pounds a year, without a prospect of a brighter career for his son. Surely this is

not the inducement to offer to a foreign soldier for special fidelity and long service.

'PS. While on the subject I must give your lordship a proof of the estimate in which "the salt water" (Kāla Pane) is held even by the most rough-and-ready portion of the native army. Last week an invalid subadār of the Bombay 18th Native Infantry was with me for an hour or more. Among other matters, I asked him about foreign service, especially about Aden, whence he was invalided. With a sort of horror, he referred to being restricted to *three gallons* of water daily. I asked him whether he would prefer 100 rupees a month at Aden, or 50 rupees at Baroda (where he had just before told me there was much fever). He replied, "50 rupees at Baroda." I then said, "or 125 rupees at Aden?" His answer was to the effect, "I went where I was ordered, but life is precious, anything in India is better than wealth beyond sea." And such, I am convinced, is the general Hindu feeling. The man was a Brahmin, but a thorough loyalist. . . .'

On May 2 he wrote :—

'I have the honour to acknowledge your lordship's letter of April 27, just received, and am glad to find that what I wrote of the 48th Regiment yesterday quite meets your views. I fear to increase alarm and suspicion, and therefore do nothing not absolutely necessary.

'The officers of H.M.'s 32nd now sleep near their lines, as they ought always to have done. Two guns of a native battery and thirty horsemen are also in their lines, so that they are a little army in themselves, and have the means of communicating with their neighbours.

'I have no reason to doubt the fidelity of the Artillery, though much has been done to disgust many of the native officers, because they don't understand our mounted drill.

All the European officers are very young men, and therefore look to mere smartness.

Two hours ago Captain Carnegie came to tell me that there had been a strong demonstration against cartridges in the 7th Oudh Infantry this morning. I hope and expect the report he heard is exaggerated, but I tell it for his commentary. . . .

‘I have had Rukum-ud-Dowlah at my house, and rather like his appearance, but his sons are not pleasant-looking fellows. These people however can only by *possibility* be dangerous in connexion with our own troops. I have struck up a friendship with two of the best and wealthiest of the chiefs, and am on good terms with all. We ought therefore to have information of what occurs.

‘I hope that the 34th Native Infantry will be disbanded, and that your lordship will raise a mixed Gúrkha and Hill Rájput corps, and a Sikh one in lieu of the 34th and 19th. Gúrkhas are not easily obtained, but seven years ago I got a thousand volunteers at Khátmandu in a week, to supply one company of the Guides. I did it through the Resident, or rather by his permission through the medical officers, whom I asked to speak to Jang Bahádur, and remind him of our old acquaintance.

‘As far as I have ascertained, the bad feeling as yet is chiefly among the Hindu Sepoys. Doubtless it is their fears for caste that have been worked on.

‘We measure too much by English rules, and expect, contrary to all experience, that the energetic and aspiring among immense military masses should like our dead level and our arrogation to ourselves, even where we are notorious imbeciles, of all authority and all emolument. These sentiments of mine freely expressed during the last fifteen years have done me injury, but I am not less convinced of their soundness, and that until we treat natives, and especially

native soldiers, as having much the same feelings, the same ambition, the same perception of ability and imbecility as ourselves, we shall never be safe.

‘I have not seen original articles on the cartridge question, but almost every letter and article in the English papers regarding Barrackpur, Ambala, Meerut, Berhampur, and Dinápur, have been translated. The original articles chiefly refer to local grievances and personalities. The politics of the editor are to be chiefly gathered from pithy exclamations, &c., heading an article, as “How good,” “Wonderful,” “Mutiny at —,” &c., “More fires,” with plentiful supply of the words “mutiny,” “disobedience,” “disturbance.”

‘I would not trouble any of them, but, with your Lordship’s permission, I think we might squash half the number by helping one or two of the cleverest with information, and even with editorials and illustrations. Dr. Ogilvie tells me that more than one of the English illustrated papers would, for a good purpose, sell cheap their half-worn plates. An illustrated vernacular paper cleverly edited would tell well, and do good politically and morally. I will be glad of your Lordship’s sanction to a trial, not involving above 5,000 rupees or £500. Of course I would not appear, and I would use the present editors; at any rate try to do so.

‘I shall be quite willing to hold Oudh entirely with irregulars, aided by one or one and a-half regiments of Europeans and a couple of batteries of European artillery, but I should ask, as your Lordship contemplates, that the corps be of three classes, one-third mixed as at present, one-third with the Pathán and other Muhammadan tribes prevailing, and a third of Sikhs; indeed, I should like to add a fourth of the Pasí, or local outcast tribes, who are fine hardy fellows and get service in the Bombay army. . . .

‘It is so far well that the 48th have given up the letter,

which is addressed to them all. Several of them have also to-day borne evidence against a Hindu plate-cleaner of the hospital, who has been telling them his colonel has great confidence in the 48th.'

On May 4:—

'Referring to what has occurred with the 7th Oudh Irregulars and to the feeling that still prevails against the 48th, I will be glad, if it can be managed, that one of the Sikh regiments can be sent up here at once, or even a wing. It might be on the plea of taking the place of the 7th. The *coup* is stated to have had great effect in the city, but people go so far as to tell me that the 48th last night abused the 7th for running away, and said if they had stood the 48th would not have fired. I don't believe one quarter of these reports, but they are not pleasant. The intercepted letter of yesterday evidently fell into the wrong hands. It ended with "it is a question of religion."

On May 9:—

'I went through the lines of the 48th yesterday and talked to many of the men; all were very civil, though many were downcast at the loss of their private property as well as of their huts, the wretched jumbling up of which (as in the Bengal system) prevents, in cases of fire in a high wind, saving anything.

'Last night I held a conversation with a jemadár of the Oudh Artillery for more than an hour, and was startled by the dogged persistence of the man, a Brahman of about forty years of age, of excellent character, in the belief that for ten years past Government has been engaged in measures for the forcible, or rather fraudulent, conversion of all the natives. His argument was that, as such was the case, and

as we had made our way through India, had won Bhartpur, Lahore, &c. by fraud, so might it be possible that we mixed bone-dust with the grain sold to the Hindu. When I told him of our power in Europe, of how the Russian war had quadrupled our army in a year, and in another it could, if necessary, have been interminably increased, and that, in the same way, in six months, any requisite number of Europeans could be brought to India, and therefore that we are not at the mercy of the Sepoys, he replied he knew we had plenty of men and money, but that Europeans were expensive, and that therefore we wished to take Hindus to sea to conquer the world for us. On my remarking that the Sepoy, though a good soldier on shore, is a bad one at sea by reason of his poor food, "That is just it," was his rejoinder. "You want us all to eat what you like that we may be stronger and go anywhere." He gave us credit for nothing. He often repeated, "I tell you what everybody says"; but when I replied, "Fools and traitors may say so, but honest, sensible men cannot so think," he would not say that he himself *did* or did *not* believe, but (as he had previously done) said, "I tell you they are like sheep—the leading one tumbles, and down all the rest roll over him." Such a man is very dangerous. He has his full faculties, is a Brahman, has served us twenty years, and knows our strength and our weakness, and hates us thoroughly. It may be he is only more honest than his neighbours, but he is not the less dangerous. On one only point did he give us credit. I told him that in the year 1846 I had rescued 150 native children left by our army in Kábul, and that, instead of making them Christians, I had restored them to their parents and friends. "Yes," he replied, "I remember well; I was at Lahore." On the other hand, he told me of our making Christians of children purchased during famines. I have spoken to many others of all ranks, especially during the last fortnight.

Most gave us credit for good intentions, but here is a soldier of our own, selected for promotion over the heads of others, holding opinions that must make him in his heart a traitor. My interview with him was occasioned by his commanding officer having specially mentioned his intelligence and good character.'

CHAPTER XV

PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF LUCKNOW

IN a week after the mutiny at the Musa Bágh the great outbreak occurred at Meerut, followed at once by the move of the mutineers to Delhi, and their proclamation of the Mughal Empire. Thus was the war openly declared, the battle-gage thrown down, and the political object exposed.

These details were not known to Sir Henry for some days, as most of the telegraph wires were at once cut and communications interrupted; but by the middle of the week, the 13th, it was certain that the Pax Britannica was unsettled. By the end of it British troops had been placed on the City side of the Cantonment, so as to interrupt the communication between these two places, and also at the Residency position, which commanded the iron bridge over the Gúmti, while the trusted 13th N.I. were put in garrison in the Mutchi Bhowm post, which also commanded the stone bridge. Thus Sir Henry held a triangular position controlling the passages over the river, the Sepoys, and the city. Next day the preparation of the Mutchi Bhowm to act as a depot for

ordnance and supplies, and a place of refuge—a post against an attack not supported by artillery—was begun; and before another week had elapsed that work was completed. The Mutchi Bhowm had been powerfully armed with artillery, was garrisoned by British troops as well as selected natives, and was being rapidly filled with provisions and ammunition. At the same time the Residency entrenchments were begun, storehouses were started, and the commissariat and district officers had set to work collecting food and supplies from all the sources and through all the agencies within their reach.

By May 23, which ended the first week of the 'state of siege,' Sir Henry was able to breathe more freely. The mutiny had not begun to spread, except in the immediate neighbourhood of Delhi; while the Mutchi Bhowm was secure, the military position at Lucknow was sound, and not only was the province showing no signs of grave disturbance, but the Tálukdárs, and even the descendants of the Bhow Begum from far Faizábád, were giving satisfactory proofs of good-will.

The following is a memorandum of Sir Henry's showing his mind and views during that week:—

'Time is everything just now. Time, firmness, promptness, conciliation, and prudence; every officer, each individual European, high and low, may at this crisis prove most useful or even dangerous. A firm and cheerful aspect must be maintained; there must be no bustle, no appearance of alarm, still less of panic; but at the same time there must

be the utmost watchfulness and promptness; everywhere the first germ of insurrection must be put down instantly. Ten men may in an hour quell a row which, after a day's delay, may take weeks to put down. I wish this point to be well understood. In preserving internal tranquillity the chiefs and people of substance may be most usefully employed at this juncture; many of them have as much to lose as we have. Their property, at least, is at stake. Many of them have armed retainers, some few are good shots, and have double-barrelled guns. For instance, (name illegible) can hit a bottle at 100 yards. He is with the ordinary soldiers. I want a dozen such men, European or native, to arm their own people, and to make thannahs of their own houses or some near position, and preserve tranquillity within a circuit around them.'

Sir Henry was at the same time supported and comforted by the warm approval he received from Lord Canning, who wrote thus on May 22 :—

'I hope you will think that I have given you the best proof of the satisfaction and confidence with which all your proceedings during the last ten days have been viewed in the support which you have received. . . . There is a lull to-day; every preparation, present and prospective, that can be made here being complete; and I take the opportunity to send you one word of earnest thanks for your invaluable service. I cannot express the satisfaction I feel in having you in Oudh.'

It seems to be absolutely certain that Lawrence was from the first left entirely to his own judgement for guidance in his actions and measures, and was quite unfettered and unhampered by orders.

Up to the 24th of May, by which time he had made himself secure against a certain class of attack, no news had arrived of any measures against Delhi. As yet the Muhammadans alone, with all Delhi and its neighbourhood, especially the Gujars and other predatory tribes there, had thrown off the British rule. On the other hand, the Oudh districts were not yet disturbed; the mutiny was not extending, and the native States were giving no sign of joining in the rising. But there is nothing in Sir Henry's language or letters showing that he realized to what extent this was due to the precipitation of the rising and to the Mughal proclamation at Delhi.

It was not until the last week in May that the Oudh districts began to be disturbed. On the 25th isolated detached officers still moved from station to station with ordinary precautions; and the 29th was the first day on which intelligence reached Sir Henry of the raising in Oudh of the green standard of Muhammadan revolt and of a murder that meant rebellion. He had already begun, on the 21st and 27th, to send off parties of troops—generally of cavalry, but sometimes of all arms—to move over the Province, partly to remove the disaffected from the most likely seat of temptation to mutiny, and partly on the chance of employing them and thus turning them to some advantage, or otherwise neutralizing any evil tendencies which might exist and which would only be increased by idleness.

The following letter to Lord Canning shows Sir Henry's position and views on May 27:—

‘I am much indebted to your Lordship for your two kind letters of the 22nd and 24th.

‘I have refrained from writing, as I had nothing pleasant to say, and, indeed, little more than a detail of daily alarms and hourly reports. Our three positions are now strong. In the cantonment where I reside the 270 or so men of H.M.’s 32nd, with eight guns, could at any time knock to pieces the four native regiments; and both the city Residency and the Mutchi Bhowm positions are safe against all probable comers—the latter quite so. But the work is harassing for all, and now that we have no tidings from Delhi my outside perplexities are hourly increasing. This day (29th) I had tidings of the murder of a talhsildár in one direction, and of the cry of Islam and the raising of the green standard in another. I have also had reports of disaffection in three several irregular corps. Hitherto the country has been quiet, and we have played the irregulars against the line regiments; but being constituted of exactly the same materials, the taint is fast pervading them, and in a few weeks, if not days—unless Delhi be in the interim captured—there will be one feeling throughout the army—a feeling that our prestige is gone—and that feeling will be more dangerous than any other. Religion, fear, hatred, one and all have their influences; but there is still a reverence for the Company’s *Ikbal*. When it is gone we shall have few friends, indeed. The tone and talk of many have greatly altered within the last few days, and we are now asked, almost in terms of insolence, whether Delhi is recaptured, or when it will be. It was only just after the Kábul massacre, and when we hesitated to advance through the Kháibar, that, in my memory, such a tone ever before prevailed. Every effort should be made to recover Delhi. The *King* is a watchword to Muhammadans. The loss of a capital is a stigma on us, and to these are added the fear

prevailing among all classes regarding all classes. A native letter, recently sent to your Lordship from Bareilly, fairly depicts the feeling of the *better* classes of natives, and especially of natives. They think that we are ungrateful, and that we no longer respect their religion or care for their interests. There is no positive abuse in that letter, whereas in all that are posted or dropped here the chief ingredients are abuse and violence.'

CHAPTER XVI

DEFENCE OF THE LUCKNOW RESIDENCY—BATTLE OF CHINNIAT

AT last, on May 30, the regular troops at Lucknow mutinied, excepting the 13th N.I. The measures taken prevented their communicating with the city and confined them to their own part of the cantonments; and next morning they were attacked, defeated, and driven off into the country. In the course of the outbreak in the night Brigadier Handscombe and Lieut. Grant were killed. The *city* malcontents made no effort at rising that night in concert with the mutiny in the cantonment. Next day however a number of them attempted to cross the river and join the mutineers; but they were promptly met, checked, driven back, and dispersed by the city police, a large proportion of whom had been only newly raised. No hostile movement whatever was made against either the Mutchi Bhowm or the Residency, and the detached local regiments remained quiet. This rising at Lucknow was the first mutiny in the heart of India after the Meerut and Delhi outbreak, and gave the signal for the spread of the revolt.

Meanwhile, Sir Henry had been in ceaseless correspondence with the out-stations in Oudh, and the neighbouring stations of Cawnpur and Allahábád outside the borders of Oudh. Allahábád was the most important strategical position in Upper India, being the site of a fortress of the European type at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna ; and Sir Henry had urged the authorities there to garrison it with English troops, and not to leave it at the mercy even of the Sikh regiment which was already there. But this advice was not attended to, and such British soldiers as had reached Allahábád, instead of being kept there, had been sent on to Cawnpur. There, in like manner, Sir Henry had urged on Sir Hugh Wheeler—a soldier of great experience—to occupy the magazine as a defensible post ; but Sir Hugh did not act on this suggestion. Two reasons have been given for his objection to it: one, that the British detachments coming up from Allahábád could be cut off by the Sepoys, if they proved to be rebels, as their lines (corresponding to barracks) lay on the Allahábád side of the magazine ; the other, that the river was that year exceptionally low, and left the magazine with an inadequate supply of water. But in his heart the old General did not realize till too late that there would be any dangerous outbreak at Cawnpur, and thus had ordered back to Lucknow those reinforcements of the 32nd which Sir Henry had sent him ; and he was also forwarding on to

Lucknow, while the Sepoys there were rising in mutiny, a company of the 84th Foot, which had reached him from Allahábád. Further, it may be noted, as some justification of his view of the feelings of the Sepoys whom he was commanding, that when they did mutiny, they did not at once turn on the officers or the English garrison and community, but moved off towards Delhi to join in the conflict there. It was owing to the solicitation of the Náná Sáhib, and the inducements which he held out to them, that they returned to Cawnpur to join in the attack and take part in the horrors that ensued.

The outbreak at Lucknow was followed by the mutinies at all the out-stations in Oudh itself, as well as in the neighbouring districts. Bareilly and Sháh-jahánpur rose on May 31, Sítápur and Azamgarh on June 3, Benares on the 4th, Jaunpur and Cawnpur on the 5th, Allahábád on the 6th, and the rest on the three following days. These mutinies need not be described here. The conduct of the Sepoys varied greatly—from murder and maltreatment in some cases to assisting and escorting officers and families in others. The Tálukdárs and chiefs were most of them helpful, a few were the opposite; among the latter were those of Pudnaha, Mitauli and Dhowrera. The Rájás of Bulrámpur, of Birhar, and Gopálpur; Rústam Sáh of Dera, Hunwunt Singh of Dharupur, Rájá Hardeo Baksh, and the chiefs of Amethi and of all the Baiswára clans, excepting Bábu Rám Baksh of Dundea Khera—all of these, mindful of Sir Henry's

attitude towards them, aided and protected the English community. The Rájá of Morarmow sheltered those who escaped from Cawnpur; old Hunwunt Singh, a typical Rájput chief, the hero of many a story, protected and aided Captain Barrow and his party into safety; but refused, when urged by him, to join the British side with his clan. 'No,' he answered, 'I obeyed the orders of the Nawáb to avoid opposing your annexation, but I now hold myself free to act as I think fit.'

Thus far Sir Henry had dealt successfully with the local outbreak, and his policy and demeanour had influenced the majority of the Tálukdárs to helpful action in the outlying districts and stations. The position was now defined, and he was able to act with greater precision.

The mutiny or outbreak, as it occurred, being much what Sir Henry had expected, caused no material change in the plans on which he had already started. The Residency defences were advanced steadily, vigorously, and equably. The Mutchi Bhowm was now worked chiefly as an *entrepôt* for the collection of supplies, and their transfer afterwards to the Residency as soon as room was gradually provided for them, while it was still so garrisoned and armed as to overawe the city. The city end of the cantonments also were still held by the troops, in order to keep open the roads to the country and facilitate the traffic and the influx of supplies. His policy, in opposition to that of some of the most influential of his officers,

was to retain as large a number of loyal natives as could be safely done without warranting any grave anxiety in the minds of the English; both because they would help in the military defence, and also because they could most suitably perform many duties which the Europeans of the force would find most trying, if they were called on to undertake them. With this view he continued to keep at Lucknow most of the 13th N.I., separated off all the Sikhs and kept them in distinct companies or detachments, and summoned in from the districts selected Sepoy pensioners, sufficient in numbers to form two companies, partly infantry and partly golundázis (gunners).

The grief caused to Sir Henry by the losses and hardships of friends in the course of these mutinies, added to his ceaseless work and anxiety, caused him to break down on June 9, and in consequence to entrust the conduct of the administration temporarily to a council, with Mr. Gubbins at its head. On this, having secured a majority of the votes in the council, Mr. Gubbins forthwith arranged, in opposition to Sir Henry's fundamental policy, to send off the Sepoys to their homes on leave; but while this measure was being carried out, Sir Henry having learnt of it, insisted, in spite of his illness, on resuming charge, upset the order, and retained the Sepoys. On the same day, Major Gall, who had volunteered, left with despatches for Allahábád, escorted by some of his own regiment; but he never reached his destination, having been murdered on his way at Roy Bareilly. Next day

the military police, who were apparently excited by the order dispersing the Sepoys, mutinied, and were driven out of Lucknow.

By this time the battle of Badli Serai had been fought, and the siege of Delhi had begun; but Sir Henry had no knowledge of this, nor of the way in which the Punjab was beginning to aid the British, nor that Rájputána and other States were holding aloof from the rebel cause. He knew, however, that virtually the whole native army in Upper India had mutinied, the bulk of them being about Delhi; but that the troops in and south of Oudh had not moved towards Delhi, and were likely to keep near Oudh if not actually to concentrate on Lucknow. Cawnpur he knew to be undergoing a siege, but it was defending itself, and might hold out till the troops moving up from Calcutta by Benares and Allahábád could arrive to the rescue. Its defence, he felt sure, would delay any attack on Lucknow, so the preparations continued to be vigorously pushed forward. On resuming charge on the 11th he sent a note to Brigadier Inglis, and, referring to the threatened siege, said—confirmatory of his intentions from the first—

‘I am decidedly of opinion that we ought to have only one position, and that though we must hold all three (Cantonments and Mutchi Bhowm) as long as we can, all arrangements should be made with reference to a sudden concentration at the Residency. The treasure, the food, the mortars, the 18-pounder guns, the powder and ammunition—in short, all the munitions and stores—should be got into the Resi-

dency, and the 9-pounder Field Battery, with a few old guns, be left to accompany the troops at the last moment. The withdrawal will not be easy at any time, so the less there is left to bring away at the last moment, the better.'

Cholera now appeared to add to the troubles. Still Sir Henry showed a stout heart and a bold front. Supplies kept pouring in from the country, and a report—a letter—at length arrived, on the 23rd, stating, but incorrectly, that the Commander-in-Chief's force had taken Delhi. The event that had really occurred was the victory of Badli Serai, with the beginning of the siege of Delhi by the occupation of the ridge on its north.

This news, and the gallant defence of Cawnpur, with the singular backwardness that the enemy were showing, both as to facing the handful of English there, and also as to making any move against Lucknow, caused Sir Henry to think that it might be worth while, if only it deferred the evil day of close investment, to put on every additional appearance that could be suggested of our strength and of our determination to make a vigorous and forward defence; and accordingly, during the last week in June, he started a couple of small but heavily-armed batteries at the Mutchi Bhowm to command the west approaches. The enemy, it was known on the 24th, were collecting at Nawábganj, Bara Banki, whence their advance would be by the Faizábád road; but they had the choice of a very wide range of avenues of near approach, and it was probably for this reason

that Sir Henry did not fortify any positions on that road at which to check them. Of course he continued his defensive preparations, and the storage of ammunition and supplies.

There was every reason now for hopefulness. The Residency entrenchments were all in a state of advanced preparation; the supplies, thanks to the exertions of James and Martin, were almost overflowing; its whole outline was encircled by obstacles, which it would be difficult for any except a very brave and expert enemy to penetrate; and troops were on the point of pushing on from Allahábád to the rescue of Cawnpur, when, alas! on the 27th, Sir Henry learnt that Wheeler had capitulated. Of Cawnpur itself no more need be said, so well known and so sad is the story, but the news of its surrender and fall set the mutineer army near Nawábganj on the alert, and it began to advance. Sir Henry knew that its appearance would not be long delayed.

On June 29 the spies reported that the advanced guard of the Oudh mutineers from Nawábganj would be at Chinhat during the night; Sir Henry then withdrew the force that was occupying the cantonments and divided it between the Residency and the Mutchi Bhowm. He thought it advisable to hold these two positions till the enemy should press the siege closely; and he hoped that, commanding the two bridges and the intervening ground and road, he would be able to move the Mutchi Bhowm garrison into the Residency without serious difficulty, so long as the enemy

did not make the passage of the river elsewhere in any numbers. During the night of the 29th he directed that a force of about 700 infantry and cavalry (half Europeans, half natives), with ten field guns and an 8-inch howitzer, should start early next morning and move along the Faizábád road, to support a reconnaissance and to check the advance of the enemy's march.

In the morning Sir Henry, with some of the staff and cavalry, proceeded to Chinhat, but saw no signs of the enemy; he then resolved that should they be seen at Chinhat he would check them there with his own force at the village of Ishmaelganj, where the front of the road was protected by a swamp. Ishmaelganj lay on the north of the road (the left looking towards Chinhat), and another village lay on the right, which was the dangerous flank, as on that side would be the direct access of the enemy to the iron bridge and to Sir Henry's own communications, and also the route of his force. The neighbourhood of Chinhat was well wooded, and a grove of trees circled round from it, reaching on the left to the immediate neighbourhood of Ishmaelganj.

During the reconnaissance the force halted under the command of Brigadier Inglis, at the bridge over the Kokrail Nala, a short way behind Ishmaelganj, but did not get the morning meal which had been sent there for them. On the enemy being eventually seen, much later than had been expected, the British force closed up to Ishmaelganj—advanced parties occupying

that and also the other village—with the rest of the infantry behind them in support, the 8-inch howitzer on the road, and the field guns and the cavalry on the right flank. On the enemy advancing beyond Chinhat, in considerable strength, the artillery opened on them, and in a short time they retreated and disappeared entirely. Presently, however, they reappeared opposite our right—the dangerous flank—and again our artillery opened out on them and seemed to check them. But meanwhile a grave error of omission had been made. The line of groves that approached Ishmaelganj on the left had not been properly guarded—no pickets had been placed there to prevent the approach of an enemy unseen. Hence the rebels' right wing had advanced through or behind the grove, formed up in force in it unnoticed, opposite and close to Ishmaelganj, and then dashed into it in mass; and, having driven out the advanced guard, brought an overwhelming fire to bear all round, a direct fire on the 32nd in rear of the village, and a flanking fire on the 8-inch howitzer on the road and on the native infantry and field artillery beyond.

This decided the contest at once. The 32nd could not face the fire, and retired; the 8-inch howitzer was captured; the field guns kept the enemy at bay for a while, two of them however falling into the enemy's hands, while the gallant charges of the few volunteer cavalry and the steady conduct of the native infantry covered the retreat of the force, and

enabled it to reach the Residency and the Mutchi Bhowm, but not without grievous loss, the 32nd alone having left 4 officers and 111 men on the field. The guns of the Residency and the position of Edmonstone's company of the 32nd at the iron bridge foiled the efforts of the enemy to cross it.

Such was the disastrous fight of Chinhat, the catastrophe being due mainly, if not entirely, to the surprise effected through the neglect to post pickets in the groves beside Ishmaelganj.

During that day the troops that now held the Residency and the Mutchi Bhowm did all they could to make them secure. In the morning these positions had been crowded with workpeople, and carts were passing between them, but immediately on the rumours of disaster arriving these had all disappeared. The enemy began to cross the river lower down; by the afternoon they had surrounded the Residency and penetrated the city, and both the positions came under fire. The arrival of the enemy and the investment of the Residency were so sudden, and the state of the troops was such that the immediate withdrawal of the Mutchi Bhowm garrison into the Residency could not have been then attempted: the semaphores, however, next day conveyed Sir Henry's order to the Mutchi Bhowm to withdraw to the Residency at midnight. As a constant intermittent fire of shells was kept up all day on the intervening ground, the enemy seem to have evacuated it; and the removal of the garrison and the desired concen-

tration were most successfully effected by Colonel Palmer, with nearly all the guns, and without the loss of a man, the two large magazines in the Mutchi Bhowm being mined and blown up at the same time. This success was a great consolation to Sir Henry after the disaster of the 30th.

CHAPTER XVII

LAWRENCE'S DEATH. FINAL REMARKS

THE early hours next morning were spent by Sir Henry in going round the defences, settling the arrangements, and issuing his orders; after which he retired to his room in the Residency building. And it was here that the fatal shell dashed in and burst, inflicting the mortal wounds to which, unhappily, he succumbed on the 4th. The fatal occurrence is thus described by his nephew George Lawrence:—

‘On July 2, about 8 o’clock, just before breakfast (which was laid in the next room at my suggestion), when uncle and I were lying on our beds, side by side, having just come in from our usual morning walk and inspection, and while Wilson, the Deputy Adjutant-General, was standing between our beds, reading some orders to uncle, an eight-inch shell thrown from a howitzer came in at the wall, exactly in front of my bed, and at the same time burst. There was an instant darkness, and a kind of red glare, and for a second or two no one spoke. Finding myself uninjured, though covered with bricks from top to toe, I jumped up; at the same time uncle cried out that he was killed. Assistance came, and we found that Sir Henry’s left leg had been almost taken off, high up by the thigh—a painful wound.

We carried him from the Residency to Dr. Fayrer's house, amid a shower of bullets, and put him in one of the verandahs. There he seemed to feel that he had received his death-wound, and calling for the head people he gave over the chief commissionership into the hands of Major Banks, and the charge of the garrison to Colonel Inglis, at the same time giving them his last instructions what to do, among which was, "Never to give in."

In the interval, and amid all the spasms of mortal agony, he was intent on arranging for the effective conduct of the defence. His dying orders and instructions are thus entered in Major Banks's Diary:—

' Reserve fire. Check all wall firing.

' Carefully register ammunition for guns and small arms in store. Carefully register daily expenditure as far as possible.

' Spare the precious health of Europeans in every possible way from shot and sun.

' Organize working parties for night labour.

' Entrench, entrench, entrench. Erect traverses. Cut off enemy's fire.

' Turn every horse out of the entrenchments except enough for four guns. Keep Sir Henry's horse Ludakee; it is a gift to his nephew, George Lawrence.

' Use the State prisoners as a means for getting in supplies, by gentle means if possible, or by threats.

' Enrol every servant as hildár, or carrier of earth. Pay liberally—double, quadruple.

' Turn out every native who will not work (save menials who have more than abundant labour).

' Write daily to Allahábád or Agra.

' Sir Henry Lawrence's servants to receive one year's pay;

they are to work for any other gentleman who wants them, or they may leave if they prefer to do so.'

General Inglis's account, as entered in his report, runs thus :—

'The late lamented Sir H. Lawrence, knowing that his last hour was rapidly approaching, directed me to assume command of the troops, and appointed Major Banks to succeed him in the office of Chief Commissioner. He lingered in great agony till the morning of July 4, when he expired, and the Government was thereby deprived, if I may venture to say so, of the services of a distinguished statesman and a most gallant soldier. Few men have ever possessed to the same extent the power which he enjoyed of winning the hearts of all those with whom he came in contact, and thus ensuring the warmest and most zealous devotion for himself and for the Government which he served. The successful defence of the position has been, under Providence, solely attributable to the foresight which he evinced in the timely commencement of the necessary operations, and the great skill and untiring personal activity which he exhibited in carrying them into effect. All ranks possessed such confidence in his judgement and his fertility of resource, that the news of his fall was received throughout the garrison with feelings of consternation, only second to the grief which was inspired in the hearts of all by the loss of a public benefactor and a warm personal friend. Feeling as keenly and as gratefully as I do the obligations that the whole of us are under to this great and good man, I trust the Government in India will pardon me for having attempted, however imperfectly, to portray them. In him, every good and deserving soldier lost a friend and a chief capable of discriminating, and ever on the alert to reward merit, no matter how humble the sphere in which it was exhibited.'

Thus died Henry Lawrence, a God-fearing, upright man; a true king of men, resolute and brave, powerful in mind, noble and generous in heart. The epitaph on his tomb—by his own desire—ran thus: ‘Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty.’

It need hardly be said that the courage and steadfastness which he had inspired in the garrison, the practical efficiency of the defences and the brilliant success of the mining operations at the numerous posts that were attacked, combined with the completeness of the arrangements for supplies and food, enabled the British to defeat all the efforts of the enemy, and to hold out till they were relieved by Havelock on September 25.

Although he was not to live to see this full fruit of his plans and efforts, still he was gladdened by the first success—the concentration from the Mutchi Bhowm into the Residency—an omen to him, it may be hoped, of the ultimate result. But there can be no question of the exceptional influence which his arrangements and measures exercised on the issue of the struggle of 1857–8.

As to the Residency, it was entirely owing to his foresight and preparations that its successful defence became possible. It was in consequence of his pacification of Oudh, and his influence with the Tálukdárs and people, that those preparations could be made; and that in his efforts to relieve the Residency, Havelock was opposed only by Sepoy troops, and not by the people of Oudh; and also that on the

outbreak so large a proportion of the English community in the out-stations of Oudh were aided and eventually saved.

It was also in consequence of his resolute stand at Lucknow and his organization of the defence of the Residency that it became an immediate theatre of war, and hence kept engaged on the spot that large army which would otherwise have gone to Delhi, and so increased the strength of the mutineer army there during its siege as to have made its capture impossible.

His action, too, it was, in the Karauli adoption case, that stayed the dismay and allayed the irritation of the princes of Rájputána, who, till then, were well on their way to that bitter stage of hostility that would otherwise have excited them, on the outbreak, into joining the rebel cause.

Lastly, great as had been the services of others in organizing the successful administration of the Punjab, it was, in a large measure, his guidance, and the tone he introduced, together with the strong and universal goodwill that his personal bearing and influence created there, that led to that assistance and support which we received from the Punjab while the vital struggle was going on, and that conduced so greatly to its success. Not only does this remark apply to Delhi and the attitude of the Punjab itself, but also to the prominent aid given by the previously raised Punjab battalions elsewhere, as in Lucknow, in the Dinapore and Arrah districts, and in securing Allahábád.

Sir Henry, during the later part of his career, served under six Governors-General. Of these, Lord William Bentinck brought him into civil employment, and Lord Auckland into political. Lord Ellenborough, impressed by his work with the Sikhs, promoted him to the important charge in Nepál. Lord Hardinge accorded to him his heartiest confidence, and Lord Canning, during their brief period of contemporaneous office, gave him warm support. Lord Dalhousie, the ablest and most brilliant of all, did not adopt the same attitude towards him. This was natural, owing to the marked difference in their views and aims on many important points. But though he held him to be wanting in the special training requisite for high civil administration, he seems to have thoroughly and cordially recognized his merits and value as a Pacificator.

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